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Abstract 
We Didn’t Start the Fire: Gas Drilling in Pennsylvania Before the Marcellus Boom 
 
Marcy J. Ladson, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
The Pennsylvania Marcellus natural gas boom that began in 2005 caused a game-changing 
increase in global energy resources. It also caused significant national controversy, as the threats 
of gas drilling to land, water, and health became a big story. Why did the gas industry expand so 
quickly in a state with long experience of the environmental degradation and regional poverty left 
in the wake of extractive industry of all kinds? The Marcellus gas drillers successfully capitalized 
on the use of new drilling technologies and new geological knowledge, but these were not the only 
factors at play. In addition, the industry’s landscape of opportunity included the existing physical, 
social, and legislative structures that made Pennsylvania a drilling-friendly region.  Those 
structures are the legacy of energy extraction in the Appalachian region, especially during a 
previous state gas boom in the 1970s and 1980s. The negative impact of gas drilling on people and 
the environment during that earlier boom prompted the passage of Pennsylvania’s 1984 Oil and 
Gas Act, the legislation still in place when the Marcellus boom began. However, the 1970s energy 
crisis and the advantages of natural gas compared to coal had established gas extraction as 
primarily a public good. Only in defense of state and national park land did grassroots citizen 
campaigns and mainstream environmental organizations present serious objections to drilling. 
Although the 1984 Act established restrictions to protect people and the environment, the 
desirability of gas helped keep regulations relatively lenient. This study focusses on a variety of 
stakeholders in gas-rich areas of Erie, metropolitan Pittsburgh, and rural Appalachia, during the 
last third of the twentieth century. These actors, in coping with the impact of gas drilling then, 
v 
helped shape the development of the current gas boom, with all its significance for the future of 
fossil fuel use and global climate change.   
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1.0 Introduction 
“I am particularly interested in two intertwined approaches: environmental history that 
details the politics, policy, and popular consciousness that shape decision-making; and 
environmental history that explores the impact of those decisions on nature and landscape.”1 
Our Ladson family has farmed in Maryland and Pennsylvania for more than one hundred 
years. But each generation moved to different land, part of a widespread agricultural retreat from 
the pressures of suburban sprawl. In 1986 my husband and I bought our Bedford County dairy 
farm, which lays in a slender valley of fertile soil atop limestone bedrock, just one ridge east of 
the Allegheny Front. This region of Pennsylvania is on the border between the larger diversified 
farms of the central valleys and the smaller part-time subsistence farms of the Allegheny 
Mountains, where the inhabitants historically have strong connections to extractive industries like 
timbering, mining, and gas and oil drilling.2  
The previous owners of our place had leased drilling rights to a gas company in the early 
1980s, when there was renewed interest in conventional gas drilling in Pennsylvania. When they 
retired and sold us their farm, they characterized this lease, which transferred with the deed, as a 
benefit. No drilling activity had actually occurred. The income from the lease was enough to pay 
the property taxes.3 We felt no particular alarm about the encumbrance, and after the first few 
                                                 
1 James Longhurst, “’Typically American’: Trends in the History of Environmental Politics and Policy in the Mid- 
Atlantic Region.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 79, no. 4 (2012), 409. 
 
2 Pennsylvania Agriculture History Project, “Pennsylvania’s Historic Agricultural Regions,” Pennsylvania Historical 
& Museum Commission, accessed March 21, 2014, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/pennsylvania%27s_agricultural_history/2584. 
 
3 Louise Long to James and Marcy Ladson, personal communication, August 1986. 
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years of our ownership, we never heard from the company again. As several very busy decades 
passed, we forgot all about it. Then, during a mortgage refinance a couple years ago, a title search 
unearthed the old lease. We were appalled. I had just finished a writing project about 
Pennsylvania’s energy landscapes, so I knew about some of the problems involved with mineral 
rights issues and the new hydro-fracking technology. Most people I knew had heard of the 
Marcellus shale gas boom. The accusation that gas drilling had ruined the water wells in Dimock, 
Pennsylvania, was big news. As it turned out, the gas company had allowed our lease (and dozens 
of others in Bedford County) to lapse in the early 1990s. We no longer faced the possibility that 
someone else had the power to decide how our land would be used. It was clear to us that the 
farmers before us, who had decided in the early 1980s to allow drilling, had done so under a 
different set of circumstances and assumptions than ours. Their decision, in the context of that era, 
represents only one of the many events that eventually enabled the natural gas industry to capitalize 
on the geological and technological discoveries that opened up the tremendous opportunities of 
the Marcellus shale reserves.  
Pennsylvania natural gas is big news, with national and global significance. During the last 
ten years, a vast increase in natural gas supply and reserves has had a global impact on energy use. 
The expanded supply has caused large shifts in the power politics of the fossil fuel industry, which 
has been the basis of the world economy since the 19th century industrial revolution. Anyone who 
bought gasoline during the 2014 Christmas season, when the price unexpectedly fell below $2.00 
per gallon, experienced the economic game-change of a natural gas glut.  Natural gas will continue 
to gain global importance as fuel for the energy-intensive societies of this century. Clean-burning 
gas is a valuable alternative to dirtier fossil fuels while renewable sources increase and improve. 
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For the United States, natural gas is an important domestic resource, an alternative to dependence 
on imported petroleum. Nevertheless, natural gas comes with its own disadvantages and risks, 
which make its extraction and consumption highly controversial. All types of gas drilling 
contaminate ground and surface water. Gas leaks and explosions occur whenever gas has been 
used. During the last ten years, objections have centered on the hazards of new drilling techniques: 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.4 Despite these risks, Pennsylvania has maintained 
generally favorable legal, social, and economic conditions by which the gas industry can capitalize 
on new technology and the discovery of new reserves. The history of natural gas during the latter 
half of the twentieth century presents a number of the reasons why the fracking boom succeeded 
so well in the state.  The experiences of earlier actors shaped landowners’ values and views, the 
state regulatory climate, and gas industry tactics during the current Marcellus period. The social 
and regulatory framework that developed during the 1970s and 1980s provided the landscape of 
opportunity for the twenty-first century Marcellus shale gas boom. 
1.1 Natural Gas and Pennsylvania’s Appalachian Energy Landscape 
The ‘70s and ‘80s were transitional years in Pennsylvania’s energy landscape. The federal 
deregulation of natural gas pricing caused renewed interest in Pennsylvania natural gas, long after 
the bulk of the industry had moved to the Southwest. Expansion of drilling within the state was 
shaped by several critical national developments. The 1970s saw the rise of the modern 
environmental movement, the first energy shortages, concurrent economic stagnation, and the 
                                                 
4 Vaclav Smil, Natural Gas: Fuel for the 21st Century (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2015).  
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collapse of heavy industry in the northeastern United States. During the 1980s, a conservative 
backlash gained momentum against federal regulation and liberal social movements, including 
environmentalism.  Within this national context, state and local governments attempted a measure 
of regional control over the benefits and impact of drilling. Another important factor was the 
physical landscape itself. In western Pennsylvania and the surrounding Appalachian region, 
drilling occurred in terrain that contained the wells and pipelines of over a century of gas and oil 
extraction. This drilling activity was further interlayered with the effects of two centuries of coal 
mining, farming, urban and suburban construction, and other land usage.  
In about 2007, a new layer was added to Pennsylvania’s energy landscape. A natural gas 
boom began within the Appalachian regions of Pennsylvania, as well as Ohio, West Virginia and 
New York. These states sit above the enormous reserves of natural gas in the Marcellus shale 
formation. The boom happened when new technologies coincided with a geological revelation. In 
the early 2000s, two companies—Mitchell Energy and Devon Energy—successfully developed an 
efficient method of releasing natural gas from the previously uneconomical ‘tight’ shale of the 
Barnett formation in Texas. Then, Pennsylvania State University professor Terry Engelder, an 
expert on Appalachian geology, released his calculations of the vast potential reserves of gas in 
the Marcellus formation, now recoverable with the new technique. Engelder identified the 
Marcellus as a “super giant gas field,” capable of annually producing nearly twice the gas of the 
then-current output from all of North America.5  
Marcellus shale rock, and the methane gas within its pores, was formed from the 
compressed mud and anaerobically decomposed plants of shallow Devonian seas about 400 
                                                 
5 Terry Engelder, Penn State Home Page, accessed October 11, 2018, http://www3.geosc.psu.edu/~jte2/. 
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million years ago. The depth of the formation—up to nine thousand feet below the surface—and 
the low permeability characteristic of Marcellus shale had made it a limited and uneconomical 
source of gas to obtain by conventional means. Conventional wells are drilled into relatively 
shallow reservoirs of gas that seep naturally out of more porous rock and accumulate in pockets 
beneath capstone rock layers. Two relatively new technologies made drilling for tight shale gas 
practical. They are horizontal drilling, in which the well bore bends from vertical to horizontal to 
follow the rock seam, and hydraulic fracturing, known as fracking, in which liquid pumped into 
the well at very high pressure fractures the rock and releases more gas.6 
Fracking for gas carries negative environmental consequences for surface biota, the human 
community, and the water vital to both. In the regions where gas companies frack, the construction 
of roads and pipelines causes forest fragmentation and habitat loss for sensitive wildlife. Many 
aspects of drilling affect people living nearby, including the noise from high-pressure pumps and 
seismic blasting, the dust and degraded roads from heavy truck traffic, and exposure to toxic 
pollutants. Communities are affected by the characteristic social problems of boomtowns, such as 
housing shortages, increased crime, contraction of other industries, and overstrained social 
services and facilities.7 The impact of fracking on ground and surface water is cause for great 
concern. Each well requires approximately five million gallons of water to make ‘slick water’ 
fracking fluid—a mixture of water, sand, and many potentially hazardous chemicals. Once 
underground, fracking fluid can accumulate salts and radioactive material. As the fluid returns to 
                                                 
6 Brian Black and Marcy Ladson, “The Legacy of Extraction: Reading Patterns and Ethics in Pennsylvania’s 
Landscape of Energy,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 79, no. 4 (2012): 385.  
 
7For an in-depth discussion of these effects, see Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, “Mixed Fortunes: The Risks and 
Rewards of Developing Shale Gas,” The Shale Dilemma: A Global Perspective on Fracking and Shale Development 
ed. Shanti Gamper-Rabindran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 33-69. 
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the surface, it can contaminate groundwater and wells. Used fluid is often stored in huge holding 
ponds subject to leaks that pollute lakes and streams, or sent to municipal water treatment plants 
ill-equipped to cope with cleaning it.8 All these environmental problems make fracking very 
controversial.  
Nevertheless, natural gas use may have advantages as a clean-burning bridge fuel while 
alternative sustainable sources develop. Natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel to burn because it is 
composed mainly of methane, the simplest compound among the class of hydrocarbons called 
alkanes. It contains no sulfur, the cause of acid rain. Burning gas produces almost no soot. Perhaps 
most importantly, it emits far less climate-changing carbon dioxide than oil or coal.9 Gas is 
convenient to use—flexible and adaptable for many purposes. With sufficient infrastructure, it can 
be easily stored and transported. At normal pressure and temperature, gas does not have the energy 
density of solid and liquid fuels. This is not an insurmountable drawback except for use in vehicles, 
for which gas must be condensed or liquefied. For most purposes, adequate pipelines carry high 
volumes of gas long distances at relatively low cost. Historian Vaclav Smil argues that the next 
global energy transition will be the replacement of petroleum and coal with natural gas. Smil 
predicts (contrary to some popular and hopeful narratives) that renewable energy and non-carbon 
fuels will not be able to supply the bulk of the world’s energy for some time to come. Most 
renewable energy at present is hydroelectric (about eight or nine percent of total energy usage), 
and dams come with their own set of environmental and social problems. Despite real advances in 
                                                 
8 Black and Ladson, “Legacy of Extraction,” 386. 
 
9 This advantage may be cancelled out by the heat-trapping effects of methane leaks into the atmosphere—methane 
is a much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. The amount of methane leakage from drilling activity is 
currently debated, see Gamper-Rabindram, “Mixed Fortunes,” 65. 
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renewable energy technologies, power from wind, geothermal, and solar sources comprise only 
two percent of the world’s energy use. Sustainable sources are gaining in importance, but assuming 
Smil is correct about the timeframe for that transition, natural gas appears to be a better choice 
than coal or crude oil for immediate needs.10  
Like other fossil hydrocarbons, gas was most probably produced by anaerobically 
decomposed biomass that was subjected to high heat and intense pressure underground. These 
underground conditions were created by a series of collisions between continental plates, which 
formed the Appalachian Mountains.11 This geological history made the Appalachians into a vast 
treasury of fossil fuel energy—not just gas. For two and a half centuries, coal, oil, and natural gas 
have played a major role in settlement and development in these mountains—nowhere more than 
in western Pennsylvania. Especially after the mid-nineteenth century, Pittsburgh became the 
national center of heavy industry, which stimulated the extraction of fossil fuel. The Marcellus gas 
boom happened in a landscape that already bore the physical effects of centuries of extraction. By 
the beginning of the Marcellus phenomenon, many thousands of conventional gas wells already 
existed in the state—possibly three hundred thousand by the late 1980s, the number increasing by 
one thousand to two thousand new wells each year.12  The pump was primed. 
                                                 
10 Smil, Natural Gas, Preface. 
 
11 Ibid., 4, 13-14; For information on Appalachian geology: United States Department of the Interior, U. S. 
Geological Survey Energy Resources Program, “Appalachian Basin Overview,” last modified December 14, 2015, 
https://energy.usgs.gov/RegionalStudies/AppalachianBasin/TabId/127/PgrID/4391/PageID/2/Default.aspx#377211-
overview.  
 
12 David A. Waples, The Natural Gas Industry in Appalachia: A History from the First Discovery to the Maturity of 
the Industry (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2005), 223. 
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1.2 Natural Gas Regulation, Environmentalism, and the Energy Crisis 
Earlier drilling caused pollution that prompted legislation to protect the environment. 
Pennsylvania first enacted bills in the late nineteenth century to mandate the plugging of exhausted 
‘orphan wells’ to prevent methane gas seepage that had caused explosions, and to protect the state’s 
waterways from pollution caused by drilling.13 In 1984, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the 
Oil and Gas Act, which created an Oil and Gas Technical Advisory Board. The Act specified 
requirements for bonding, permitting, reporting, and inspecting gas wells. It set rules for safety, 
storage reservoirs, well casings, and distances from wells to other structures and property lines.14 
But the process of developing state policy for the industry did not happen in a vacuum. In the late 
1960s and 1970s, a number of national and international events had a major impact on 
Pennsylvania’s gas industry. These events included the birth of the modern environmental 
movement, the nearly simultaneous energy crisis, and the consequent changes in federal gas 
policy.  
Environmentalism was one of the important social movements that gained prominence in 
the 1960 and 1970s. Americans became more aware of threats to the environment at the same time 
as their increased mobility and leisure time resulted in growing interest in the protection of 
unspoiled wild spaces for recreation. They read such publications as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
on the dangers of pesticides, and Paul Erlich’s The Population Bomb on a looming Malthusian 
crisis. The environmental problems of suburban sprawl were becoming more and more evident. In 
                                                 
13 Julie Grant, “Historian Makes Case,” The Allegheny Front, accessed February 19, 2019, 
http://www.alleghenyfront.org/story/historian-makes-case-tougher-fracking-laws-pa#sthash.SlxBnVCr.dpuf. 
 
14 The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Senate Bill No. 402, Session of 1983, accessed February 24, 2014, 
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=1983&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=0402. 
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1968, a major oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, dramatically reinforced these 
concerns. For the first time, major news outlets printed and broadcast pictures of oil-soaked birds 
and animals dying on a ruined beach. That same year, the highly-polluted Cuyahoga River caught 
fire where it ran through Cleveland, Ohio, into Lake Erie. The growing national environmental 
consciousness culminated in the first Earth Day in April 1970, a national ‘teach-in’ that involved 
tens of thousands of grass-roots participants. National concern over pollution problems resulted in 
landmark legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which established 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency. Individual states also acted. Pennsylvania’s 
legislature passed an amendment to its constitution that established citizens’ fundamental right to 
a decent environment. Environmental consciousness motivated a shifting attitude toward 
extractive industries. 
Just three years after the first Earth Day, the 1973 energy crisis made resource scarcity a 
major national concern that dominated the decade. The problem of natural gas scarcity in the 
populated and industrial northeast prompted federal deregulation of natural gas prices in order to 
incentivize more drilling. Price deregulation and rising demand led to a significant increase in gas 
drilling in Pennsylvania during the late 1970s and early 1980s.15 That leasing and drilling boom 
generated environmental and social concerns, which resulted in the state regulation that was in 
place when geologist Terry Engelder published his conclusions on the potential of the Marcellus 
play. Nevertheless, the regulatory and cultural climate in Pennsylvania remained mostly favorable 
to the drilling industry, despite a long collective experience with the impact of energy extraction 
of all types. The state’s Oil and Gas Act was not passed until well into the Reagan administration, 
                                                 
15 Those were the circumstances and timing that led to the gas lease on our farm.   
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when petroleum had become more cheap and plentiful. Voters had rejected President Jimmy 
Carter’s call for an energy policy based on limits and restraint. The national mood had changed. 
The Act was better than no regulation, but still not very restrictive.  
1.3 The Case Studies: Rural and Urban Spaces, Public and Private Land 
This dissertation examines the history of natural gas during the latter third of the twentieth 
century in three areas of Pennsylvania: the northwest corner of the state that borders Lake Erie, 
the rural Appalachian countryside, and the urban and suburban landscapes of the metropolitan 
Pittsburgh region. Each case study illustrates the enormous difficulty of devising a sound energy 
policy, given the number of stakeholders and their complicated goals and motives. Among the 
sources of conflict over gas policy in these case studies, surface and mineral rights ownership, 
especially whether ownership was public or private, was a key variable that influenced whether or 
not stakeholders supported or resisted gas extraction and its regulation. Where the surface was 
owned by private citizens, or controlled by local leaders who treated municipal land much like 
private property, Pennsylvanians were apt to defend drilling as part of their private property rights. 
This was the case on farm land, and in the city of Erie. On the other hand, citizens and community 
leaders were more inclined to object to drilling on nearby public land. In the examples of Erie’s 
lakebed and the Allegheny National Forest, citizens strongly objected to drilling and called for 
better state control of the industry. However, the picture is more complicated in the Pittsburgh 
metropole, where the public/private distinction breaks down. Multiple layers of the effects of past 
extraction and accumulated infrastructure lay under the region, long pre-dating current land 
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ownership and uses. Especially concerning pipelines, the law of eminent domain has abrogated 
private property rights.  
The first case study, Chapter two, describes gas infrastructure as one of the many layers in 
the built environment of southwestern Pennsylvania. Gas use was historically viewed as beneficial. 
It was associated with clean air, a major issue to a degree not found in other parts of the state. 
Whenever gas supplies were reliable, it was the preferred fuel for industrial and domestic use. 
When the first gas boom in the Pittsburgh metropole ended in the late nineteenth century, extensive 
pipelines began to transport gas, first from the counties surrounding the city, and eventually from 
the American southwest. Gas suppliers also built storage facilities to help meet demand. However, 
as the gas infrastructure aged, it became more hazardous. In addition, as the city expanded, more 
people lived near aging gas workings. Despite the dangers, gas infrastructure remained fairly 
invisible to the residents who lived near it, a situation the gas industry encouraged. Existing 
infrastructure both complicated and facilitated the success of the twenty-first century Pennsylvania 
gas boom.  
Chapters three and four concern gas drilling in Erie, the gas-rich northwestern corner of 
the state. Chapter three describes the controversy over whether or not to drill for gas in the bed of 
Lake Erie during the beginning of the modern environmental movement. In this case, drilling in 
the lakebed was actually drilling public ‘land.’ The city of Erie, which owed its historic identity to 
the lake, was struggling economically and wanted to capitalize on the growing economic 
possibilities of the tourist industry on its shoreline. However, the state owned the lakebed area in 
question, and Pennsylvania State Secretary of Forests and Waters Maurice Goddard wanted the 
gas revenue to support the development of state parks. The United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, a federal agency, was charged with assessing the environmental impact of drilling the 
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lakebed, and had control of the permitting process if the project went forward. In the end, a multi-
state consortium of governors prevented drilling in Lake Erie.16  These events show the dynamic 
between federal, state and local power and priorities, all of which influenced the legal framework 
that was in place when the Marcellus gas boom began. 
Chapter four involves gas drilling on land in the city of Erie and the surrounding region. It 
examines the consequences of the 1970s energy crisis and natural gas shortages on the 
municipality and its citizens. During the energy crisis, amid growing poverty in the 
deindustrializing northeast, struggling municipalities and citizens drilled ‘back-yard’ gas wells. 
While some actors resisted any attempt to limit their ability to extract gas for themselves, others 
worried about the implications of wells within the built urban environment, and looked to the state 
to regulate local extraction. Individuals like those in Erie who wintered in the snow belt appealed 
to the federal government for relief from prohibitively expensive heating costs. Municipal and 
private organizations such as the public school system, the water authority, the zoo, and even a 
local convent drilled their own wells right in town, a real reversal from the public position on gas 
wells in the lake. Like the fight over drilling the lake, these events were factors in the evolution of 
key federal and state laws regulating gas, which were still in place forty years later. However, this 
case demonstrates the on-going commitment to private property rights—the right to capitalize on 
resources under personal control. It also shows the how the energy crisis reinforced the desirability 
of gas extraction as a public good, another factor that kept the regulatory climate in Pennsylvania 
friendly to the gas industry.  
                                                 
16 Lake Erie’s Canadian waters contain oil and gas wells, but there are none on the American side of the lake. 
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Chapters five and six involve gas drilling in rural Appalachia, again looking at the 
differences between drilling on private versus public land.  As in the case of Erie, protests against 
drilling, and calls for better regulation, were generally stronger in defense of public land. Chapter 
five looks at the decisions and experiences of Appalachia farmers. Rural landowners have a long 
history of subsidizing their agricultural income with the sale of mineral rights. That tradition, 
combined with the defense of their private property rights, and the need for cheap energy for their 
own enterprises, have all fostered famers’ inclination to cooperate with the natural gas industry. 
Nevertheless, they were also sensitive to possible environmental degradation. Many rural 
landowners who signed gas leases at the beginning of the Marcellus boom were acting on 
awareness that farmers had done so in the 1980s, apparently with no really adverse consequences. 
The possible impact of gas extraction looked benign, especially when compared to the legacy of 
coal.  
Chapter six shows that the situation was different in the case of gas drilling in the Allegheny 
National Forest (ANF). The many preexisting gas leases and wells in the large track of 
northwestern Pennsylvania that became ANF caused conflicting interests between subsurface 
private property rights and the public use of the surface as wild land. Federal park personnel, acting 
on legal precedent, prioritized sub-surface rights over surface use. Environmental advocates 
pushed for better protection for the wilderness from the gas industry. In the 1980s, the Western 
Pennsylvania branch of the influential Sierra Club focused its energies on wilderness preservation, 
not on policy for an environmentally-sound use of working landscapes. The Sierra Club’s actions 
illustrate the classic dichotomy in American environmental thought between the utilitarian model 
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of ‘wise use’ resource conservation, and the deep ecology model of wilderness preservation.17 This 
polarized habit of mind concerning energy extraction is with us still, nowhere more than in the 
debate over the benefits and problems of fracking for natural gas.  
This dissertation contributes to regional studies of working landscapes and the people in 
them. It is also situated in scholarship on unconventional activists, those who have a personal stake 
in protecting their environment, but do not identify with the stereotypically white, middle-class, 
urban and suburban activists that join mainstream environmental organizations. My work joins 
other central Appalachian histories that explore these subjects, many of which examine the pivotal 
role of energy extraction in shaping regional history.18 However, for the most part, this energy 
scholarship is focused on coal mining and oil drilling. The history of natural gas sometimes appears 
as an adjunct to the history of oil, in part because petroleum was viewed as more important than 
natural gas throughout much of the twentieth century. That view has changed, and natural gas is 
well worth examining in its own right, especially as it becomes more important as an energy 
source.  
My work is focused on the less-studied social and environmental impact of natural gas 
extraction in the latter half of the twentieth-century. Stories of the current natural gas boom that 
                                                 
17 More than twenty years ago, William Cronan exposed the fundamental problems of the conservation/preservation 
polarization in environmental thought, a legacy of progressive-era politics, in “The Trouble with Wilderness,” 
William Cronan, ed. Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1996), 69-90. 
 
18 Shirley Stewart Burns, Bringing Down the Mountains: The Impact of Mountaintop Removal on Southern West 
Virginia Communities (West Virginia University Press, 2007); Chad Montrie, To Save the Land and People: A 
History of Opposition to Surface Coal Mining in Appalachia (University of North Carolina Press, 2003); James 
Longhurst, Citizen Environmentalists (Lebanon, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, Tufts 
University Press, 2010); Allen Dieterich-Ward, Beyond Rust: Metropolitan Pittsburgh and the Fate of Industrial 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Joseph Pratt, Martin Melosi, and Kathleen 
Brosnan, eds., Energy Capitals: Local Impact, Global Influence (Pittsburgh University Press, 2014); Brian Black, 
Petrolia: The Landscape of America’s First Oil Boom (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
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center on people and landscape are proliferating in both popular and scholarly work. Authors of 
popular books describe the impact of the new drilling boom on people in Appalachian regions.19  
Others show the gas boom in national and international context.20 Researchers also focus on the 
social effects of the new fracking technology.21 Major newspapers dedicate special sections to 
coverage of gas drilling.22 Josh Fox’s 2010 documentary film Gasland, in which the resident of a 
Pennsylvania gas field famously set the water coming from his kitchen tap on fire, has aroused 
considerable controversy. 23  By contrast, the academic literature of twentieth-century natural gas 
history neglects the impact of gas extraction on people and the environment. The historiography 
is dominated by the problems of federal price controls, even in the case of the only work extant 
specifically on Appalachian gas. 24 Vaclav Smil, arguably the most respected and prolific historian 
                                                 
19 Tom Wilber, Under the Surface: Fracking, Fortunes, and the Fate of the Marcellus Shale (Cornell University 
Press, 2012); Seamus McGraw, The End of Country: Dispatches from the Frack Zone (New York: Random House, 
2011).  
 
20Russell Gold, The Boom: How Fracking Ignited the American Energy Revolution and Changed the World (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Gary Sernovitz, The Green and the Black: The Complete Story of the Shale 
Revolution, the Fight over Fracking, and the Future of Energy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016); Shanti 
Gamper-Rabindram, ed., The Shale Dilemma: A Global Perspective on Fracking & Shale Development (Pittsburgh 
University Press, 2018). 
 
21 For the impact on jobs, community infrastructure and services, and quality of life, see Northeast Regional Center 
for Rural Development, “Boomtowns and Natural Gas: Implications for Marcellus Shale Local Governments and 
Rural Communities,” ed. Jeffrey Jaquet, Pennsylvania State University: NERCRD Rural Development Paper no. 43, 
Pennsylvania State University, January 2009, accessed March 25, 2012, http://www.nercrd.psu.edu. For health 
impacts, see Simona L. Perry, “Using Ethnography to Monitor the Community Health Implications of Onshore 
Unconventional Oil and Gas Developments: Examples from Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale,” New Solutions: 
Scientific Solutions 23 no. 1 (2013): 33-53. 
 
22 The New York Times publishes the Drilling Down series to “examine the risks of natural gas drilling and efforts 
to regulate this rapidly growing industry,” 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/DRILLING_DOWN_SERIES.html. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette features the 
 award-winning Pipeline, “Your source for Marcellus Shale coverage and community,” http://pipeline.post-
gazette.com/. 
 
23 Gasland, directed by Josh Fox (New York: Video Group, 2010). 
 
24 Richard H. K. Vietor, Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations 
(Cambridge University Press, 1984); Arlon R. Tussing and Connie C. Barlow, The Natural Gas Industry: Evolution, 
Structure, and Economics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984); Michael Graetz, The 
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of energy, takes a very broad approach to the issues of natural gas. Vaclav’s work is extremely 
valuable for understanding the global implications of Pennsylvania’s gas resources, but it perforce 
neglects the relationship between the global and the local.25 My study shows the agency of regional 
actors within the context of federal and state policy. It shows the importance of scale in obtaining 
a nuanced understanding of the actions of different stakeholders. A close-up view offsets the 
danger of reaching conclusions through an ecological fallacy, an analysis that draws skewed 
inferences about individuals from aggregated data—sometimes called “aggregation bias.”26 In 
short, my work looks at understudied individuals and places in Pennsylvania during a period that 
set the institutional, legal, and social framework that facilitated the Marcellus Shale boom of the 
early twenty-first century.  
There is another type of literature that has influenced my research on the history of energy, 
especially in considering the individual, and who benefited and who payed along the way—
writings on the ethics of extraction. Not all this literature is academic. This past year we lost Ursula 
K. Le Guin, a particularly insightful writer and commenter on what makes an ethical life. One of 
her best-known stories, which I first read in high school, was “The Ones Who Walk Away from 
                                                 
End of Energy: The Unmaking of America’s Environment, Security, and Independence (Cambridge: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 2011). Waples, The Natural Gas Industry in Appalachia: A History from the First 
Discovery to the Maturity of the Industry (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2005). 
 
25 Among many other works, Vaclav Smil has published Energy in World History (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1994), Energy and Civilization: A History (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2017), and Natural 
Gas: Fuel for the 21st Century (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2015).  
 
26 “Aggregate data are often easier to obtain than data on individuals, and may offer valuable clues about individual 
behavior. Ecological inferences will therefore continue to be made. The problems of confounding and aggregation 
bias, however, are unlikely to be resolved in the proximate future.” David A. Freedman, “Ecological Inference and 
the Ecological Fallacy,” International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Technical Report No. 549, 
15 October 1999, p 5.  https://web.stanford.edu/class/ed260/freedman549.pdf. Accessed February 15, 2019. 
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Omelas.”27 It describes a utopian society that depends for its existence on the misery of one child, 
doomed to absolute isolation and suffering. The story was framed as science fiction, but it was a 
conscious expansion on the following quotation from the nineteenth-century pragmatist 
philosopher and psychologist William James:  
Or if the hypothesis were offered us of a world in which Messrs. Fourier’s and Belamy’s 
and Morris’s utopias should all be outdone, and millions kept permanently happy on the 
one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life 
of lonely torment, what except a specifical and independent sort of emotion can it be which 
would make us immediately feel, even though an impulse arose within us to clutch at the 
happiness so offered, how hideous a thing would be its enjoyment when deliberately 
accepted as the fruit of such a bargain? 
--William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” 
Le Guin’s story is about the classic question of what people are willing to pay for what 
they want. It asks who benefits and who suffers in the support of a particular social order. Those 
questions are the germ of the debate over exploitation generally, but certainly apply to the fracking 
controversy: Who gets rich, and who just gets the headaches? What sacrifice is exacted from a 
particular region’s human and non-human life, certainly to make some enormously wealthy, and 
to power modern civilization as we know it, but also to mitigate—to some degree—planetary 
climate disaster? Many stakeholders connected with natural gas extraction have argued that it is 
possible to do it right, or at least right enough, without creating social and environmental sacrifice 
zones.  Possibly. The effort to do so requires as complete a knowledge of the situation as possible, 
                                                 
27 Ursula K. Le Guin, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas (Variations on a theme by William James),” The 
Real and the Unreal: The Selected Short Stories of Ursula K. Le Guin (New York: Saga Press, 2016), 329-336. 
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including how previous attempts have played out. It is hugely important to understand the context 
and contingencies that have resulted in our current system, in order to inform energy choices going 
forward.  
 19 
2.0  Palimpsest: Natural Gas and Southwestern Pennsylvania’s Energy Landscape 
The citizens of western Pennsylvania live, work and travel amid a huge conglomeration of 
natural gas infrastructure—hundreds of thousands of wells, both active and abandoned, extensive 
underground storage facilities, and thousands of miles of pipeline. Inevitably, the presence of so 
much gas and its infrastructure leads to bad accidents: leaks, explosions and fires. Nevertheless, 
the sources of these hazards are often either unknown or generally disregarded by the people who 
live near them. The danger has not impeded the current gas boom. On the contrary, Russell Gold, 
senior energy reporter for the Wall Street Journal, stated that the extensive pre-existing natural gas 
infrastructure was a major factor in making unconventional gas drilling such a success in 
Pennsylvania’s Marcellus region, more so than in other places with similar geologic potential.28 
Preexisting gas infrastructure facilitated the Marcellus boom, but what facilitated the 
infrastructure, an integral part of Pennsylvania’s built landscape? This chapter examines how the 
complicated legacy of fossil fuel extraction, in combination with other rural and urban land uses, 
affected the gas industry and the people who lived near its works in the city and countryside of 
Pittsburgh’s metropole.29  
 
 
                                                 
28 Russell Gold, The Boom. Gold made the statement to NPR’s Neal Conan on “Politics of Oil” Truth, Politics and 
Power, Episode 49, March 2, 2018. https://truthpoliticsandpower.org/politics-of-oil/.  
 
29 For a thorough and concise discussion of the history and relationships of Pittsburgh’s natural and built landscapes, 
see Devastation and Renewal: An Environmental History of Pittsburgh and Its Region, ed. Joel A. Tarr (University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), particularly Edward K. Muller and Joel A. Tarr, “The Interaction of Natural and Built 
Environments in the Pittsburgh Landscape,” p. 11-40. 
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The natural gas industry contributes to most Pennsylvanians’ lack of awareness about the 
concentration of gas infrastructure under their feet, in part by keeping the location of most pipelines 
confidential. According to the United States Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, there are 89,296 miles of natural gas pipelines in 
Pennsylvania. Of these, only eleven percent are mapped. Federal law only requires that the location 
of large transmission lines be available to the public. The law does not require the gas industry to 
disclose the location of the rest, which include about a thousand miles of medium-sized lines that 
gather gas from wells, and the large remainder that consists of smaller lines that supply gas to 
homes and businesses. The leaking pipeline that caused an explosion in Beaver County on 
September 10, 2018—which destroyed a house, shut down a section of I-376, and caused 
numerous families to evacuate at a moment’s notice—was an unmapped gathering line.30 But 
would wider knowledge of the line have made any difference to the safety of those residents?  
Another recent dramatic and catastrophic event, in this case involving a large mapped 
transmission line, illustrates the dangers associated with the proximity of natural gas infrastructure 
to residents of western Pennsylvania. On April 29, 2016, a fireball exploded along Route 22 in 
Westmoreland County, just east of Pittsburgh. One man was badly burned while trying to escape 
the fire. The explosion destroyed one house and damaged several others. The road next to the 
intense fire buckled and melted, but luckily no passing vehicles were caught in the blast. This 
pipeline leak explosion probably resulted from one or more corroded welds. The major failure 
occurred despite regularly scheduled inspections, although the last one occurred in 2012. The 
                                                 
30 Davis, “Only 11 Percent”; Susan Philips and Reid Frazier, “Natural Gas Pipeline Blast in Beaver County Prompts 
Evacuation,” National Public Radio: State Impact Pennsylvania, September 10, 2018. 
https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2018/09/10/natural-gas-pipeline-blast-in-beaver-county-prompts-
evacuation/. 
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vicinity of the explosion contains a lot of natural gas infrastructure, including a compressor station 
to process gas, a thirty-nine square mile subterranean storage field with about one hundred 
injection and monitoring wells, and at least four other pipelines. Some older residents of the 
neighborhood had long worried about the potential dangers of living so near a major gas supply. 
Fortunately, precautionary measures to prevent the spread of the fire were successful. The pipeline 
involved is a large interstate line, built by the Texas Eastern Corporation in 1981. It carries a 
significant amount of gas—enough that the explosion and interruption in service had a noticeable 
impact on national gas trading and prices. Westmoreland County is not unique among 
Pennsylvania counties in the amount of natural gas infrastructure built in and under it, especially 
since the 1950s. Texas Eastern alone owns about 9,000 miles of pipeline, 2,000 miles of it in 
Pennsylvania.31  
The extent of the accumulated infrastructure is not really surprising; Pennsylvania has been 
“ground zero” for American fossil fuel extraction for the last one hundred and fifty years. 
Pennsylvania coal powered nineteenth-century industrial development. The first oil well was 
drilled in the state, leading the way for the twentieth century addiction to petroleum. Hundreds of 
thousands of conventional gas wells exist, some dating as far back as the eighteenth century. The 
twenty-first century Marcellus shale natural gas boom has affected energy markets on a global 
scale. These successive phases of energy extraction are written into the landscape of Pennsylvania, 
and the greater Pittsburgh region is an especially rich part of that text. The coal, petroleum and 
                                                 
31 Anya Litvak, “Natural Gas Well Explosion in Westmoreland County,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, April 29, 2016; 
Don Hopey, “Westmoreland Residents Worried About Effects of Pipeline Explosion,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 
11, 2016.  
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natural gas industries co-evolved, and overlapped in time and space. Each continued to affect 
subsequent energy-related activity.32 
The legacies of resource extraction, especially coal mines and natural gas wells, are 
interlayered with rural and urban settlement. The abundant energy sources concentrated under the 
hills of middle Appalachia had a fundamental impact on the settlement and development of 
southwestern Pennsylvania. The wealth of energy was a primary factor in the industrial 
development that drew hundreds of thousands of people to the region.33 Those layers of 
development and settlement form a palimpsest. Geographers have repurposed that term, which 
originally meant a piece of reused writing material on which the current text overlays older and 
partially obliterated script. As geographer Jasper Knight summarizes, “. . . palimpsest landscapes 
are multidimensional expressions of physical and human processes, which is one reason why they 
are so interesting to study.”  The effect of multiple layers of extraction, especially in close 
proximity to other rural and urban land uses, continues to complicate the production of energy, as 
well as the business of living generally. The problems of the aging infrastructure and abandoned 
workings of the natural gas industry, often in conjunction with the legacy of coal, have made life 
more dangerous for western Pennsylvanians. Nevertheless, people in the region have become 
accustomed to living around, above, and near fossil fuels. That gradual and long-term process of 
                                                 
32 Black and Ladson, “The Legacy of Extraction,” 377; Pratt, Melosi and Brosnan, Energy Capitals, xi. This 
collection of essays concerns places that have been more intensely involved with fossil fuel energy than others; to a 
greater degree they have been shaped by its production and use. It includes Pittsburgh as one of the cities that played 
an especially important role in global energy production, and was itself shaped by that role.  Joel A. Tarr and Karen 
Clay, “Pittsburgh as an Energy Capital,” Energy Capitals: Local Impact, Global Influence, Joseph A Pratt, Martin 
V. Melosi and Kathleen A. Brosnan, eds. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 5-29. Tarr and Clay argue 
persuasively that the most significant events of energy history in southwestern Pennsylvania have been the 
transitions between the use of coal and the use of natural gas. The authors use these transitions as a framework for 
the regional history of coal and gas, and their economic, social, and environmental impacts on the Pittsburgh area. 
Their study of energy transitions—broad structural changes in the use of energy—also reveals the persistence of 
multiple types of energy extraction and use in every period.  
 
33 Tarr and Muller, Devastation and Renewal.  
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normalization, amid the accumulated built environment of energy extraction, was part of the 
structure in place when the Marcellus gas boom developed. The palimpsest is a text in which one 
can read the history of how the physical structure of the natural gas industry evolved in the context 
of all fossil fuel extraction and use.34 
Fracking for natural gas in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus play may be new, but gas drilling has 
a long history in the state, and has always been layered with other types of carbon energy 
extraction. Coal was the principal fuel of the industrial nineteenth century, and addiction to 
petroleum characterized the twentieth century. The gas industry predates the region’s nineteenth-
century petroleum boom, and has outlasted much of its coal-based heavy industry. The share that 
each type of hydrocarbon contributes to global energy use changes, but their usage and technology 
co-evolved. The history of the gas industry in southwestern Pennsylvania, from its earliest days, 
demonstrates some of the tight connections between different types of resource extraction, which 
have resulted in the complicated and problematic legacy of natural gas. The infrastructure involved 
in the April 2016 blast was in place long before the hazards of fracking prompted a wealth of 
publicity on the subject. The results of more than a century of accumulated gas industry activity 
lie under the houses and roads of Westmoreland County, affected by other extractive industries all 
along the way. 
In this chapter, a series of examples show the co-evolution of gas, petroleum and coal in a 
shared landscape, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. This evolution was punctuated 
                                                 
34 Definition of ‘palimpsest:’ “A manuscript or piece of writing material on which later writing has been 
superimposed on effaced earlier writing. Something reused or altered but still bearing visible traces of its earlier 
form.” English Oxford Living Dictionaries, Oxford University Press, (2016), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/palimpsest; Jasper Knight, “Development of Palimpsest Landscapes,” 
Vignettes: Key Concepts in Geomorphology, The Science Education and Research Center at Carlton College, last 
modified November 15, 2016, http://serc.carleton.edu/vignettes/collection/67822.html. Knight provides a useful and 
succinct explanation of how physical geographers use the word palimpsest. 
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by a number of disasters, which nevertheless failed to ultimately discourage the expansion of gas 
industry infrastructure. In Pennsylvania during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
gas was a local resource for domestic and early manufacturing use. Salt-making in particular was 
associated with natural gas drilling. Coal miners began to accumulate information about fossil fuel 
geology that expanded knowledge of new gas fields. During the late nineteenth century, the first 
petroleum boom further stimulated the discovery of productive gas fields and helped develop the 
technology of commercial gas pipelines. The availability of natural gas in industrial quantities 
made it attractive to Pittsburgh’s heavy industry, creating demand which further encouraged 
construction and refinement of gas delivery technology.  At the turn of the twentieth century, rapid 
exhaustion of shallow gas wells made gas storage structures increasingly necessary, even after 
most heavy industry returned to coal. At mid-century, the importance of petroleum to national 
security favored pipeline construction, which benefited the gas industry as well. The energy crisis 
of the 1970s also stimulated well-drilling and pipeline expansion. Suburban sprawl after World 
War II brought a new generation of Pennsylvanians into proximity with the accumulated effects 
of energy extraction. Each of these developments caused accidents and loss of life. Nevertheless, 
at the end of the twentieth century, many Pennsylvanians remained relatively unconscious of, or 
indifferent to, the hazards from past and present extraction—virtual land-mines under their feet.  
2.1 Nineteenth-Century Brine, Petroleum, Coal, and Natural Gas 
Until the first half of the nineteenth century, Appalachian gas remained locally produced 
and used. It commonly predated the use of petroleum. Eighteenth-century travelers and explorers 
of the western Pennsylvania mountains like young George Washington reported naturally-
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occurring oil and gas seeps, as well as the ‘burning springs’ long familiar to the original Native 
American population.  Early settlers used gas from local wells for heat, light, and especially for 
evaporating brine (a concentrated solution of mineral salts obtained from wells since ancient times) 
to make salt. As the region became more populated, drillers often made gas discoveries 
accidentally while looking for water or brine.  Early brine wells in the Pittsburgh area also 
produced gas, sometimes with destructive consequences. For example, in 1820, gas leaking from 
a brine well on the south bank of the Ohio River caused a fire, destroying the entire salt works. In 
1830, a 670-foot brine well produced another accidental gas discovery south of the city, next to 
Saw Mill Run. Similar gas discoveries occurred all around the region, and the local population 
either deplored or utilized the gas with varying degrees of efficiency. Drillers often simply flared 
off great quantities of unwanted gas, which they regarded as a waste product. In villages and towns 
near productive wells, short pipelines made from wood supplied gas for household needs, and 
powered many early industries in addition to salt-making, such as brass-works; brewing; and brick, 
soap and lampblack production.35 
The fledgling nineteenth-century petroleum industry stimulated natural gas usage. Natural 
gas did not change from a localized fuel to a larger-scale commercial resource until after the 
nation’s first oil boom, which began in western Pennsylvania. In 1859, Edwin Drake drilled the 
first oil well in Titusville and sparked a black-gold fever that drew tens of thousands of speculators 
and drillers to the western part of the state. Nearly all oil wells contain some gas; that’s what causes 
a ‘gusher.’ Citizens in the oil boom towns like Pithole and Oil City made some attempts to use gas 
for domestic purposes, but more gas was wasted. Gas was burned off or simply allowed to dissipate 
                                                 
35 Waples, The Natural Gas Industry, 5-14. Waples provides a detailed summary of the early history of Appalachian 
natural gas in his first chapter, “Burning Springs—The Cradle of the Industry.” 
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into the air if the well yielded no oil. The necessary infrastructure and technology needed to control 
and deliver the gas from the well head to the consumer was missing. However, the expertise gained 
in the initial attempts to capture and pipe gas to towns in the oil fields eventually led to successful 
construction of the first pipelines of any significant length and capacity. Credit for the first 
commercial long-distance gas pipeline goes to the Bloomfield and Rochester Natural Gas Light 
Company.  In 1872, that company constructed a twenty-mile pipeline made of hollowed white pine 
logs to supply Rochester, New York.36  
Coal (ironically) played a major role in the developing natural gas industry.37 The ready 
availability of coal was one of the key reasons why nineteenth-century Pittsburgh had become an 
industrial giant. In a self-reinforcing loop, available coal encouraged heavy industry, creating 
demand for yet more energy. The highly competitive nature of Pittsburgh’s industry incentivized 
the use of natural gas, which became more convenient and economical than coal in the 1870s.  In 
the Pittsburgh area, large-scale use of natural gas began with the extraction of significant supplies 
from around and under the city itself, and in the nearby countryside. The famous Haymaker gas 
well, drilled in 1878, supplied natural gas to Pittsburgh from the Murrysville gas field in 
Westmoreland County, about eighteen miles east of the city. (That was the vicinity of the 2016 
explosion.38) By the 1870s, iron and steel manufacturers used gas in mills along the Allegheny 
River. In the 1880s and 1890s some owners of major Pittsburgh industries converted their plants 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 15-19. 
 
37 The irony is that expansion of the gas industry came at the expense of the coal industry—an improved gas supply 
translates to less demand for coal. That fact is acutely evident today; Pennsylvania’s coal industry is in a severe 
decline due to competition from cheap, abundant Marcellus shale gas.  
 
38 Underground gas storage fields were typically in areas containing played-out gas wells. The pockets that had 
originally held the gas were reused to store gas from other places. 
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from coal to natural gas, including Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and Andrew Carnegie’s Homestead and 
Edgar Thomson steel mills. 
The extraordinary inventor George Westinghouse, involved in many major transportation 
and energy innovations, played a major part in facilitating gas distribution and improving pipeline 
technology during the late nineteenth century. His efforts helped expand the domestic use of 
natural gas in the city. Westinghouse sank a gas well next to his own Pittsburgh residence. Gas 
from it exploded a short time later and burned for weeks, but he was not deterred. Westinghouse 
formed the Philadelphia Company, which (despite the name) distributed natural gas to Pittsburgh 
homes and industries.39   
2.2 Nineteenth-Century Farmers and Natural Gas 
The landscape and history of rural Greene County provides an example of how coal mining 
and oil drilling helped establish the natural gas industry. The county, located in the southwestern 
corner of Pennsylvania, about thirty miles south of Pittsburgh, is part of the hinterland that supplied 
a substantial amount of natural gas to metropolitan Pittsburgh during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Before natural gas became an important industrial fuel, Greene County had 
long supplied coal and coke to industries along the Monongahela River valley. The coal came from 
the high-quality Pittsburgh bituminous coal seam. Miners accumulated important information 
about the underlying geology of the region, which helped guide and promote the extraction of 
natural gas. The record of gas drilling in Greene County also illustrates how quickly old workings 
                                                 
39 Waples, 44.; Tarr and Clay, “Pittsburgh as Energy Capital,” 14.  
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became forgotten or ignored.  For better or worse, within the first few decades of commercial 
drilling, abandoned and forgotten wells became a common part of the Pennsylvania landscape.40 
Greene County resident Ira D. Garard wrote a memoir about life in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, which present a picture of gas drilling in an established, but not 
particularly prosperous, farming community. Some farmers supplemented their resources and 
income with the home use or sale of coal, oil and gas. Shallow coal deposits had supplied local 
demand decades before serious commercial mining began. According to Garard, the original oil 
boom of the 1860s that began with Edmond Drake’s Titusville well instigated drilling for oil and 
gas in Greene County. The oil boom prompted exploratory drilling all over western Pennsylvania. 
At first there was not much method in the selection of well sites. Wildcatters in Greene County 
like everywhere else were men who gambled on the hit or miss chance of a productive well in new 
territory.41 Oil was of primary interest at that time, but oil wells often produced natural gas as well. 
Concerning natural gas, Garard reported:  
Here and there over the county there was a well with commercial quantities of gas that was 
piped to the nearest village. The farmer collected a royalty on the gas and free gas to heat 
and light his house including an outside light, which was of the torch type and which could 
be seen for miles. But the companies soon saw that they were losing a lot of gas and 
specified that the outside light had to have a mantle and globe like an inside light.  
                                                 
40 County of Greene, Pennsylvania, “About Greene County Communities, History & Government, Pennsylvania,” 
last modified Feb. 11, 2015, www.co.greene.pa.us/secured/gc2/history/aboutGC.htm.  
 
41 ‘Wildcat’ drilling is the sinking of exploratory wells in new untested terrain, in hopes of an eventual payoff. 
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Garard stressed the importance of commercial development of coal, oil, and gas for bringing in 
cash that benefited the struggling agricultural economy, beyond the benefits to individual 
landowners.42 
Market forces and the expansion of pipeline infrastructure helped promote demand for 
Greene County gas. The first recorded commercial gas well in the county began production in 
1889 near the town of Waynesboro. At that time, uncertain gas supplies near Pittsburgh were 
already causing the shift back toward industrial coal use. Pittsburgh industries that continued to 
use gas chose not to relocate near the expanded sources of supply, preferring to transport gas 
through pipelines to their factories. Individual gas companies built and maintained the pipelines, 
which mostly supplied Pittsburgh, although some gas was transported to Wheeling, West Virginia, 
and other Ohio River Valley industrial towns. Gas, when available, was cheaper, cleaner, and more 
convenient than coal. Private citizens preferred gas for home use as well. These various uses drove 
increasing demand. However, the early shallow wells quickly ran dry, so constant drilling of new 
wells was necessary to keep up the supply.43 
To expand production, the natural gas industry drew upon knowledge gained from the 
record of earlier wildcat drilling, as well as geological information acquired during decades of coal 
extraction. In 1907 Ralph G. Stone and Frederick G. Clapp of the United States Geological Survey 
prepared a document, “The Oil and Gas Fields of Greene County, Pa.” as part of the USGS series 
on economic development and descriptive geology. The authors hoped to present a useful 
                                                 
42 Ira D. Garard, “Greene County, Pennsylvania, 1890-1918,” The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 63, 
no. 2 (Apr., 1980): 146. 
 
43 Ralph W. Stone and Frederick G. Clapp, Oil and Gas Fields of Greene County, PA. Department of the Interior, 
United States Geological Survey, Charles D. Walcott, Director (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 
64, 9, accessed April 4, 2016, http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/0304/report.pdf. 
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compilation of information to aid drillers in identifying promising new areas. They described the 
surface strata in various formations throughout the county and the relationship between topography 
and subsurface geology. They predicted the type of rock formations drillers could expect to 
encounter, and estimated the depth of productive sands. They constructed maps of named gas 
fields, which included the known active and exhausted wells that were drilled from the beginning 
of gas production in Greene County to the time of their survey, roughly between 1890 and 1905. 
However, the authors acknowledged that the inventory of wells was incomplete. Even in 1905, 
abandoned wells with the super-structure removed were not easy to find.44  
Stone and Clapp emphasized the importance of the Pittsburgh coal seam formation in 
aiding gas exploration. They explained that drillers used the well-known seam as a practical point 
of reference to identify promising rock strata: “It happens that the Pittsburg (sic) coal, which is at 
the base of the Monongahela formation, is the lowest easily recognized bed outcropping in the 
county and is also the stratum used by drillers throughout the county for calculating distances to 
productive sands.” The use of the coal seam as a reference was particularly important because 
information from previous drillers about the subsurface formations they had encountered was often 
sketchy or incomplete. The authors indicated the location of all the known productive gas-bearing 
sandstone formations—the Murphy, Dunkard, Gas, Salt, Big Injun, Thirty-foot, Gantz, Fifty-foot, 
Nineveh, Gordon, Fourth, Fifth, and Bayard sands—by providing their depth below the Pittsburgh 
coal seam.45 
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The history of natural gas in Greene County illustrates the palimpsest of natural gas and 
other fossil fuels interlayered with rural life. Coal mining and oil drilling helped the development 
of the gas industry, which shows the tight connections of all types of carbon extraction. In Greene 
County, and southwestern Pennsylvania generally, early gas workings were quickly obscured and 
effaced; the old text previously written on the landscape was hidden. Wells are not like mines, 
which leave larger and more visible scars. Those wells remained ignored or forgotten by the people 
who lived near them. It is reasonable to assume that if rural people had regarded abandoned wells 
as a particularly serious danger or liability, the USGS researchers would have had less difficulty 
locating them.  
Gas wells became a normal part of rural life. Nevertheless, the disadvantages of natural gas 
were apparent from the beginning of its commercial use. Oil and gas wells polluted surface and 
ground waters with wastewater brine, greases and sands.  Abandoned ‘orphan’ wells that lacked 
proper casing (the well shaft lining) or that were not plugged could continue to leak those pollutants 
into drinking water supplies. As early as the 1870s, concerns about water pollution prompted 
efforts at regulation. State legislation required drillers to plug exhausted wells to prevent gas and 
brine leaks. A few individuals and at least one municipality successfully sued drilling companies, 
demanding compensation and better management practices after drinking water sources became 
contaminated. Although enforcement was weak and spotty, the attempt at regulation indicated at 
least some public awareness of these chronic problems.46 
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2.3 Infrastructure: Gas Storage and the 1927 Manchester Explosion 
Natural gas transported from the countryside into the heavily-built and crowded city 
resulted in a different set of acute problems. In the City of Pittsburgh during the early twentieth 
century, the most frightening and immediate dangers from gas were the numerous explosions, 
which resulted in destructive fires and loss of life. A contemporary Pittsburgh newspaper editorial 
titled “Death in the Streets” claimed that natural gas explosions presented a hazard to the city that 
could only in be exceeded during a war. These explosions were a vivid lesson in the dangers of 
natural gas transportation, storage, and use in a crowded urban setting, especially as decades went 
by and the gas infrastructure began to age.47  
By the 1920s the unreliability of gas supplies from quickly-depleted shallow wells had 
caused most of Pittsburgh’s heavy industry to revert to coal, although domestic demand was still 
strong.48 Gas storage systems, although expensive, were necessary to stockpile supplies  needed 
for peak winter demand.49 In its natural state, gas can be stored underground, often injected into 
exhausted gas wells, mines or salt domes.50 Such storage wells were numerous in Appalachia, 
where the technology was invented and improved.  Even more old wells were converted to storage 
in the region’s depleted gas fields when gas began to flow in from the southwest in mid-century.51 
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In urban areas, gas was sometimes stored in a constructed tank, similar to a civic water tower. That 
storage method was abandoned as unsafe, after a 1927 tragedy that occurred in Pittsburgh.  
A catastrophic explosion occurred on November 14, 1927, in Pittsburgh’s North Side 
neighborhood of Manchester, part of old Allegheny City. The blast originated in two large 
Equitable Gas Company storage tanks located at the corner of Reedsdale and Fontella Streets. 
Residents and local organizations initially objected to the construction of the tanks as hazardous, 
but city authorities permitted the tanks based on the safety record of similar gas storage units. 
Nevertheless, local property values had subsequently suffered because of the perceived threat to 
nearby people and buildings. The concerns were unfortunately justified when the tank blew sky-
high, and took a sizeable chunk of the neighborhood with it. Later investigation reports blamed 
the explosion on an attempted repair to an ostensibly empty tank, by a workman using an acetylene 
torch. Evidently enough gas remained to ignite.52 
The destruction was enormous. The disaster took the lives of twenty-six people, including 
the workmen on the repair job; another 465 were treated at local hospitals. The damage to 
surrounding homes and businesses was estimated at that time to be about five million dollars.53 
Streets heaved and buildings collapsed into rubble that did resemble the aftermath of a bomb blast. 
Buildings within a half mile radius were mostly leveled, and windows broke and plaster cracked 
in structures as far as six miles away. Broken water and sewer mains flooded some streets. A 
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weather bureau located about one mile from the blast reported that tremors similar to an earthquake 
shook the area, and the noise of the explosion carried for fifteen to twenty miles. A fireball emerged 
from the smoke and dust, and rose a thousand feet into the air. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
recounted the experiences of some survivors:  
“The floor seemed to lift and I was thrown into the yard,” Louise Chamay, who lived 
on Reedsdale Street, told a Post-Gazette reporter. "When I got to my feet, everything was 
black. Everybody ... was running and screaming and then I fainted." 
"I had just entered my barber shop when the explosion came," Joseph Sharp said. "The 
ceiling bulged a bit and dropped just as I reached the front door. Two adjoining 
buildings swayed a bit and then seemed to fold up. Then everything got black."54 
Equitable Gas never again utilized that particular type of storage, but gas leaks remained a 
perennial problem even after the tragedy. The repair work that caused the explosion suggests that 
the tanks were starting to deteriorate with age; some of the city’s gas infrastructure was more than 
forty years old. The existence of large gas storage structures in a densely built and highly populated 
area ended in a worst-case scenario, yet did not seem to discourage gas use afterward. The 
continued use of natural gas for domestic light, heat, and cooking indicates the continued 
importance of gas in the life of the city and the persistence of that layer of the carbon palimpsest, 
despite the city’s renewed blanket of coal smoke. The history of gas use after the Manchester 
explosion demonstrates that natural gas remained an important energy source, despite its hazards 
and the alternative of cheap available coal. 55 
54 W. S. Brotzman, "Damaging Gas Explosion at Pittsburgh, PA," Monthly Weather Review (Weather Bureau, 
January 25, 1928), 11, doi:10.1175/1520-0493(1927)55<500a:DGEAPP>2.0.CO;2; Barcousky, “Eyewitness 1927.” 
55 Tarr, “Energy Capital,” 19. 
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2.4 Infrastructure: Mid-century Pipelines 
 To meet Pennsylvania’s demand for natural gas in the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, pipelines transported natural gas from the southwestern United States. As the Appalachian 
region ceased to be the primary hub of commercially distributed natural gas, and the federal 
government became increasingly involved in interstate gas regulation, the network of pipelines 
that crossed state lines expanded.56 In addition, patriotism and the demands of World War II 
influenced planners of energy infrastructure. During this time, the gas industry gained a significant 
power: the ability to exercise eminent domain to obtain pipeline rights-of-way.  This muddled the 
distinction between public and private land ownership.  
The first big interstate pipelines to transport natural gas from the southwest oil and gas 
fields to Pennsylvania, called the Little Inch and the Big Inch, were originally constructed to 
transport petroleum for defense purposes during World War II. Oil supplied through pipelines was 
less susceptible to enemy disruption. Even before the war began, President Roosevelt and his 
advisors recognized the importance of petroleum to the modern war effort, and the vulnerability 
of ocean-going tankers that transported nearly all oil at the time. Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes advocated for pipeline construction even if it was uneconomical.  He declared, “. . . in the 
event of an emergency it [a pipeline] might be absolutely necessary.” Even the oil tanker industry 
soon concurred.57  
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Despite some remaining resistance, the emergency-driven pipeline plan succeeded. 
Railroads were the most serious opponents of pipeline construction because they had a vested 
interest in the transportation of coal, a competing fuel.  Railroad opposition prompted federal 
legislation that granted interstate pipeline companies the right of eminent domain to obtain 
easements along their proposed routes. Railroad interests had initially succeeded in blocking 
eminent domain cases at the state level. In response, in 1941 Maryland Congressman William Cole 
successfully introduced a federal bill that became the Cole Act, which granted pipeline companies 
condemnatory power in the interests of national security.58 The subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor, 
and extensive shipping losses to submarine warfare—at one point enemy subs were sinking three 
tankers a day—prompted heroic efforts by the War Board and everyone else involved in pipeline 
planning, supply and construction. Despite incredibly adverse conditions, the nearly three-
thousand-mile project was completed in December 1943.59 Another major pipeline, this one from 
Texas to West Virginia specifically for natural gas, was also constructed during World War II. 
Again, the War Board quickly approved the allocation of material for this line. Northeastern 
manufacturing deemed critical to the war effort required the gas. After the war, this pipeline 
functioned as a precedent and foothold for southwestern gas suppliers seeking markets in the 
industrial east.60  
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As World War II ended, and the peacetime economic conversion began, the federal 
government classed the Inch pipelines with other surplus war materiel. In 1947, Texas Eastern 
Corporation acquired the lines, and repurposed them for natural gas transmission. Railroad and 
coal interests again opposed the gas conversion plan, this time joined by local gas suppliers, none 
of whom wanted to lose energy market share.61 Nevertheless, Texas Eastern succeeded in 
establishing natural gas lines from Texas that stretched across Pennsylvania’s entire southern tier 
and ended on the east coast.62 These lines were part of the expanding network of gas transmission 
built after the war—a kind of “golden age” for interstate gas companies.63  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s resurgence of the Appalachian gas industry, 
pipelines systems also multiplied. In Pennsylvania, the expansion of the gas pipeline network 
apparently caused no widespread public objections. Individual reports on the general acceptability 
of gas pipelines are supported by the coverage, and lack thereof, in the trade and popular press. 
One individual report comes from Sam Delassio, a landman in the 1980s, during 
Pennsylvania’s last big expansion of shallow-well gas drilling. A landman is an independent 
contractor who negotiates with landowners on behalf of an energy company for mineral leases and 
rights-of-way. Delassio was a well-known cattle dealer when the gas company recruited him. At 
least one of Sam’s neighbors, who was in high school then, remembered thinking how smart that 
was. Delassio had a good honest reputation and an established working relationship with area 
farmers. His trustworthiness was an asset when he contacted landowners about gas rights.64 
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Delassio himself claimed to have received no particular training for the job, and pointed out that 
anyone could go to the courthouse and see which properties were leased or not. He was in fact so 
familiar with the situation of folks in his area that he already knew whom to approach. Delassio 
related that all the people he contacted were in favor of leasing their mineral rights; they were 
happy to be asked. They would get a royalty for gas produced from shallow wells, usually one-
eighth the total value, or sometimes more in especially promising areas. They would get free gas, 
so they would have no heating bill. The situation was the same for pipeline easements—no one 
objected. The money was the important thing, even though Delassio was and is careful to explain 
that once the company has a right of way, the land does not really belong to the farmer anymore. 
No structure can be built on it, and any roads that cross it can be torn up.65  
Articles in Pennsylvania’s main agricultural trade press corroborate Delassio’s narrative. 
In the 1980s, Lancaster Farming presented pipelines as a familiar and benign technology, only 
opposed by those whose economic self-interest conflicted with a larger public good. In June 1983, 
the paper ran a story on pipelines, which focused on how simple, effective, and economical a 
pipeline is for transporting many commodities. The article stressed the long history that pipelines 
had. Prompted by a proposed international pipeline then much in the news, the article stated: “If 
and when the pipeline to carry natural gas from Siberia to western Europe is built, it will be just 
one more piece in the world’s vast, largely invisible network of underground pipes carrying 
commodities (even milk!) from one place to another.”66  
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The article implied a parallel between current and historic opposition to pipeline 
construction. It described the beginning of Pennsylvania pipelines in the nineteenth century, 
beginning with the lines laid for petroleum during the 1860s oil boom. At first, early efforts to pipe 
oil failed, because teamsters who transported oil in barrels “ripped the lines out of the ground.” 
Nevertheless, a subsequent attempt to pipe oil succeeded, reduced the cost of transport by more 
than two-thirds, and “an industry was born.” The only basis for current opposition to pipelines, the 
article claimed, was against plans to pipe coal in slurry form—the railroads were fighting to keep 
the coal-hauling business. It stressed that pipelines had minimal impact on their surroundings; lines 
were “mostly unseen, their rights of way replanted after the pipe is laid.”  The only negative 
environmental impact mentioned was concern about the quantity of water needed to liquefy coal. 
Natural gas was not implicated.67 
The editors used patriotic and other positive associations to further present pipelines in a 
positive light. They referred to the pipeline transport of milk, something all farmers were familiar 
with. They included a photograph of workmen cleaning a natural gas line, “so that the end product 
is as pure as possible.” They placed the story on the “Kid’s Korner” page, although the writing 
style and vocabulary level were similar to those in the rest of the paper. Just below the text was a 
color-by-numbers drawing of Daniel Webster, lauded in the caption as a fine orator and statesman, 
famous for declaring “Liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable.” They pointed out 
the role of pipelines in winning World War II: the “famous” Little and Big Inch lines, and a “secret” 
line under the English Channel that supplied fuel to allies in Europe.68 
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Lancaster Farming covered other positive connections between farmers and gas pipelines. 
It ran a number of articles about the heavy equipment manufacturing giant J.I. Case. One of these 
concerned a desirable farm machinery repair insurance service. Others introduced new and 
superior types of machinery. All mentioned that Case’s parent company Tenneco also produced 
natural gas pipelines. The paragraph concerning Case, Tenneco and pipelines was essentially cut 
and pasted into a series of articles.69 Another article discussed the connection between pipelines 
and the royalty income to farmers from gas leases. It explained that without a convenient pipeline, 
the gas well would be capped; the gas could not be extracted and sold. The landowner’s payment 
would be limited to a small “shut-in royalty” to preserve the lease. However, these “delay rental 
fees” did not compare to production royalties, “the stuff dreams are made of,” according to a 
community development agent.70 
Newspaper coverage of the topic also supports the idea of general industry acceptance in 
less direct ways. It may be possible that Lancaster Farming had an interest in promoting pipeline 
construction, perhaps because of the paper’s relationship with a company that bought a substantial 
amount of advertising space.71 In that case, its handling of the topic might be intended to guide, 
rather than reflect, public opinion. The boiler plate about Tenneco’s pipeline manufacture has a 
‘product placement’ look about it. At the same time, the paper also published numerous real estate 
ads, composed and paid for by individual Pennsylvania landowners and their representative 
realtors, which mention gas industry leases as an asset; these ads support the probability that there 
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was general public acceptance of gas industry activity. 72 By contrast, no Lancaster Farming story 
during the 1980s reported a conflict between a landowner and a pipeline company over eminent 
domain and related issues. No story covered advice to landowners on how to negotiate with 
pipeline landmen, as the Pennsylvania Cooperative Extensive Service does now. A similar search 
of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette archives also failed to yield any such coverage. 
2.5 The Tyhurst Subdivision, South Park, Pittsburgh 1990 
The final case study of this chapter examines an additional layer in southwestern 
Pennsylvania’s palimpsest.  Among the major changes in national land-use patterns during the 
same post-war era as the huge build-up of gas infrastructure described above, none had more 
impact than the enormous growth in suburban development.  In the metropolitan Pittsburgh area, 
new subdivisions superimposed another layer on a landscape already heavily affected by a century 
of energy extraction. A new phase of residential building produced suburban sprawl on land that 
had supported first farms, then mines, then gas wells. One such development was the suburban 
Tyhurst subdivision in South Park Township, near Pittsburgh.  The homes there, built in the late 
1970s, were spacious and modern. Many featured the new split-level plan, with integral garages 
and large yards arranged along curvilinear streets. South Park was a high-end suburb, a category 
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that continued to experience growth even during the inflationary 1970s, while Pittsburgh’s general 
population continued to shrink with the decline of heavy industry.73 
Late one night in December 1990, the blast from a natural gas explosion leveled one of 
these homes, severely injured its occupants, and caused the evacuation of the whole development. 
Like the 1927 Manchester tragedy, the explosion shows the potential for tragic consequences from 
the interlayering of extractive and residential land uses. The 1990 explosion further illustrates the 
entangled history of coal and natural gas extraction, the combined problems of leaking gas and 
aging infrastructure within a residential area, and the low public awareness of any danger this 
might cause. The Pittsburgh Press, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, and other local newspapers 
reported that just before midnight on December 28, 1990, an explosion and fire leveled a home at 
1268 Armstrong Drive in the Tyhurst subdivision of South Park. Owners Frank and Sandy 
Votodian and their two sons—fourteen-year-old Francis Jr., and nine-year-old Joey—were in bed 
at the time of the blast. The doctors who admitted the family to Mercy Hospital’s burn unit listed 
the parents and younger son in critical condition. The older boy, less badly injured, was in fair 
condition. 74  
By the next morning, the situation forced twenty-seven families in the neighborhood to 
evacuate, while the fire marshal, community leaders, and representatives from Equitable Gas 
Company attempted to determine the source of the gas that caused the accident. To begin, officials 
investigated evidence of a problem that occurred before the explosion. Two weeks previously, 
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some neighbors had reported the smell of gas. At that time Equitable Gas servicemen had not 
found any leaks in the lines that supplied nearby homes. The Pennsylvania Department of Natural 
Resources (DER), responding to those earlier complaints, had investigated an active gas well about 
200 feet from the Votodian house. The inspectors reported that the problem was a leaking valve, 
which was then presumably repaired. Nevertheless, as servicemen found no leaks in Equitable’s 
supply lines after the explosion, suspicion centered on the well. Equitable informed investigators 
that it purchased gas from the well, but did not own it. At first, officials could not reach the owner 
of the well.75 
Allegheny County Fire Marshal John Klaus concluded that the active gas well was the 
source of the leak that fueled the explosion. Klaus agreed with Equitable that the leak did not seem 
to originate in its lines. Gas had leached from the well into the surrounding wet soil, and followed 
the path of least resistance along underground pipes and utility lines. Gas had accumulated in the 
Votodians’ basement, and the pilot light of their hot water heater probably ignited it. Investigators 
detected high levels of gas inside another house near the Votodians,’ prompting the evacuation of 
the remaining residents of the Tyhurst subdivision, seventy–five households in all.76 
By New Year’s Day 1991, four days after the explosion, investigators had officially 
attributed the gas leak to the active well, which was owned by a person that news reports identified 
as Joseph Augustino (his correct name was Agostini). He was not arrested or charged with any 
wrongdoing. The local police chief remarked to newspaper reporters that lawsuits would sort out 
the issue of liability. Pennsylvania DER ordered Agostini to engage a contractor within twenty-
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four hours to permanently cap the well with a concrete plug. At that point, it looked as though the 
evacuated families could return home because all nearby houses had tested free of gas, and workers 
had flared off some accumulated gas at the well. However, the residents who did return kept their 
bags packed and nervously watched to see whether their neighbors would decide to remain home 
or to stay away. Even though investigators had identified the problem, uncertainty remained about 
the possibility that gas would continue to leak until the well was properly plugged.77  
Work to plug the well did not go smoothly. Township police informed twenty-eight 
families that it could take days or weeks before their homes would be declared safe. Tight security 
kept everyone except the work crews out of the area. The contractor planned to pull the old well 
casing, insert a new pipe to prevent more gas from seeping out, and pour a concrete plug. As the 
crews worked, they discovered fresh leaks. The original casing had been installed in the 1920s, 
and according to a DER spokeswoman, “looked like Swiss cheese.” The work was further 
hampered by debris in the well. An interesting find among the debris was a wrench typical of the 
1920s, further evidence of the well’s age. Digging reached twenty-seven feet below ground, but 
then stalled. DER officials ordered Agostini to hire additional crews and acquire the equipment 
necessary to complete the project.78  
The evacuated residents were frustrated and afraid. They did not know when they could 
safely return, and some felt they never wanted to go back to what had been their dream homes. 
Their homeowners’ insurance policies typically covered only fourteen days of temporary housing 
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in the event of a civil order for evacuation. Many Tyhurst residents would remain displaced under 
evacuation orders until the beginning of February. The township authorities had responded to the 
emergency in several ways—they helped start a fund for donations toward the Votodians’ medical 
expenses, they sponsored informational meetings, and they provided a group session for 
psychological counseling. However, they announced that the township could not be responsible 
for paying extended hotel bills or other expenses. As the police chief suggested earlier, these 
authorities advised the homeowners to seek compensation through legal proceedings, presumably 
from the owner of the well or other involved parties. Nevertheless, some homeowners felt that the 
civil authorities had “screwed up” in some way that contributed to the disaster, and now were 
leaving private citizens to cope on their own.79 
Frank Votodian was also anxious to reconstruct his life. In a January press conference at 
Mercy Hospital, he stated that he would go back to South Park and buy or rebuild, although not 
on the location of his old house. Insurance would cover the cost of building and refurnishing.  He 
declined to comment on the possibility of a lawsuit. Votodian was angry, but also thankful. All of 
his family were alive, and both Votodian and the director of Mercy Hospital’s burn unit marveled 
that any of them had walked out of that house. Flames had engulfed it within minutes and left only 
a part of one wall standing. The Votodians were also grateful that doctors expected them to fully 
recover with the help of skin grafts, therapy, and other treatments to minimize damage and 
scarring.80 
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As the weeks went by, the official reaction from the township appeared to grow defensive. 
Amid the ongoing public criticism, the South Park Township emergency management director 
claimed that the township had informed sixteen organizations and individuals immediately after 
the explosion. In addition to DER, these included county and state elected representatives, the 
Public Utility Commission, and the Red Cross. The township supervisors soon employed a 
solicitor to investigate how much power they actually had to control drilling, and to determine if 
they should impose tighter regulations.  Pennsylvania DER received legal authorization from the 
district common pleas court to take over the project of plugging the well and monitoring gas levels 
near the site because work under Agostini had not made satisfactory progress.81 
The evidence from the newspaper coverage suggests that Joseph Agostini was an 
ineffective and elusive figure. News reports variously misspelled his name as Augustino or 
Agostoni. His address was also uncertain. Different reports claimed that he was from Monongahela 
or perhaps Finleyville, both Monongahela Valley towns south of Pittsburgh. Agostini had owned 
the sixty-eight-year-old well for just six or seven years before housing construction began in the 
Tyhurst subdivision.  He apparently lacked the expertise or the financial resources to cope with 
the problem well. When he acquired the well, state law required him to either post a twenty-five 
thousand dollar bond, or pay a fifty dollar permit fee if he could not afford the bond. The money 
contributed to a state fund to deal with problems that arose with wells. Some of that fund would 
pay for DER actions in South Park. Agostini had paid the fifty dollar fee.82  
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The gas well leak and explosion were part of an interconnected series of problems for the 
officials and certainly the residents of the Tyhurst subdivision in South Park, stemming from land-
use decisions made long before construction of their homes in the late 1970s. First, it was hard to 
avoid gas wells. “Wells are a fact of life in this part of the world,” a DER geologist informed a 
reporter in 1991. At that time, DER estimated that 25,000 active natural gas and oil wells were 
located in metropolitan Pittsburgh. In addition, as many as 500,000 abandoned wells existed in 
southwestern Pennsylvania, some dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century. They 
were, and are, very common in residential sections of Allegheny and Westmoreland counties.  
Nevertheless, the president of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Association insisted that well 
explosions like the one in South Park were possible but very unlikely. He declared, “’It’s also 
possible that the earth could be hit by the moon.’” In addition to the presence of gas wells, the 
development contained another layer of southwestern Pennsylvania’s carbon palimpsest—a coal 
mine. A DER official claimed that acid draining from an old coal mine or seam may have caused 
the advanced state of corrosion in the sixty-eight-year old gas well pipe.  However, according to 
the state director of oil and gas management who also commented on the gas explosion, the cause 
of the corrosion was beside the point. In his opinion, real estate developers, not miners or drillers, 
were at fault if any problems arose from the proximity of wells, mines, and houses. In other words, 
the wells and mines were there first.83  
Local zoning authorities had in fact objected to South Park’s Tyhurst subdivision, which 
developed multiple problems resulting from earlier land uses. The township supervisors initially 
voted not to allow the development, because they had (correctly, as it turned out) anticipated 
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complaints from future residents about the strong smell from a near-by sewage treatment plant. 
However, the developer successfully contested that decision in court and went ahead with the plan. 
Then, flooding became a problem shortly after the houses were built. In 1981, work began behind 
Armstrong Drive to reclaim abandoned strip-mined coal land and construct a sports field on it. The 
reclamation and construction work disturbed the local water table and drainage patterns, which 
caused the flooding.  Yet another controversy arose concerning the neighborhood landfill, and that 
problem was also related to local mining and drilling. During the summer before the well 
explosion, M. C. Arnoni Co., owner of the landfill, had applied for permission to expand it by 
blasting with dynamite. Neighbors had already objected, but unsurprisingly, after the December 
1990 explosion they voiced increased fears. Even if the cap on the problem well worked, a 
dynamite blast might trigger new leaks. DER officials were undoubtedly concerned that blasting 
would touch off more explosions of accumulated gas in underground pockets. They instructed 
Arnoni to shelve his expansion project. They also drilled holes into the old coal mines located 
under the landfill, in order to monitor methane gas levels there.84 
Finally, in mid-February, DER determined that the leaking well was safely plugged by six 
hundred feet of cement.  In March, a group of Tyhurst residents filed a class action suit for damages 
from the events connected with the explosion. They accused Agostoni and Equitable Gas of 
conducting an “‘ultra-hazardous activity’” and “creating a ‘private nuisance,’” by operating a gas 
well in a residential area. The suit named Darcy Production and Operations, the company initially 
called in to repair the leaking valve before the explosion, and to attempt plugging the well 
afterward. The suit also named the following individuals and businesses for failing to inform 
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home-buyers of the well’s existence: Donald Bierworth, owner and developer of the Tyhurst Plan; 
Russell Industries, owner of the well-site land; and Ryan Homes, the construction company that 
erected the houses.  A few weeks later, a second group of residents filed a similar suit, which the 
courts allowed to join the first in a consolidated action. The Votodian family hired an attorney, but 
did not join the class action suit. At that point, public reporting of the affair appears to end.85  
The narrative of the explosion that leveled the Votodians’ home and threatened an entire 
neighborhood prompts a question. How is it that although gas wells and other gas infrastructure 
were so ubiquitous in Allegheny County, and had been for over a century, they were for the most 
part invisible to both private citizens and public officials? When the Tyhurst residents smelled gas, 
they did not call the police or try to find the owner of the well located only a few hundred feet 
from their homes. Instead, they assumed that the problem was in the utility delivery system and 
called Equitable, their local supplier. The residents were angry that neither the builder nor the real 
estate developer had informed them that such a well existed within the subdivision, but it evidently 
had never occurred to anyone to ask. Even before that, when the township supervisors tried to 
prevent the subdivision’s initial development, they did not raise the issue of the well’s existence 
to add weight to their objections. Only after the Votodians’ house blew up did anyone take the 
trouble to locate a number of abandoned gas wells in the neighborhood. Only after the explosion 
did DER nix the landfill owner’s plans to excavate using dynamite, although presumably the 
agency would have had better access to information about the existence of possible hazards than 
other actors. It is difficult to know what answers to this question the affected parties might have 
supplied, without interviews with those involved. The lack of further news coverage and the 
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absence of any record of court proceedings suggest that the civil suit was settled out of court, 
possibly with a non-disclosure clause in whatever agreement the parties reached.86 
Suburban development in South Park had overwritten the record of earlier landscape use. 
The older script was there, but more obscure. The evidence of past coal mining was hidden under 
reclamation work, a ball field, and a landfill. The gas well was also from another era, and so 
unobtrusive that people who moved to the area had either not noticed it or had disregarded it while 
choosing a home.  Even DER officials and people in the gas industry, possessed of more 
knowledge about past energy extraction, viewed the old workings as an ordinary part of the 
landscape.  After all, for every well that figured in a dramatic newspaper article, perhaps thousands 
of others operated throughout their productive existences without causing any easily perceptible 
problems. Despite the December 1990 explosion, there was no drastic exodus by the residents of 
South Park.  Today, Armstrong Avenue remains a pleasant, well-kept street. The house now 
standing at 1268 Armstrong looks like a nice place to live.  
2.6 Conclusion 
At this writing, in spring 2019, pipeline construction appears more newsworthy than well 
drilling. Protests by the Standing Rock Sioux and other environmental groups drew national and 
international attention to the Dakota Access and the Keystone XL oil pipelines, meant to carry 
crude from the Bakken oil fields and the Alberta tar sands to refineries on the Texas Gulf. The 
controversy gained fresh attention when a January 2017 memorandum by President Donald J. 
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Trump revived these projects, which had halted under the previous Obama administration. 
Students attending a recent lecture of mine on energy issues were familiar with the pipeline 
controversy. However, they were very hazy on gas drilling—what fracking meant, for example, or 
what the Marcellus shale was.  
In Pennsylvania, pipelines have also become controversial. After the dramatic drop in 
energy prices circa 2014 caused by a natural gas glut, the gas industry focused on the infrastructure 
necessary to expand its markets. Unlike in the past, the industry faced substantial and well-
publicized protest from residents of Pennsylvania’s towns and farms along proposed pipeline 
routes.87 In response to the tremendous surge in planned pipelines, nearly 3,000 miles of line in 
Pennsylvania’s Marcellus basin, the state extension service prepared a fact sheet for affected 
landowners. It anticipated questions about the process of pipeline construction, how they are 
regulated and inspected, and important points to negotiate. Despite its advice on how to negotiate, 
there is no advice on how to prevent a pipeline from being built on one’s land. The fact sheet 
emphasized that in the state of Pennsylvania, pipeline companies have the right of condemnation, 
or eminent domain, to secure easements for an interstate pipeline. Companies deemed public 
utilities, which includes all companies that deliver any sort of energy to consumers, may condemn 
land for a pipeline easement whether the line is interstate or not.88 
My own family was recently faced with the possibility of living over a major new gas 
pipeline. Despite the new negative public attitude (at least among some groups of Pennsylvania 
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citizens) toward expansion of the fossil fuel network, our situation was governed by the events 
from past decades, especially events that had determined the location of existing gas infrastructure, 
and the ability of pipeline companies to condemn land. In the summer of 2015 a man came to our 
Bedford County farm on behalf of Spectra Energy (the company which has acquired Texas Eastern 
of Big Inch and Little Inch fame). Spectra was planning a new pipeline route. Part of it would run 
through Cumberland Valley Township, a narrow valley between Wills Mountain and Evitts 
Mountain in southern Bedford County, and right through the center of our farm. The line would 
connect with the Texas Eastern pumping station on the old Inch line, just to our north, and extend 
south to the Carolinas. Spectra wanted permission to survey the route on our land.  
I did not want to let Spectra’s landman into the house, although in hindsight that decision 
would deny me a kind of research opportunity. Several neighbors and my husband Jim met with 
the landman at another affected farm.  Afterward, Jim thought I should hear what the man had to 
say, and we invited him back. He brought maps generated from court house deed records; the maps 
were bad. He said that the company wanted a hundred foot right of way. The proposed route went 
between our house and Evitts Creek, which are perhaps sixty feet apart. At that point I gave in, 
and signed the survey permission. It seemed to me that if Spectra was going to run a pipeline 
through my kitchen, we should both know about it ahead of time.89  
No surveyors arrived, and we heard unofficially that the project has been shelved.  If the 
company had proceeded, we would probably not have been able to refuse permission, or even 
negotiate from a position of strength.  Because events seventy-five years ago—especially the 
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wartime emergency, and opposition from railroads—gave Texas Eastern the authority to build the 
Inch lines how and where they did, our valley became a logical location for another pipeline. Only 
the amount of compensation would be in question. How much would the pipeline devalue our 
farm? Like many farmers, our main asset is land. If circumstances require us to sell out, potential 
buyers reading the real estate disclosure form would certainly sit up and take notice of a major gas 
pipeline.  Their lender would, too. Times have changed. Back in the 1980s when we bought our 
land, we were as indifferent as possible to the implications of the natural gas pipeline pumping 
station only seven miles away. We were not much different from the officials, builders, and 
homeowners in South Park.  
For over two centuries, the physical structures of fossil fuel extraction have accumulated 
in the Pennsylvania landscape. The infrastructure of natural gas, which developed in tandem with 
the extraction of coal and petroleum, created what engineers call “path dependence.” This phrase 
is shorthand for the way technologies tend to develop as a result of their existing structures. In 
other words, decisions in the past—the history of a technology written in the landscape—created 
a path of least resistance for current and future development. Less tangibly, but just as importantly, 
the beliefs and values of Individuals and institutions operate in a similar way. 90 In the southwestern 
Pennsylvania gas fields and the urban spaces they supplied, past events helped create a climate of 
acceptance for gas extraction and use, despite the repeated evidence of disastrous consequences. 
A strong inertial force, born of long coexistence, accustomed residents of the Pittsburgh metropole 
to the workings of the gas industry.  The rights and choices of surface owners were a lesser issue, 
as the following chapters show. 
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3.0 Erie, Pennsylvania: Drilling the Lake 
Lake Erie is beautiful. It gives land-locked Pennsylvania its only “seashore.” Presque Isle, 
a peninsula arching out from the Erie coast, is Pennsylvania’s largest and most visited state park. 
It is ecologically diverse, sheltering more of Pennsylvania’s rare and endangered bird species than 
any place of similar size in the state. It features rich and varied habitat—shoreline, dunes, marshes, 
ponds, shrubby thicket, and climax forest. The most fragile habitat contains many threatened plant 
species.91  
Erie, town and county on the lake, had significant strategic and economic importance from 
the mid-eighteenth century up through the mid-twentieth century. Its natural resources and 
location, later augmented by canals and railroads, made it a military, commercial and industrial 
asset important far outside the immediate region. Traditionally, Erie based its civic pride on its 
contribution to national economic expansion. Numerous regional histories published in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflect that pride and prosperity.92 But the source of Erie’s 
prosperity was also the source of residential, manufacturing, and agricultural waste. By the mid-
twentieth century, Lake Erie was severely polluted, its fishing industry declining, and its beaches 
unsafe.  
During the 1960s at the beginning of the modern environmental movement, serious efforts 
to address and improve the lake’s degraded condition coincided with a local fight against state 
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plans to drill for natural gas in the lake bed off Presque Isle. Although Erie people who opposed 
drilling had little direct power to affect Pennsylvania’s plans, outside events raised the national 
environmental consciousness enough to influence the state’s policy and stop lake-bed drilling. 
However, the energy shortages of the 1970s and natural gas price deregulation at the federal level 
renewed state interest in drilling the lake. At the same time, Erie was part of the deindustrialization 
and impoverishment of the northeastern United States ‘Rust Belt.’ Issues of economic necessity 
and civic pride complicated the local attitude toward gas extraction. Most Erie residents and 
leaders remained opposed to lake-bed drilling, and in the end multi-state and cross-border 
initiatives prevented off-shore gas extraction. However, the city allowed extensive unregulated 
onshore wells, until the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act of 1984 set a number of limits. To date, 
there are no gas or oil wells in Lake Erie along the Pennsylvania shore, although drilling is 
permitted under state law. A federal ban has prevented off-shore drilling, at least for the present.93 
This chapter, the first part of a study of natural gas extraction in Erie, Pennsylvania, 
involves the controversy over plans to drill for gas in the bed of Lake Erie from 1968 to 1982. It 
follows actors at the local, state, and federal level—Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Fish and Waters, Dr. Maurice Goddard, who initiated the plan; the citizens and leadership of Erie, 
who opposed the plan; and the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the agency in charge of 
the permitting process at the federal level. All three had their aims and strategies affected by nearly 
simultaneous mandates to protect the environment and extract more energy. What happened in 
Erie illustrates the importance of scale in resource regulation.  At the national or state scale, a cost-
benefit analysis of environmental protection versus energy extraction may be quite different from 
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how the impacts and advantages look on the local level, as they did in Erie. The fight over drilling 
Erie’s lakebed illustrates the convergences and contingencies that shaped twentieth-century 
drilling policy Pennsylvania.  
3.1 Geography, Geology, and Pride 
 Erie’s geography and geology have largely shaped its civic identity and pride as it evolved 
over the last three centuries--as a transportation hub, a resource extraction and industrial center, 
and a recreational mecca. The city owes its existence to the peninsula that forms a natural harbor 
on Lake Erie’s shore. Presque Isle peninsula is an arc-shaped sand spit of glacial moraine 
sediments, left behind by the melting glaciers that also filled the lake with water. The peninsula is 
connected to the mainland by a very slender neck where water occasionally breaks through, 
transforming the wider section into an actual island several times during the last hundred years. 
Wind and wave action cause the whole peninsula to gradually shift eastward, at the rate of about 
a half mile per century. The constantly changing shoreline contributes to the diversity and fragility 
of Presque Isle’s ecosystem.94 
The drainage patterns extending south of the Lake Erie shoreline, also shaped primarily by 
the glaciers of the last ice age, made Erie an important link in extensive transportation systems in 
the northeastern United States. The glaciers deposited layers of sand, gravel and fine glacial till 
over fairly level strata of Upper Devonian and Lower Mississippian shales and sandstones. The 
flat lake plain ends at an escarpment that rises to the rolling upland Appalachian Plateau. An upland 
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drainage divide runs roughly parallel to the escarpment. The divide is not high, but it serves to 
make Erie County the border between two major drainage basins and navigation systems. It sends 
some streams and rivers north into Lake Erie and the Great Lakes drainage basin. Others flow 
south via French Creek into the Allegheny River, whose waters join the Monongahela River at 
Pittsburgh to form the Ohio, a tributary of the Mississippi.95  
Erie’s advantages as a transportation hub connecting two great river systems made it a 
natural location for the industry that supported its growth into an important city. Unfortunately, by 
the mid twentieth century, industrial pollution threatened the city’s drinking water supply. Because 
the groundwater under the lake plain tends to be saline, except at very shallow depth, most public 
water came from Lake Erie and other surface water. A serious decrease in fish catches underscored 
the decline in lake water quality. In order to deal with the problem, some industries experimented 
with a different waste disposal method of injecting waste into deep wells instead of allowing it to 
run into the lake.96 Waste injection wells would later create problems of their own. 
Resource extraction was another part of Erie’s economy. In the 1960s, natural gas was an 
increasingly important regional source of extractive wealth, but not the largest. At that time, sand 
and gravel were Erie’s biggest commercial mineral asset, used for road-building, masonry, and 
cement. Half a million tons were sold annually. As a gas producer in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Erie was “small but steady” with about 325 wells drilled over that fifty-year period. 
Exploratory wells drilled in 1961 opened up new sources, and by 1965 commercial producers had 
sunk more than 100 new wells. However, Erie remained a net importer of natural gas from the 
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southwestern states. During the summer, gas was stockpiled underground in old exhausted gas 
workings.97  
Erie has its own public narrative, which affect its citizens’ perception of natural resource 
extraction. Erie’s history and historiography celebrates its long significance in national and 
international affairs. Mid-twentieth-century Erie as a municipality mirrored the indignation of 
individual residents of the region, whose standing and opportunities had been reduced by broad 
systemic forces—sometimes in ways that are ironic. The civic identity of Erie was built on trade, 
resource extraction, and especially industrialization, all highly polluting. Yet by the 1960s the city 
had compelling reasons to preserve its natural environment.98  
Erie’s importance for trade and defense was recognized early, certainly by the time of the 
eighteenth-century French and British wars of empire. The Erie site was a key link in the water 
route from the Atlantic seaboard all the way to New Orleans. The excellent natural harbor in 
Presque Isle Bay was one of the best in the Great Lakes/Saint Lawrence River system, which links 
the American interior with the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, the harbor is only a fourteen-mile 
portage from French Creek, a tributary of the Allegheny River system, part of the Mississippi 
watershed.99 The French, the British, the native inhabitants, and eventually several members of the 
newly-independent United States contested control of Presque Ilse bay. Finally, the state of 
Pennsylvania, which previously lacked a connection to the Great Lakes shoreline and 
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transportation corridor, purchased the “Erie triangle” from the federal government in 1792.100  
Erie’s importance to the new nation rose further during the War of 1812, when it became the 
premier United States naval shipyard and the site of a decisive American victory, a heroic past 
much celebrated in Erie’s public history.101 
In the nineteenth century and continuing up through World War II, Erie grew and 
industrialized in step with the innovations of the times, and retained its national importance. The 
General Electric Company’s Erie division, a major manufacturer of locomotives, helped make Erie 
"the Boiler and Engine Capital of the World," and was a major defense contractor during the 
war.102 The local Hammermill Paper Company was a significant supplier to the bureaucratic side 
of the war effort. But Hammermill is emblematic of the Erie industries that generated wealth at a 
severe environmental cost to the lake. In the 1920s, with the growth of automobile travel, Erie 
leaders first began to consider the economic benefits of tourism. The conflict between 
environmental and industrial claims on Lake Erie began to be evident.103 After the industrial boom 
times of World War II ended, Erie was part of the general decline in the de-industrializing ‘rust 
belt.’ Tourism and the service sector gained more importance. Unfortunately, serious pollution in 
the lake discouraged fishermen and vacationers. 104 Erie was in a downward spiral.  
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Beginning in the mid-1950s, Mayor Louis Tullio, one of Erie’s most influential leaders, 
made a sustained effort toward Erie’s revival as a great city, modeled on Pittsburgh’s famous 
Renaissance. Among his strategies were plans to revitalize the city waterfront to attract visitors.105 
Although Tullio and other Erie leaders still hoped to attract new industry, for example in plastics, 
to compensate for the loss of some heavy manufacturing, they were increasingly aware of the 
importance of tourism and the danger that pollution of Lake Erie posed to it. A 1968 federal study, 
in cooperation with civic leaders from all Lake Erie’s bordering states, concluded that the principal 
pollutants were municipal and industrial wastes, and agricultural runoff, in that order. The low 
water quality was painfully evident with bad smells and vigorous algae blooms. It affected 
commercial and sport fishing. The number of visitors at Presque Isle State Park fell twenty-five 
percent in just one year, between 1971 and 1972. Major efforts to reduce pollution over the next 
five years had significant results. By 1977, record numbers again visited Presque Isle. Civic 
boosters stressed the importance of tourism as a growth industry, which added $178 million to 
Erie’s economy in 1978. The environment was a factor in earning Erie the highest score in quality 
of life among a dozen Pennsylvania cities studied in 1975. Erie was rebranding itself.106  
Nevertheless, the city’s new image was fragile. Erie’s citizens felt understandable dismay 
when one of their own neighbors ridiculed the town on national television.  Erie’s City School 
Director Mary Lamary was a guest on the popular Tonight Show, hosted by Johnny Carson. She 
referred to Erie as “’the mistake on the lake.’” Tullio was angry. He wondered why Lamary hadn’t 
mentioned that Erie was voted an All-American City. He said, “I’ve worked hard to tell regional 
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and national audiences about the progress in Erie—new sewers to clean up Lake Erie, and the 
attractive tourist industry . . . one swipe like that wipes out all of the progress we have made to 
improve Erie’s image.”107 
In 1968, amid the widespread local concern over lake pollution and the determined efforts 
to revitalize the city, Pennsylvania state officials announced a plan to drill for natural gas under 
Lake Erie. The mayor and county commissioners of Erie, local township supervisors, and 
Pennsylvania sportsmen’s organizations strongly objected to lake-bed drilling, and they spent most 
of the year fighting it. The general consensus was that the lake had troubles enough already. Erie 
locals did not have the power to veto the plan outright, so they used grassroots campaigning, 
judicial actions, and legislative initiatives in their strategy to keep drillers out of Pennsylvania’s 
section of the lake.  
The state’s drilling plan had a precedent on the Canadian side of the lake, where at least 
one exploratory well dated to 1913. Serious productive drilling began in the 1950s. In 1968, 
Canadians drilled forty-five new wells in the lake.108 Despite the often-repeated declaration that 
the Canadian wells had caused no pollution problem, Erie’s citizens had solid reasons for their 
objections. Conventional drilling, not just the current practice of hydro-fracking, produced a 
number of hazardous pollutants. As part of the routine process, drilling wastes include muds and 
cuttings. Muds are a slurry of water and dirt mixed with toxic drilling lubricant chemicals. Cuttings 
are the actual pieces of rock and soil excavated from the bore hole. Wells also generate “produced 
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water,” or brine, which is very high in dissolved substances that are environmental threats—salt, 
organic compounds, heavy metals, and even radioactive material. The particular composition of 
produced water varies by site. These wastes are typically released into a body of water, deposited 
in landfills, or injected into deep wells. All these disposal methods carry the risk of spilling or 
leaching into ground and surface water. Many of the toxic materials, especially heavy metals, 
accumulate in the food chain where they can directly poison or cause long-term genetic damage. 
In a lake environment, these substances become more concentrated as they are absorbed by small 
aquatic organisms, which are consumed by larger ones. In turn, fish that interest humans eat these 
eaters. In addition to the pollution of routine drilling, accidental leaks and blowouts threaten land 
and water. Although not as visibly dramatic as an oil spill, natural gas (methane) releases are highly 
poisonous to aquatic organisms. The long history of fossil fuel extraction shows that accidental 
releases will occur. It’s not if, but when. Even very recently, just before the fracking boom, a report 
on proposed drilling off Lake Erie’s Ohio shoreline concluded that the state did not have sufficient 
power to properly inspect drilling operations, protect human and environmental health, and 
regulate disposal practices.109 
3.2 Secretary Maurice K. Goddard’s Plan 
Maurice K. Goddard, Secretary of Pennsylvania’s Department of Forests and Waters 
(DFW) from 1955 to 1970, and then Secretary of Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental 
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Protection until 1979, initiated the plan to drill the Lake Erie bed. A strong advocate of drilling on 
public land, he was a political force to be reckoned with. That said, Goddard had an undeniable 
commitment to environmental protection. He was a highly-respected and committed 
conservationist in the manner of Gifford Pinchot, who is the symbol of utilitarian conservation, 
dedicated to the regulated, sustainable use of natural resources to ensure their availability and 
enjoyment for present and future generations. Pinchot is most often remembered for saying that 
resources should be managed “‘for the greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest 
run.’”110 
Maurice Goddard’s career followed Pinchot’s principles, and his career path reflected the 
influence of Pinchot and other Pennsylvanian progressive-era conservationists like Joseph 
Rothrock and Mira Lloyd Dock. Goddard trained to work for the U.S. Forestry Service, and was 
an instructor and later director of the Mont Alto Forestry School. Mont Alto was founded 1903 by 
Rothrock and Dock to produce scientifically trained foresters on the German model, to address 
problems of deforestation, especially from clear-cut logging and strip-mining.111 Goddard was 
similarly committed to the proper management of natural resources, and the protection of forests 
and clean water, but he was not a wilderness preservation advocate like, for example, John Muir.  
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Secretary Goddard’s commitment to environmental conservation paradoxically motivated 
him to acquire gas royalties for the state. In 1955, his first year as secretary, he was instrumental 
in the passage of the Oil and Gas Lease Fund Act 256. Under Act 256, income from gas extracted 
from state land went exclusively into a special fund managed by his department “‘for conservation, 
recreation, dams, or flood control,’” money that Goddard dedicated to the improvement and 
support of Pennsylvania’s state park system.112 He was inspired by a similar program in California, 
which used revenue from off-shore wells to rebuild that state’s park system after World War II. 
Goddard leveraged his reputation for personal integrity and exercised his political skills to build 
bipartisan support for a measure that gave him considerable power. He had the authority to decide 
on the need and the location of any project covered under Act 256, and the power to acquire land 
by purchase or condemnation. He established a Mineral Division within DFW to administer gas 
and oil leases, although at the time only gas wells were involved. Goddard’s fund received about 
twenty million dollars during its first fifteen years. Aside from some land purchases for state 
forests, he used nearly all the money to establish new state parks.113 
Early in 1968, Erie’s citizens became aware of Secretary Goddard’s plan. First reactions 
were more negative than positive. On January 29, the Millcreek Township114 supervisors officially 
opposed drilling, until they were “assured that there will be no pollution.” The next day Erie 
County commissioners went on record opposing lake bed gas leases. The city council announced 
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that they, too, would not approve the drilling unless “‘there will be no pollution of the lake, nor 
any disturbances of fish spawning beds in Lake Erie or any tributary.’” Because nearly everyone 
wanted more information, local leaders planned a meeting to include DFW Secretary Maurice 
Goddard, mayor’s assistant Joseph J. Robie, county commissioners Fred W. Lamberton and Leo 
P. Weir, and a number of sportsmen’s club representatives.115  
Mayor Tullio was a little slower to declare a position. A few weeks passed while the mayor 
waited for information from Goddard on details of the plan before reaching a conclusion. Tullio 
said, “I’m not going to be opposed to anything until I know the actual facts and what the results 
will be.”116 However, Tullio also was adamant about no pollution. In a letter to Goddard, Erie’s 
City Solicitor James G. Hanes stated, “Mayor Tullio, of course, has an open mind on this matter . 
. . but he wants you to know in advance that he will strenuously oppose these drilling operations 
if they will lead to any pollution whatsoever which would endanger the peninsula as a tourist 
attraction.”117 
City and township officials, state representatives, and members of local sportsmen’s clubs 
met with Goddard in mid-February. Goddard had two arguments to support his plan—the benefits 
to Erie and the safeguards to the lake.  He informed the officials that royalties from lakebed gas 
would go into a fund to benefit state parks. Presque Isle Park, he reminded them, had already 
received two million dollars from that fund for infrastructure improvements and would likely 
receive more. Goddard reassured the Erie delegation that the proposed wells would cause 
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absolutely no pollution. The terms of the proposed lease were so restrictive that the mayor’s 
assistant Joseph Robie expressed doubt that any gas company would actually be willing to drill 
under such highly regulated and probably expensive conditions. When someone asked Goddard if 
he would continue to offer lakebed gas leases despite strong local opposition, he side-stepped the 
question by asking if there would be any real opposition if civic leaders foresaw no pollution 
problems. Goddard emphasized some key points of the lease. Drilling waste would not go into the 
lake, but would be dumped on land in locations approved by the health department. The lake would 
receive less pollution from drilling than it did from the city sewage system. The shoreline would 
not become a “derrick city.” A commissioner quoted Goddard, “It’s humanly impossible to 
guarantee that there won’t be pollution, but that everything will be done to prevent it.” Mayor’s 
assistant James Robie found Goddard’s presentation persuasive. Robie said, “Based on his 
background and the interest he has shown in our Presque Isle, would this not suggest that Goddard 
would avoid anything that would cause pollution in the lake?” The sportsmen’s club representative 
remained “cautious,” out of concern for the “sixty-million-dollar tourist business,” and concern 
for club efforts to revive salmon fishing. Other civic leaders acknowledged Goddard’s 
transparency, but nevertheless wanted to wait for more information before deciding on their 
position.118 Goddard was already scheduled to appear at a testimonial dinner in early March, 
organized by the Erie County Tourist Convention Bureau, to honor Goddard as a benefactor who 
promoted Erie as a beautiful place and a recreational destination. Robie suggested using Goddard’s 
visit as an opportunity to meet and further talk over the natural gas issue.119 
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In mid-March 1968, the Pennsylvania Department of Forests and Waters (DFW) 
announced that it would open bids on April 9 for leases on thirty-seven blocks of lake bottom—a 
total of about 370,000 acres—for oil and gas drilling. Each block could contain twenty-five wells, 
totaling nearly a thousand possible drilling sites.120 Gas was the main goal, as DFW did not 
anticipate discovery of any substantial quantity of oil, a greater threat to the lake’s ecosystem. 
DFW officials intended to protect the interests of all concerned, and therefore set strict conditions 
for drilling companies in order to prevent contamination of the lake and interference with shipping. 
DFW would first review drilling operational plans and retain strict control in the drilled area. It 
would have the authority to shut down any “operation which is a source or potential source of 
pollution.” DFW regulations required drillers to post permanent bonds of forty thousand dollars, 
to post additional bonds of twenty thousand dollars for each well, and to maintain an accident and 
liability insurance policy of one million dollars. That money would presumably fund mandatory 
clean-up of any damage to the lake and shore, and compensate any people harmed. Furthermore, 
pipelines under shipping lanes would run on or below the bottom of the lake bed. Wells sites would 
be at least one mile from a public or industrial water supply, and one thousand feet from any 
wastewater discharge facility. The department required drillers to mark wellheads with buoys and 
trawler deflectors. It mandated precautions against leaks, blowouts, ice damage, and boat 
collisions. Regulations forbade drilling along several miles of public and private beaches, 
particularly Presque Isle State Park. They forbade any interference with fishing rights.121 
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Despite DFW’s strongly-worded requirements and Goddard’s credibility, the Erie County 
commissioners and sportsmen’s representatives continued to oppose drilling in the lake. The 
commissioners cited a newsletter from the federal Water Pollution Control Administration, which 
reported, “The state of Ohio has called off drilling for oil and gas in Lake Erie. The fear of pollution 
was too great.”122 Northwestern Pennsylvania Sportsmen’s Association Vice President David 
DeHaven, who represented members in seven counties, expressed doubt that Pennsylvania could 
adequately control pollution from drilling in the lake. DeHaven had attended the banquet in honor 
of Maurice Goddard, but was not convinced by the secretary’s repeated assurances. DeHaven 
feared that all the efforts by sportsmen’s clubs to restock local waters, especially Coho salmon in 
the lake, would be undone by pollution from drilling. DeHaven wondered why Ohio and New 
York would not grant leases off their Erie shorelines, yet Pennsylvania would.123 The Erie County 
Council of Sportsmen’s Clubs also played a very active role in opposing Goddard’s plans. They 
organized yet more meetings, one with Goddard on March 21 to question him on lease details.124 
Afterwards, the Council scheduled a public meeting for April 11 to show bipartisan opposition to 
lakebed drilling.125 
Erie’s Democratic State Representative Frank Polaski quickly sponsored a bill on March 
19, to stop DFW’s plan. He reported extensive concern among Erie citizens and nearly unanimous 
opposition to lakebed drilling from “‘all the governing bodies in Erie County, the Erie County 
Council of Sportsmen Clubs and the majority of people interviewed by news media.’” Polaski 
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argued that Pennsylvania lacked sufficient supervisory capacity to monitor pollution from leaks 
and blowouts. The state, he said, would receive approximately $500,000 from rental and royalties, 
but would risk “destroying a $60 million tourist business as well as the major recreational facilities 
for 250,000 residents of Erie County.” Polaski explained that Ohio had rejected plans to drill the 
lake based on a federal study by the Water Pollution Control Administration, and New York’s 
plans were on hold pending a legislative study prompted by existing oil pollution in Buffalo.126 
Sportsmen Association Vice-President DeHaven, who had already collected several 
hundred signatures from people opposed to drilling, requested that the county commissioners place 
the issue on the April 23 state primary ballot. The commissioners referred the request to their legal 
counsel. Another spokesman for the sportsmen’s club, John D. Tarr, sent an open letter to Goddard 
with objections to particular provisions of the lease. Tarr feared the lack of guarantee concerning 
adequate pollution inspection. In Tarr’s view, the Pennsylvania Department of Health (apparently 
charged with the task) had neither manpower nor boats to provide for even the inadequate monthly 
inspection schedule DFW proposed.127 
At the end of March Mayor Tullio sent a telegram stating his objections to Governor 
Raymond Shafer. Maurice Goddard, local legislators, and sportsmen’s organizations received 
copies.  Tullio stated: “After a careful study of all available information, I’ve reached the 
conclusion that off-shore drilling for oil and gas in Lake Erie is not in the best interest of the City 
of Erie and of Northwestern Pennsylvania.” He further informed the governor that “I strongly urge 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to withdraw invitations of bids as Ohio and New York have 
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done, and in the event that bids are accepted for this operation, I as the Mayor of the City of Erie, 
will file a taxpayers’ suit to enjoin such activity.” Tullio expressed “considerable doubt in my mind 
concerning the possibility of lake pollution and possible hazards to commercial and pleasure craft 
. . .”  and stated “Tourism to Erie and the surrounding area stands as our number one industry.”128  
Other drilling opponents remained active. Some worked to support Representative Frank 
Polaski’s bill to prevent DFW from offering drilling leases.  Time was short. When Tullio sent his 
telegram, less than two weeks remained before Goddard planned to open bids on April 9. Speaking 
for the Erie County Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, which unanimously supported Polaski’s 
measure, David DeHaven described the urgency of getting the bill onto the House floor and 
through the reading process before the Easter recess. Although 1,500 people in Erie County had 
already signed anti-leasing petitions, DeHaven hoped for “10,000 signatures by mid-April.” If the 
bill passed after April 9, it could still prevent drilling even if bids had been opened. If it failed, the 
next resort would be to file for a court injunction to stop the leasing of drilling plots, which 
DeHaven said would require soliciting contributions toward $1,000 in legal fees.129 In early April, 
state Representative Wendell Good told the press he had heard that even if the bid process 
proceeded as scheduled, the state might delay awarding contracts pending the fate of the bill to 
prevent leasing, which was still in committee. Further, Good wanted hearings before the newly-
formed Joint Senate-House Air and Water Pollution Study Committee, as well as more information 
on the effects of Canadian drilling.130 A state convention of Federation sportsmen that represented 
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130,000 members in sixty-seven counties also condemned Goddard’s plan. The key points of their 
objections, according to spokesman James Quinn, were the lack of measures to adequately inspect, 
detect and correct causes of lake pollution.131  In a set-back for the activists, counsel judged that it 
was not legally possibly to include a referendum on the April 23 primary ballot.132  
Goddard responded in a letter to John D. Tarr, secretary of the Erie County Council of 
Sportsmen Clubs. Goddard re-emphasized that drilling could be done without endangering lake 
water quality or tourism. The DFW, in cooperation with the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Administration, would be fully responsible to assure proper surveillance and adherence to the lease 
stipulations. He promised that a power boat would always be available for surveillance. Drillers’ 
plans would be subject to federal and state approval, especially state departments of health, of 
mines and minerals, and the fish and game commission. All drilling waste would be transported to 
approved disposal sites on land. The operation of a non-compliant driller would be halted, his lease 
cancelled, and his bond forfeited to correct the problem. Goddard also declared, “. . . experience 
has shown that drilling operations attract fish and these sites make excellent fishing areas,” and 
“these operations do not result in cluttering up the harbors with drilling apparatus and other craft 
which crowd out pleasure craft.”133 
Tarr rebutted Goddard’s statements in an announcement for a planned public meeting to 
gather support for the work against drilling. Tarr strongly endorsed the sportsmen’s council 
petition drive for 20,000 signatures to make state lawmakers understand that Erie County residents 
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seriously opposed drilling in the lake and supported the bill (still in committee) to halt the project. 
Tarr complained that Goddard “responded to specific questions about the lease agreement with 
generalities.” He did not think the lease was tight enough and had several objections to Goddard’s 
assurances. Tarr said that the state did not own the type of boat needed for surveillance, and the 
lease did not require the driller to furnish one. He could not find any provision empowering the 
Department of Health or the Fish and Game Commission to halt a polluting drilling operation. If 
a polluting accident occurred, the lease only required notification to DFW, not to local officials. 
Tarr declared, “Finally, no one, not even Dr. Goddard, can guarantee us that there will be no 
pollution.”134 That last is of course true. The exchange seemed to be a battle of rhetorical positions. 
Despite efforts to the contrary, DFW opened bidding for drilling leases as scheduled on 
April 9. State government sources indicated that contracts were not expected to be “immediately” 
awarded, but they provided no information on when that might happen. Polaski’s bill remained 
stuck in committee when the legislators left for Easter break.135 In response, the Erie County 
commissioners passed a unanimous resolution to aid drilling opponents who were collecting 
petition signatures in support of another state bill to transfer authority for leasing drilling rights 
from DFW to the Department of Health. Petition papers were widely available at city hall, local 
fire houses, and other public buildings.  Drilling opponents needed 20,000 signatures to advance 
the bill out of committee and on to the legislature’s floor. 136 Mayor Lou Tullio filed suit for a 
permanent injunction against drilling leases from the state court; a hearing was scheduled in 
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Harrisburg for April 17, 1968. The suit would prevent DFW from leasing any lake-bed drilling 
rights, on the grounds that drilling would threaten Erie’s drinking water supply, and its commercial 
fishing and tourism industries. Two companies had already sent bids to DFW: Ranger Oil 
Company of Alberta, Canada, bid $10,242 for one block; Pan-American Petroleum Company, Fort 
Worth, Texas, bid $3,029, $21,376, and $93,382 on three blocks. These bids were on hold at least 
until the suit was settled.137 
The relationship between Maurice Goddard and the citizens of Erie remained complicated. 
An unsigned editorial article in Erie’s Times had the lead line: “Isn’t it time to call a halt to the 
growing dispute between the city and the state over the oil and gas drilling in Lake Erie?” The 
article called Goddard “a proven friend,” and declared that Presque Isle was “as much the 
handiwork of Dr. Goddard as any other human being.” For the editor of the Times, Goddard’s 
pride in and commitment to the park was proof of his assurances regarding the negligible impact 
of drilling on the region. The editorial claimed that Erie would only be the loser if city officials 
seriously alienated Goddard by enacting measures to obstruct the onshore transportation of gas 
and oil from the lake. In that case, there would be small likelihood of further state-funded 
investment in the peninsula. The editorial called for the city to accept Pennsylvania Commerce 
Secretary Clifford Jones’s offer to mediate the dispute, in hope that he could reach a compromise 
by altering lease terms to better reassure city leaders. At least initially, that attempt to bring Tullio 
and Goddard together was fruitless.138 Nevertheless, the county commissioners, who supported 
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Tullio’s suit and remained strongly opposed to drilling, stressed that this was not a “personal 
vendetta” against Goddard.139 
An accident at the Hammermill Paper Company reinforced the county commissioners’ 
uneasiness about pollution in the lake, and strengthened their resolution against off-shore drilling. 
A ruptured pipe associated with a Hammermill waste-disposal injection well leaked pulp waste 
into the lake, prompting the question of how drilling companies could control such accidents, when 
the paper mill, which they “commended” for its pollution control efforts, could not. The 
commissioners did not criticize Hammermill, or other local industries that contributed pollution to 
the lake. Instead, they advocated the appointment of sanitary engineers to assist with industry 
initiatives to curb pollution. The commissioners’ tone was business-friendly. They maintained that 
industry leaders were willing to abide by water quality regulations, but “needed help.”140 As in the 
case of Maurice Goddard’s lake-bed project, this was another case for official expertise; if things 
are done properly, problems are controllable. But the commissioners did not have the same 
incentive to accommodate drilling as they did local industry, which contributed to the regional 
economy.  
On April 30, Commonwealth Court Judge James S. Bowman dismissed Mayor Tullio’s 
request for an injunction against lake-bed drilling. The state began steps to award two lease 
contracts from earlier bids. At that point Tullio expressed a desire to meet with Goddard, and “‘iron 
out problems with the lease.’” The city’s Assistant Solicitor Joseph Walsh, in conference with the 
Mayor, contemplated plans for an appeal. Apparently in anticipation that the appeal might fail, 
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Walsh began working with other borough and township attorneys to compose legislation on the 
local level to control possible pollution on land fronting the lake.141 Efforts at the state level to 
counter Goddard’s plans ended with one last attempt by Representative Frank Polaski. In February 
1969, Polaski introduced a bill to the Pennsylvania General Assembly that would amend a previous 
act in “eliminating the power and duty of the Department of Forests and Waters to mine or remove 
oil and gas beneath waters of Lake Erie owned by the Commonwealth; providing for eminent 
domain as to existing leases”142 The bill was referred to the House Committee on Conservation 
the same day, and that was the last action on it, according to House records.143  
Nevertheless, not all state and local stakeholders actively opposed the drilling. Some 
members of the business community and, surprisingly enough, tourism boosters acquiesced. At an 
April 30 meeting, the Erie Tourist and Convention Bureau, the Erie Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Millcreek Chamber of Commerce released a joint statement declaring themselves satisfied with 
the terms of the lease, in the belief that it would adequately protect the region’s tourism industry.144 
Pennsylvania’s U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark also did not see any evidence of danger to the lake 
from drilling—in his view, it was the existing pollution in this most polluted of the Great Lakes 
that required immediate attention.145  
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3.3 Federal Intervention 
The drilling controversy attracted attention on the national level. Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey sent a telegram to Erie officials expressing the administration’s commitment to protect 
national waters. Humphrey promised that “‘top science advisors’” from the U.S. Department of 
the Interior would investigate Pennsylvania’s Department of Forests and Waters plans for Lake 
Erie drilling.146 Humphrey then telephoned Erie County Commissioner William Hill Jr., again 
promising a federal study of the issue.147 Chairman of the Federal Water Pollution Advisory Board 
Max N. Edwards independently planned a hearing in Pittsburgh to consider water quality issues in 
Lake Erie, although his main concern was acid coal mine drainage. Erie was well-represented at 
the hearing. Sitting on the federal board was Everett F. Zurn, a major Erie industrialist whose 
company (still in existence) manufactured plumbing and other water-related items.148 At least 
some of the Erie commissioners attended.149 The Erie County Federation of Sportsmen Clubs also 
sent representatives, equipped with their own report on water pollution. The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Administration determined that Erie was the most polluted of the Great Lakes. 
It judged that the poor water quality already affected tourism, fishing, drinking water and other 
uses vital to Erie.150 
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Maurice Goddard provided testimony at the hearing as well. He was a former member of 
the President’s Water Pollution Advisory Control Board. Although Goddard described his 
experience in serving on the board as “‘one of the best, most constructive experiences of my life,’” 
he nevertheless strongly criticized federal efforts to control pollution as “‘inadequate, too unwieldy 
and too slow and its programs have been hampered by poor coordination and duplication of those 
already undertaken and completed by the states.’” Goddard suggested that a national-level agency, 
such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, be responsible to consolidate and 
direct pollution abatement efforts. Erie’s Times editor agreed with Goddard, whom he 
characterized as “a man with immense prestige as a conservationist.”151In effect, Goddard, a 
representative of a state agency, advocated federal control. 
In fact, a federal agency already had substantial power to affect plans to drill the lakebed. 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was involved in the controversy over 
drilling for natural gas in Lake Erie because, by law, it had responsibility for the permitting process 
for any activity that disturbed the bottom or erected structures in navigable waterways. At the time 
when DFW began to accept bids for drilling leases, the Corps had a century of history as an 
institution that supported economic development. However, in the late 1960s, USACE’s mission 
was undergoing serious change. USACE began to take environmental impact into account when 
evaluating the projects under its jurisdiction. This change was a significant departure for the Corps, 
which long had an adversarial relationship with environmental organizations. As conservationist 
and preservationist activism increased over the course of the twentieth century, even before 
passage of the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps evolved different approaches 
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to planning and programs.152 Conservationists both within and outside the government had 
pressured the Corps into expanding the factors it used to evaluate a project, which were 
traditionally limited to economic, engineering, and hydrological concerns. In 1967 the Secretaries 
of the Army and the Interior issued a joint directive that required USACE to inform agencies 
responsible for environmental protection about the permits USACE was considering. 153 
However, before the USACE could begin the evaluation and permit process for drilling 
Erie’s lake bed, Pennsylvania Governor Raymond Shafer stopped the whole project. In 1969, 
Shafer signed a moratorium on drilling for gas or oil in the state-controlled portion of Lake Erie. 
Shafer’s action was a response to a larger national awareness of the dangers of off-shore drilling, 
caused by the Santa Barbara Oil spill.154 That spill, caused by an oil rig blowout off the California 
coast on January 28, 1969, was part of the inspiration for Gaylord Nelson’s first organized Earth 
Day in 1970. The Santa Barbara spill, like the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and 
the day in 1969 when the Cuyahoga River caught fire, was a key event in the beginning of the 
modern environmental movement. It helped inspire the unprecedented amount of federal 
environmental regulation passed in the early 1970s.155 
Nevertheless, Governor Shafer’s moratorium was not the end of Pennsylvanian efforts to 
extract gas from under Lake Erie. In the 1970s, the energy crisis changed the focus of the debate. 
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Rather than just supporting Goddard’s state park projects, gas from Erie would arguably help to 
alleviate pressing national fuel shortages. Pennsylvania, as well as Ohio and New York, lifted their 
bans. Federal legislators and agencies paid renewed attention to Lake Erie’s gas reserves. For 
example, in 1977 the bipartisan Joint Legislative Air and Water Pollution Control and 
Conservation Committee held a hearing to explore the potential of lakebed gas.156 In 1978, USACE 
in cooperation with the Great Lakes National Program Office of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency began a four-year study on the subject. USACE commissioned a report from an 
independent organization, Argonne National Laboratory. The purpose of the report was not to 
make recommendations, but to explore the issues involved and predict possible benefits and 
problems. 157 
Local input was part of the study process. The environmental impact statement by Argonne 
Lab was initially released in draft form, without a decision on whether or not drilling permits 
should be issued, to allow the public comment period required under the National Environmental 
Protection Act.158 Then USACE would issue a final report that incorporated comments. Following 
another 30-day comment period, they would then make a decision. Erie’s Times published 
instructions on how to obtain a copy of the draft, and the address to which citizens could mail 
comments.159 
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The results of the initial study draft indicated that the residents of Erie would not benefit 
to any great extent from gas extracted from the lake. During the natural gas shortage in the bitter 
winter of 1977-78, when natural gas was rationed according to the type of usage, the most severely 
curtailed deliveries in the ten-county study area were to industrial users in Ohio—99   percent of 
curtailment by volume. The most significant economic benefit of drilling in the lake would result 
if the increased production was channeled to industrial users. Residential consumers in 
Pennsylvania supplied by the National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation were affected very little. 
If lakebed gas was added to state reserves, the increase in natural gas reserves for Pennsylvania 
was estimated at about 11 percent, compared to 49 percent for Ohio and 68 percent for New York. 
The study also revealed that intrastate gas prices doubled and tripled between 1972 and 1978 in 
the study area. Pennsylvania intrastate gas increased by 245 percent during those six years.160 In 
other words, Erie’s consumers would pay much more for gas produced locally. Erie’s state 
assemblymen had a mixed reaction to the USACE report on the potential financial benefits to PA 
from gas drilling in the lake. The assemblymen were not necessarily against drilling, but stressed 
the need for strict environmental safeguards to protect the lake. They wanted to go slowly with the 
project, and wanted proof that drilling would not pollute. With the smallest shoreline of all the 
bordering states, Pennsylvania stood to gain the least—an estimated $240 million spread over 
thirty years.  On one hand, that’s a sizeable sum. On the other hand, as Assemblyman Harry 
Bowser expressed, “‘$247 million? That’s not enough money to buy us a new lake.’” 161 
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The United States Army Corps of Engineers released the final report in 1982, which 
approved drilling for natural gas under Lake Erie, although with some caveats. USACE did not 
approve drilling in an area on the western end of the lake, where the risk of encountering petroleum 
instead of natural gas was too great. While USACE found no compelling reason to prevent gas 
drilling, it listed some potential problems. Drilling would certainly disturb toxic sediments on the 
lake bottom, at least temporarily. Accidents to drilling equipment and infrastructure were another 
danger because capsized rigs or ships would deposit hazardous material in the water, air, and on 
the lake bottom, including “chrome lignosulfate, barite and hydrogen sulfide.”  Broken gas 
pipelines carried the risk of explosion and contaminated drinking water supplies. Gas from 
submerged leaks could increase the amount of polyethylene glycol in the water. That chemical 
could react with water treatment methods in municipal plants to produce suspected carcinogenic 
trihalogenated methanes.162 Based on the study, USACE engineers concluded that it was possible 
to drill for gas “in an environmentally acceptable manner,” assuming that strict controls would 
limit environmental impact. USACE, which had the authority to approve or deny drilling permits, 
did not specifically recommend drilling in the lake. It would be up to the states to pursue 
development.  In any case, when the final study was released, no permit applications had yet been 
filed with USACE.163 
                                                 
162 “Report approves drilling for gas in Lake Erie,” The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 15, 1982. 
 
163 Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement: U.S. Lake Erie Natural Gas Resource Development (U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, Buffalo District and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Great Lakes National 
Program Office, 1982). 
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3.4 Conclusion 
With by far the smallest shoreline along Lake Erie of any state or Canadian province, 
Pennsylvania had the least area for potential gain from drilling the lake. If the state would benefit 
relatively little from royalties, consumers in Erie would benefit not at all. The proposed drilling 
project did not include plans to connect to local supply lines. Even if it did, the lake gas supply 
would be priced as intrastate gas, which at that time was as much as ten times as expensive as 
interstate gas delivered from the southwest. It would certainly not benefit consumers struggling 
with their heating bills. Therefore, any negative impact to the lakeshore environment would not be 
offset by a substantial benefit to its inhabitants.  
In the end, none of the local Erie efforts—the grassroots petition campaign, pressure from 
the large voting block represented by Pennsylvanian sportsmen’s organizations, the vigorous 
opposition of the mayor and city council, the township supervisors’ resolutions, the mayor’s suit 
in Commonwealth Court for an injunction, Polaski’s proposed legislation—appeared able to halt 
Maurice Goddard’s plan to extract natural gas offshore in Lake Erie. It took an unexpected 
environmental disaster of national importance to kill the project, just at the moment when it was 
about to begin. Goddard’s conservationist philosophy was overtaken by the new national 
environmental consciousness. The word ‘progress’ had begun to lose its halo, and progressive-era 
faith in technological expertise had waned. When presented with the images of seabirds drowned 
in oil on a previously paradisiacal stretch of California coast, the public position shifted from 
interest in the conservation of useful resources toward the preservation of wild nature. At least, the 
degree of that shift was enough to permit passage of fundamental environmental legislation on the 
federal level.  
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Erie’s leaders and citizens defended their commons—their shared interest in the 
preservation of Lake Erie’s ecosystem and natural beauty. They shared an identity built on place 
and their pride in it. Like other communities in many places and times, Erie’s people and economy 
depended to some degree on benefits from natural resources they did not own or control. They had 
the least power and the most to lose from the state’s appropriation of those resources.  Despite 
Maurice Goddard’s immense reputation as a conservationist, he never managed to allay fears that 
gas drilling in the lakebed would have a severe impact on Lake Erie and Presque Ilse. The cautious 
approval of the USACE, accompanied by detailed descriptions of possible dangers and few 
benefits, was not very reassuring. Local defense of the lake at least prompted federal investigation 
of the issue, one factor in establishing a federal ban on drilling in the Great Lakes.  
There are no gas wells in Pennsylvania’s share of Lake Erie’s bed. Currently there is no 
state law against it. The most recent federal ban to effectively prohibit drilling in the Great Lakes 
was an executive order from President Barack Obama, a response to serious concerns about all 
off-shore drilling prompted by the disastrous 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill. However, the idea of 
drilling in the Lake Erie bed, or in any of the Great Lakes, never really went away. On June 19, 
2018, President Donald Trump signed “Executive Order Regarding the Ocean Policy to Advance 
the Economic, Security, and Environmental Interests of the United States,” which rescinded 
Obama’s order, and emphasized the economic “entrepreneurial” role in water policy and resource 
management. Natural gas industry spokesmen hailed the measure.164 
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4.0 Erie: Drilling the Land 
Natural gas drilling in Erie, Pennsylvania has had a long-lasting influence on the state’s 
natural gas policy and on the drilling technology that fostered the Marcellus gas phenomenon.  In 
the 1970s and 1980s, Erie experienced a local drilling boom. Unlike the civic action to defend their 
common interest in Lake Erie from gas extraction, the land boom displayed the classic 
characteristics of Garrett Harding’s tragedy of the commons. Local actors bitterly contested for the 
right to drill before the gas was all gone. That fight demonstrated the acute need for new drilling 
regulation. Erie’s gas field became a setting that displayed the interaction of federal, state, and local 
power in environmental policy-making. Local citizens, with the most to gain or lose, were least 
able to establish control. Chapter three covers the course of the boom, including the impact of high 
energy prices on the Erie’s citizens, the self-help measures they took, and their futile appeals for 
federal relief. It shows the relationship between federal regulation, local policy, and subsequent 
state action that produced the Pennsylvania Oil and Natural Gas Act of 1984, the principle 
regulatory framework for the state’s twenty-first century Marcellus shale fracking boom.  
Federal action first motivated Erie’s gas boom. As part of the response to the 1970s energy 
crisis, the administration under President Jimmy Carter reacted to a natural gas shortage by passing 
the 1978 Oil and Gas Act, intended to incentivize new drilling by eliminating price controls. The 
1978 Act deregulated gas prices in a complicated way that left Erie, a gas-rich region, struggling to 
pay for heat. Heating costs were a significant added burden in a region where private citizens and 
municipal organizations were already coping with rust-belt deindustrialization. Then, in keeping 
with his economic policies to reduce government spending, President Ronald Reagan (1981-1988) 
proposed federal funding cuts for social safety nets, including heating subsidies. Erie’s elderly and 
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poor citizens were object lessons illustrating the impact of gas deregulation and Reagan’s federal 
policies.  
The heating cost crisis, as well as the gas shortage itself, reinforced the perception that 
solutions to the energy problem depended a great deal on local efforts. Many Erie institutions and 
some citizens began drilling private-use gas wells, with serious infighting over who would control 
and benefit from these wells. The state of Pennsylvania, reacting to the upsurge in gas drilling 
caused by the energy crisis and deregulated prices, eventually passed the 1984 Oil and Gas Act, 
which provided at least some protection from the impact of drilling on people and the environment. 
The gas-drilling surge in Erie’s distinctive geology also helped develop the new ‘fracing’ 
technology (as it was initially spelled)—hydraulic fracturing.  Two decades later, the provisions of 
the 1984 Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act still regulated gas drilling at the beginning of the Marcellus 
shale gas boom, made possible by the use of what we now refer to as fracking. 
4.1 Erie Gas in National Context 
The gas boom of the 1980s was not the first in Erie, which had rich reserves of natural gas, 
early prominence in the gas industry, and a long-established precedent for gas wells drilled for 
local use. The first commercial deep gas well in the United States was drilled near Erie in 1854. 
In the 1860s, Erie had the first identified production field, or “gas pool,” recorded in Pennsylvania, 
and an Erie brass-works became the first industrial-scale user of gas in the country. By the 1870s, 
Erie’s streets were gas-lit, and gas fueled the town water works, a number of businesses, and some 
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homes.165 City authorities planned to drill their own wells to power government facilities. An 1870 
letter to a local paper titled “Erie’s Big Card” claimed that Erie had an advantage over Pittsburgh 
for manufacturers, because the natural gas “under our feet” was so superior to coal for industry.166 
However, the first industrial-scale gas boom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
did not last. Throughout western Pennsylvania, early shallow wells ceased to be productive, and 
the majority of heavy industries and many domestic consumers once again relied on coal. Not until 
after World War II, when pipelines began to transport gas to the northeastern United States from 
the southwestern oil fields, did coal use again decline in favor of natural gas.167 
Despite piped-in supplies, by the 1970s natural gas was viewed as a scarce commodity, 
likely to get even more scarce. In 1973, when the first oil and gasoline shortages were contributing 
to a national panic, natural gas was in very short supply in some parts of the United States. The 
shortage was significant because natural gas then furnished about one-third of the energy used in 
the country. Continued shortages of gas during the cold winters of 1977 and 1978, especially in 
the Northeast and upper Midwest, resulted in significant hardships for residential and industrial 
customers. People could not heat their homes, and an estimated two million people were affected 
by factory closings and layoffs due to gas shortages.168 
                                                 
165 Waples, Natural Gas Industry in Appalachia, 14. 
 
166 Waples, Natural Gas Industry, 178. By the mid 1880s, Pittsburgh manufacturers were converting to natural gas 
from wells near the city. 
 
167 For a detailed examination of the energy transitions between coal and natural gas in another section of western 
Pennsylvania, see Tarr and Clay, “Pittsburgh as an Energy Capital: Perspectives on Coal and Natural Gas 
Transitions and the Environment,” In Energy Capitals: Local Impact, Global Influence, edited by Joseph A. Pratt, 
Martin V. Melosi and Kathleen A. Brosnan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014) 5-29. 
 
168 Graetz, End of Energy, 98. 
 87 
Previous federal policy had undeniably contributed to the gas shortage. As a clean-burning 
source of power, natural gas has many advantages over oil and coal, but it is more difficult to 
transport than the other fossil fuels. Because of the expensive and permanent infrastructure 
required to transport gas—pipelines—this energy source had historically been regulated as a public 
utility and natural monopoly. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the monopolies of 
pipeline supply allowed just four companies to control about two-thirds of the nation’s interstate 
gas supply. In order to protect consumers from monopolistic price gouging, the 1938 Natural Gas 
Act gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC) the right to regulate the prices that gas companies 
could charge.   
In the 1950s, the FPC began to regulate gas prices on a complicated regional cost-of-
production basis. The details of this regulation kept natural gas prices low enough to encourage 
consumer and industrial demand. Unfortunately, it also inhibited new production. Further, the 
regulations tended to keep gas sales within the states where the gas was produced and discouraged 
interstate sales. FPC, a federal agency, could only regulate gas in interstate commerce, not gas 
produced and consumed within the same state. For a long time, this problem of jurisdiction made 
gas prices very different for interstate vs. intrastate gas, which resulted in uneven distribution. 
Even in the 1970s, plenty of natural gas was available in Southwest oil and gas fields, but the 
Northeast and upper Midwest were suffering. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 began the 
deregulation of natural gas prices, which would be fully deregulated by 1985. The Act’s authors 
intended it to allow national market forces to set gas prices at the well head, and to better balance 
supply and demand.169 Deregulation and rising gas prices did stimulate exploration and 
production, causing increased interest in drilling in Pennsylvania and adjacent Appalachian 
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regions. It also caused a significant increase in consumer prices. Erie served as a case study for 
federal policy-makers studying the effects of deregulation.  
During the energy crisis of the 1970s, with its shortages and the significant rise in all energy 
costs, and particularly after passage of the 1978 Oil and Gas Act, natural gas prices rose 
dramatically. Erie was particularly hard-hit by economic downturn, energy shortages, and harsh 
weather. Many public institutions and private citizens in Erie County had their own gas well 
drilled. Compared to the significant local opposition to drilling in the lake bed, Erie’s leadership 
showed great willingness to drill within the built areas of the city and county. The local land wells 
were of most benefit to organizations and municipal agencies, because the expense of drilling 
made a gas well out of reach for many (although not all) private home owners.  
Reaction to the unexpectedly high production of the first of these wells followed Garrett 
Hardin’s classic theory of the “tragedy of the commons.”170  Various well-owners tried to 
maximize their individual gains, fearing that the gas pocket under the town would soon run dry. 
When the Erie school district tapped a highly productive ‘bonanza’ gas pocket, more organizations 
quickly sank their own wells. When these organizations attempted to sell gas to the local gas 
company, it became more difficult to sort out individual gain and public good. A hotly debated 
city ordinance established some limitations on zoning and usage of wells. Controversy remained 
high concerning whether or not commercial wells—those that sold to National Fuel Gas, the 
regional commercial distributer—should be permitted within the city. Opposition to local policy 
                                                 
170 Hardin used the example of sheep grazing a common meadow. Each sheep owner attempts to maximize his 
individual gain by grazing as many sheep as possible, which soon depletes the grass, a community resource. Garrett 
Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859 (13 December 1968), pp. 1243-1248.  
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centered on some environmental concerns, but more on private property rights, and accusations of 
conflict-of-interest problems and possible profiteering.  
4.2 Erie’s Pro-Drilling Motivators: Poverty, Energy, and Reaganomics 
Erie’s most vulnerable citizens did not benefit from the local gas initiatives. They suffered 
not only from the deregulation of gas prices, but from a substantial shift in general federal policy 
after the election of President Ronald Reagan.  Federal energy policy, combined with federal 
neoliberal philosophy, contributed to the persistent drilling-friendly climate in Pennsylvania. The 
combination of federal policy, energy costs, and rust-belt poverty reinforced the local inclination 
to favor gas extraction, as part of self-reliant strategies to solve local problems. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, heating bills were the most serious financial issue for many people, 
and therefore a political issue as well.171 Under President Ronald Reagan (1981-1988), federal 
policy emphasized privatization of resources and reliance on market forces. Energy policy called 
for reduced environmental regulation and expanded energy extraction. Reagan argued that letting 
“the forces of the marketplace work without undue interference, the ingenuity of consumers, 
business producers, and inventors” would solve the country’s energy problems.172 In addition, the 
Reagan administration pushed for cuts in federal aid to a variety of social welfare programs, 
including energy assistance. Under the threat of funding cuts, local and state agencies charged with 
                                                 
171 Heating costs then were analogous to health-care costs today, in terms of their outsized impact on household 
finances. 
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implementing energy assistance programs did not know what their budgets would be from year to 
year, which hindered efficient operation and left recipients feeling even less secure.  
The consequences of soaring energy costs were very difficult for Erie’s elderly and poor. 
Federal representatives recognized Erie’s importance as a case study on energy costs and poverty. 
They conducted local hearings that underscored the urgent need for federal aid, which President 
Reagan’s economic policies made harder to get or to depend on. Federal representatives held two 
hearings in Erie County to investigate the connection between energy and poverty under rapidly 
changing economic and regulatory circumstances. The first hearing was before a Senate Special 
Committee on Aging in 1982, “Energy and the Aged: The Widening Gap.” The second was two 
years later, initiated by members of the House of Representatives Committee on Government 
Operations. The testimony at these hearings showed that the elderly and poor were often forced to 
choose between heat and food. Some froze to death in their homes. They desperately needed relief 
from high heating costs, and looked for federal solutions—naturally enough, because the federal 
government had the most power to influence energy markets and the most resources to provide 
financial aid.  
Bob Lathrop, Erie Director of the Pennsylvania Public Interest Coalition, directly 
connected harsh economic conditions overall, the special problems of energy costs, and the effects 
of deregulation under 1978 Natural Gas Act. Lathrop criticized Reagan’s “New Federalism”173 
policy, which he thought shirked a national responsibility concerning energy supply and price that 
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could not be addressed only at the local or state level. Nationally, from 1972 to 1980 the Consumer 
Price Index doubled, while energy costs tripled. Lower income households spent a 
disproportionate and increasing share of income on heat. Close to half of low-income houses 
lacked insulation, storm windows and doors, and thermostatic controls. Concerning price 
deregulation, Lathrop protested: 
Since the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 we have seen natural gas costs 
rise at approximately a 20 percent annual rate. Here in Erie, the rise in gas costs has been 
virtually the same. If this wasn't bad enough now we have to weather the continued threats 
of the Reagan administration, as well as the major oil companies, to accelerate decontrol 
of natural gas. This could be one of the most disastrous measures to hit the entire economy 
in decades. In short, it would probably double consumers' gas bills . . .174  
In 1982, the U.S. Senate Special Committee On Aging met at Gannon College with 
members of the Greater Erie Community Action Committee, the Erie County Council on Aging, 
and Father Vincent Enright and Sister Carolyn of the Coalition for Human Dignity. Senator John 
Heinz of Pennsylvania was chair. Heinz wanted evidence to support the funding of energy 
assistance in the fiscal 1982 federal budget. President Reagan had proposed serious funding cuts 
for heating assistance and home weatherization, although current programs were already 
inadequate to meet the extensive need.  In addition to his stated agenda to increase federal aid, 
Heinz also hoped to enlist the local community and industry leaders to compensate for the shortfall, 
whatever the outcome of the budget vote.175 According to Heinz, and some local authorities, Erie 
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had better-than-average cooperation among community action agencies to avoid duplication of 
services and not let people “fall through the cracks.”176 
Heinz stressed the need for policy-makers to visit communities and see what was 
happening on the ground and get beyond statistics. His statistics were bad enough. In the United 
States as a whole, the average household spent 10 percent of its income on heating fuel. But the 
elderly poor in the northeast spent on average between one-third and one-half of their income for 
heat.  Conservation of energy by weatherizing homes was an option for those who could afford 
renovations. However, poor people shut off rooms, used make-shift coal stoves and kerosene 
heaters, chose between heat and food, and sometimes died of hypothermia.177 The national 
officially-reported number of those who died from cold in 1977 was 1,000. However, according 
to the report, the true number could be closer to 25,000.178 Previously, during the Carter 
administration (1977-1981), the federal government had attempted to mitigate the effect of rising 
fuel prices. Legislators had enacted a windfall profits tax on the oil industry to fund energy 
assistance for low-income households. However, existing funding levels only served a fraction of 
the need. As part of “The New Federalism” policy, the Reagan administration proposed cutting 
assistance by over 20 percent, from $1.8 billion to $1.4 billion.179  It also proposed eliminating 
funds for weatherization.180 One participant in the hearing, the Reverend Vincent L. Enright, 
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Department of Community Action in Erie, harshly criticized funding cuts under Reagan’s policy. 
Enright pleaded for the continuance of social services programs that grew out of the Depression 
era. He called the New Federalism “juvenile and simplistic,” in regards to reality of people’s needs, 
merely “a showcase.”181 
Senator Heinz intended to demonstrate the widening gap between legitimate need and 
dwindling aid. His witnesses included local officials such as Erie County Coroner Merle Wood 
and Erie’s Energy Assistance Coordinator Victor Rutkoski. But first, Heinz called Mrs. Katheryn 
Grygo and Mrs. Mildred Kline to represent ordinary residents of Erie. The two women were typical 
of those who depended on federal help. Both were older widows living alone. One was ill, and 
therefore unable to care for herself very well. The other helped herself to the best of her abilities. 
Mrs. Katheryn Grygo lived on a fixed Social Security income and received some rent and energy 
assistance. Her house had some weatherization work done under the energy program, but not 
enough. Grygo’s attic and basement needed insulation, but program workmen told her that there 
was not enough funding to do all the work promised to her.  Mrs. Grygo had arthritis and other 
medical conditions, which made her very sensitive to the cold and added to her expenses. Her 
doctor advised moving to a warmer climate, which she could not afford to do. She depended a 
great deal on energy assistance.182 If she lost the heat subsidy, she said she would be “desperate.”183  
The second witness, Mrs. Mildred Kline, had been a widow for twelve years. She was 
entitled to 82 percent of her late husband’s Social Security income, and had a small amount saved 
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for emergencies. Mrs. Kline economized by making her own clothes, buying the least expensive 
food, and socializing only in non-expensive ways. She kept her home daytime temperature at 68 
degrees, 55 at night. She conserved energy by closing off rooms, using storm windows and 
weather-stripping, and keeping a low setting on the hot water heater.  She budgeted ahead to allow 
for months when the heating bill was high, and to cover the gap before heating assistance arrived.  
Her adult children had moved away for jobs, like many others from Erie, and so could not help 
with needed home repairs. Mrs. Kline had received energy assistance for two years. Without it, 
her only choices were to cut back on food or to deplete her savings, leaving nothing for medical 
or other emergencies.184 Her income was $403 per month.185 In the early 1980s, United States 
median household income was about $22,390.186 Someone working full-time for minimum wage 
earned about $7,000 annually.187 Mrs. Kline was living on $4836.  
County Coroner Merle Wood testified about the causes and dangers of hypothermia, and 
explained that elderly and ill-nourished people were most vulnerable. He listed several case 
histories from Erie County.  Neighbors found one woman in coma with an internal temperature of 
sixty-four degrees. She survived, but suffered the amputation of gangrenous limbs. Another 
woman aged fifty-six with rheumatoid arthritis died of exposure in her poorly heated trailer. Three 
such deaths had recently occurred in Erie County.188  
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Testimony from local aid organizations covered the changed federal policy regarding social 
safety nets. In some instances, the testimony reported a reluctance on the part of older people to 
accept what help was available, reflecting a long-standing local ethos of self-reliance.  Erie County 
Board of Assistance Energy Program Coordinator Victor Rutkoski discussed details of the 
program and problems of administering it. Over the previous five years, requests for assistance 
had increased four-fold. The amount of federal funding for energy assistance varied from year to 
year, and funds were not available until late in the heating season.189 Rutkoski’s office had received 
over 5,000 applications that year; by February his staff had only processed half.190  
The National Fuel Gas Distribution Company (NFG), Erie’s retail natural gas supplier, did 
not take much responsibility to aid their customers, or identify those at most risk. NFG initiated a 
number of policies to mitigate the crisis, which nevertheless could not address the basic problem 
of soaring cost. For the cost issue, NFG recommended federal action, but appeared to agree with 
the Reagan Administration that rigorous standards must limit who could qualify for assistance. 
Charles A. Wood, NFG administrative assistant for the Department of Public Affairs, and NFG 
Vice President William J. Hill presented the company’s policies to help those swamped by heating 
expenses. The policies included averaged monthly payments (a new thing at that time), third party 
notification of termination, and a below-cost energy audit of the home. The elderly and disabled 
policy included no shutoff for non-payment between November and April, no late penalty for 
payment after receipt of Social Security or pension checks, and a no-cost but less-extensive energy 
audit. NFG’s medical hardship plan stipulated no shutoff in a medical emergency, or where life-
sustaining equipment was needed. NFG provided brochures with information on public and private 
                                                 
189 Ibid., 18-19. 
 
190 Ibid., 30.  
 96 
sources of possible energy assistance to senior citizen centers and to individuals that already had 
service terminated.191 Wood recommended that the federal government increase funding to cover 
everyone eligible, time the distribution of payments better, improve outreach to inform citizens of 
benefits, keep eligibility guidelines simple, but only fund the “truly needy.”192 Nevertheless, NFG 
spokesmen stated that the company could not take on the job of identifying who may be at risk—
they didn’t keep records of customers’ ages, for example.193 NFG also continued to send alarming 
shut-off notices even in winter, a requirement of the Public Utilities Commission.194  
Conditions in northwestern Pennsylvania were no better during the winter of 1983-1984. 
Consumers faced hardship in the face of recession and high unemployment, and industry that 
remained in the area was under similar pressure. The issue was the pricing structure of the 1978 
Natural Gas Policy Act.  Gas was plentiful in northeastern Pennsylvania, but people were suffering 
from high prices because the Gas Policy Act had created many different classifications of natural 
gas, based on the depth and age of the well, and where it was located. All of these categories were 
priced differently. Once again, federal representatives chose Erie to hear testimony that addressed 
new proposed Federal gas regulation to alleviate some of the hardship. An implied take-away, not 
directly stated by the attendees, was that Erie needed more cheaply priced locally-produced gas.  
On February 13, 1984, the Committee On Government Operations and the Commerce, 
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee met near Erie in Warrenton, Pennsylvania. The 
Committee planned to investigate the causes and the impact of rising prices in the midst of lower 
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demand and a gas glut, and an appropriate federal and state response. The committee wanted to 
determine if gas prices should be deregulated, reregulated, or kept under current controls. 
Representatives of state and federal government, industrial and residential consumers, and the gas 
industry attended. Testimony covered many of the same issues as the hearing two years previously. 
Congressmen William F. Clinger and Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania, as well as the other committee 
members, addressed the serious problem of a 20 to 40 percent rise in natural gas prices during a 
time of high unemployment. Congressman Clinger described the situation: 
Senior citizens on fixed incomes, farmers, small industry, low income individuals, and the 
unemployed were particularly hard hit, and this year, with the frigid temperatures we have 
been experiencing—thank heavens not so frigid this morning—these groups among others 
continue to be affected. For many the disastrous choice has been between heating and 
eating. Nationally, heating bills were up 41 percent during the December 1983 cold snap, 
costing Americans nearly $1.8 billion more than usual to stay warm during the last 2 weeks 
of last year.195  
William Orzechowski, director of the North Central Pennsylvania Office of Human 
Services (a private non-profit recognized by the state as an area agency on aging) submitted a 
survey on regional hardships caused by high heating costs, which provided more specific data, and 
reinforced the testimony of the 1982 hearing. As shown previously, low income residents in 
Orzechowski’s service area went without other necessities to pay for heat. They still risked 
hypothermia, which their health care providers often failed to diagnose. Gas costs rose much faster 
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than Social Security cost of living adjustments. Available aid was inadequate. The reluctance of 
many to accept aid, out of pride in their self-reliance, caused Orzechowski to advocate regulation 
that would stabilize gas prices at a moderate level, and place the burden of paying for bad 
distribution decisions mainly on gas industry companies and investors, not on consumers. He also 
asked for additional funding for fuel assistance programs, and more recognition of the dangers of 
insidious hypothermia.196   
Independent citizen advocate Kenneth Springirth came prepared with a list of 
recommendations for the legislators. Springirth pointed out the big differences in regional pricing, 
depending on whether the utility used local gas supplies.197 One demand drew such an outburst of 
applause from the audience that the chairman had to call the meeting back to order. Springirth 
argued, “. . . require utilities to purchase the most reasonably priced gas and if cheaper local 
production gas is available, the utility should be required to use it in place of the more expensive 
gas from other areas.”198 The message was clear: Erie needed more local gas. 
4.3 First Initiatives: Municipal Drilling and Regulation 
The poorest citizens of Erie were desperate to find ways to pay for heat, but the City of 
Erie was also desperate. At that time, the economy was truly terrible. In just one example, the 
home loan interest rate hit its all-time high in October 1981, at a usurious 18.45% for a thirty-year 
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fixed mortgage.199 Deindustrialization, the energy crisis, inflation, and Reaganomics all 
contributed to the economic crisis. Erie, like so many rust belt cities, struggled to reinvent itself. 
While Erie residents were fighting state plans to drill for gas in Lake Erie (to protect the region’s 
tourist industry centered on Presque Isle State Park as described in the previous chapter), many of 
the same citizens advocated expanded drilling on land. Ironically, an abandoned, oozing well in 
the Park—part of the legacy of decades of well-drilling—contributed to the surge of interest in 
drilling in the City of Erie. The Park well was first in a chain of events that culminated in new gas 
policy for Erie and for Pennsylvania.  
In the early 1980s, Presque Isle was an environmental paradox. It was the busiest state park 
in Pennsylvania with four million visitors annually coming to hike, picnic, hunt, fish, and enjoy 
the beaches.200 Yet, in 1982, Presque Isle was one of eight sites in western Pennsylvania on the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency’s priority list of waste clean-up sites.201 Among the 
park’s environmental problems were old gas wells. For at least ten years, visitors to one of the 
park’s beaches had complained about the presence of a stinking black ooze, redolent of ammonia 
and the rotten-egg smell of sulfur. In 1979, Park personnel discovered the source—a leaking 
abandoned gas well hidden under a paved road. The city of Erie had drilled the 3,500-foot well in 
1910. It supplied power for machinery at a city water treatment plant until the 1920s. The foul 
discharge was probably injected waste from the Hammermill Paper Co., located about four miles 
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from the well.202 However, Pennsylvania DER did not formally charge Hammermill with causing 
the leak, and the company denied it.203 Park workers used a temporary cap to control the effluent 
and siphon it into drums until the International Petroleum Company installed a permanent cap in 
November 1982.204  
 Federal officials at the Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Geological 
Survey were concerned that the waste may have contaminated other abandoned wells, and through 
them the ground water too.  The contamination could have spread over a wide area inside and 
outside the park.205 However, local and state officials reported that it had no negative impact on 
the tourist industry or the local ecosystem. Bill Pennewill of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources and aquatic biologist Robert Wellington of the Erie County Health 
Department agreed that the effluent had not harmed the biota of the park or lake, and had not 
affected human health.206 Pennewill then spoke about benefits to the park from the well. It was not 
completely plugged, which allowed the possibility that gas from it could heat some of the park’s 
buildings.207 The agency tasked with protecting the environment judged that the financial 
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advantages of a self-help gas well outweighed the potential for future problems, even in a place 
where environmental concerns would seem to be especially important.208  
Pennewill may have been thinking of an existing gas well drilled by Monsanto Corporation, 
that supplied heat to Presque Ilse Park facilities.209 The success of Monsanto’s well inspired Erie 
Mayor Lou Tullio to raise federal and private funds for a survey of drilling possibilities in the 
whole county.210 Monsanto, working with the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), had done a 
preliminary study focused on drilling at the park and along the bay front. The city wanted DOE 
permission to hire Monsanto too.211 Tullio first requested funding for the study from businesses 
located on the lakefront. Although he intended to seek federal funding, he did not want to wait for 
it.  He hoped to move ahead with private money to generate energy savings for the city as soon as 
possible. Tullio expected to partner with business and industry; he hoped for gas on city property, 
but anticipated shared benefits from wells on private land.212 As many as thirty public and private 
groups, including the city of Erie, Millcreek Township, a church, and a number of industries 
expressed interest.213 All were major players in Erie’s economy and life. Department of Energy 
officials, whose permission was necessary, met with Tullio and the concerned industry 
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representatives.214 DOE agreed to fund the study when the local businesses agreed to split the 
cost.215  
The joint study by the U.S. Department of Energy and Monsanto Corporation revealed that 
natural gas deposits underlay all of Erie County. Some citizens thought it was a waste of time to 
conduct a study when everyone already knew that gas was everywhere in Erie. Nevertheless, the 
federal government gave the city of Erie $65,000, and seventeen local businesses donated amounts 
from $400 to $500 each to fund the study. Although gas was found under the whole county, it was 
not necessarily available in commercially profitable amounts everywhere.216 The study based its 
conclusions on the examination of surface geology, and aerial photographs taken by the USGS. It 
identified promising places to drill on private land as well as city property. However, the study 
could not guarantee that these sites would be productive. Only sinking a ‘spud’ (the initial stage 
of drilling) could determine that. Landowners were free to drill when they liked.217 
The new study confirmed a number of previous studies and the experiences of drillers: 
shallow wells in the Devonian formation down to about 1,200 feet yielded small but fairly 
dependable amounts of gas. Deeper wells, into the Medina formation, could produce commercially 
important quantities.218 For self-help wells, the situation was ideal. Gary Moody, of the gas 
exploration and drilling firm Moody & Associates, observed, “You can dig just about any place in 
Erie County and get gas.” Moody’s firm would go on to produce wells for homeowner 
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consumption, for the city of Erie, the Erie School district, and Millcreek Township.219 Geologist 
Dr. John P. Gilewicz of Gannon University agreed that shallow wells in Erie were unlikely to 
produce great quantities of gas, but that they could persist for decades. Such wells had been part 
of the supply for local utility National Fuel Gas Company for a long time. “The gas in this area is 
good, but not spectacular.” Gilewicz considered Erie gas unlikely to make any great contribution 
towards national energy needs.220  
The industries that considered it worthwhile to contribute small sums to Monsanto’s study 
of potential well sites claimed that they did not expect a payoff very soon. They were investing in 
information that would be useful if new technology developed that would make shallow Devonian 
shale wells productive on an industrial scale. Devonian wells were relatively inexpensive to drill 
($30,000 to $40,000 in 1980) and might last 50 years, but they commonly produced only one to 
five thousand cubic feet of gas daily, about enough to heat a few houses. Deep wells would be 
much more productive, on the order of 25,000 to 100,000 cubic feet, but also much more expensive 
to drill ($125,000 in 1980).221 
 Even though industrial gas users claimed that information from the study would not be 
immediately useful, they apparently expected to have exclusive access to the information for at 
least several months. Erie city government and the contributing companies had paid for only about 
10 percent of the study cost. However, Erie City Engineer Wasinder Mokha announced that the 
full report would not be released for two to six months, “to keep the moochers out.” Contributing 
                                                 
219 Wesman, “Gas Drilling Study – Wise or Waste?” 
 
220 Paul Groucutt, “Gas Wells Expensive, but Becoming Popular,” Times-News, February 23, 1980. 
 
221 Wesman, “Can Shallow Wells Fuel Industry?” 
 
 104 
company owners did not want other individuals or businesses to begin speculating on good sites. 
Mokha said, “They’ve paid for the study and have a right to an exclusive look at it.”  He admitted 
that the city was obligated to make the report public because public funds had also paid for it.222 
Really, private companies had contributed a relatively small fraction. Those contributors may have 
had reason to believe that the technology needed to make shallow wells worthwhile to industry 
was not very far off.  
The Monsanto study prompted the first serious local effort to draft legal controls on drillers 
within the city limits.  The study would clearly increase drilling, which raised concerns mainly 
about public safety. Mayor Tullio planned to propose an ordinance that would regulate gas drilling 
in the city, but only as a safety measure. He plainly stated that he did not want to discourage 
drilling.223 Erie City Engineer Wasinder Mokha and the city council agreed with the mayor. Mokha 
said. “We’re obviously going to need some kind of ordinance to regulate it. You just can’t have 
any kind of gas well going up anyplace in the city.” He added, “This could mean a good number 
of gas wells. It all has to be done carefully; you wouldn’t want a gas well two feet from somebody’s 
front door, for example. Valves have to be the right kind, and so on.” At that time, there were no 
regulations at all to control drilling in the city. National Fuel Gas had requested such a measure 
two years previously, when a new private well in the city proved productive, but nothing came of 
the company’s request.224 Based on his research of drilling laws in other municipalities, Mokha 
proposed a permit requirement for gas and oil drillers.225 Other main provisions of the city 
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ordinance concerned proximity of a well to the property line, and the requirement for a one-
million-dollar liability policy.226 
            During a public hearing about the proposed measure, citizens objected most to the set-back 
provision (the distance required between the well and property lines) because it limited the 
opportunities for people who owned houses on small town lots. The council had already reduced 
the proposed setback requirement from twenty-five feet to twenty feet. However, one man called 
for fifteen feet in order to make it possible to give most people in town “the right to drill a gas 
well.” “The average citizen cannot continue to be taken advantage of and that’s exactly what 
happened. Don’t tie our hands.”227 Another commenter argued against any placement restrictions 
at all. He claimed that the regulations were designed to keep ordinary citizens, the “little guy,” 
dependent on National Fuel Gas for energy. A member of the city’s energy committee added that 
natural gas was “put in the ground by the creator for the use of the people.” Restricting access just 
allowed big business to continue “exploiting” and “profiteering” at the expense of others. “People 
are going to die this winter. We’re getting into a period like the Great Depression. It’s an energy 
depression.” Only one citizen was concerned with the lack of energy conservation provisions in 
the ordinance. He wanted those with high heating bills to upgrade their homes to save energy.228 
Councilman Mario Bagnoni, who opposed the measure, “blasted” the zoning requirement because 
requiring any well to be at least twenty feet from the property line would make it difficult to drill 
on town-sized lots without a special variance. He accused Mayor Tullio of wanting to stop the 
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“little guy” from drilling his own well. The measure passed four to three. 229 In fact, businesses did 
file most of the first fifteen permit applications under the new law.230  
The particulars of the protests against controls on gas extraction indicate that the issue was 
not so much about the practical realities of drilling.  The right to drill was the important point. For 
the average homeowner with a town lot, a backyard gas well had little economic logic. The real 
grievance was about out-of-control utility expenses. Why would homeowners spend up to $30,000 
(in 1980 dollars) to drill a well, when that amount of money would pay the heating bill for many 
years? Even the lower estimates for shallow drilling, starting at about $6,500, would be out of 
reach for those so poor that they were at risk of hypothermia. In addition, the residents who 
protested set-back provisions evidently did not consider the disruption they might experience from 
a well within a few feet of their own homes. 
4.4 Drilling Fever 
In the meantime, before any ordinance could be passed, municipal and community gas 
users began drilling at once. The excitement—and there was a lot of excitement—was first focused 
on the possibility of saving on rocketing energy costs during terrible economic conditions. Mayor 
Tullio moved forward with plans to drill on city land to benefit the Water and Sewer Authority, 
despite a lukewarm report on the site’s potential. The Benedictine Convent and the Erie and Harbor 
Creek school districts planned deep wells into the Medina Sandstone, where high production was 
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most likely. Their successes exceeded their best hopes, especially in the case of Erie School 
District.  
The Order of Benedictine Sisters in Erie gambled its “last red cent” on a gas well it hoped 
would supply the convent with energy for heat. It paid $100,000 for a 2,700 foot well, which 
luckily contained an estimated twenty-five-year supply of gas. The Sisters intended to start using 
the gas almost immediately and expected to save at least $500,000 over the life of the well. One 
member of the convent spoke further on the benefits of the well. “We think this discovery is a 
contribution to the movement of world peace,” Sister Joan Chittister told reporters. “People are 
fighting over limited resources. If we have our own energy, we won’t use up other people’s 
resources.”231 The convent’s decision to drill, reached by the religious community consensus, 
“caused headlines all over the world, probably because nuns were doing it” and was featured in a 
People Magazine article. The convent well lasted a long time, and still provides a small amount of 
gas.232 
Erie’s wastewater treatment plant was one of the first facilities the city hoped would benefit 
from its own gas supply.233 The Erie Sewer Authority passed a resolution to approve drilling four 
wells at the waste water treatment plant. Mayor Tullio projected costs to drill between $400,000 
and $500,000. Fuel bills at the time were $900,000 annually and rising fast. The Sewer Authority 
agreed to transfer mineral rights to the city if financing was arranged for drilling.234 In late 1980, 
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Tullio sought city council’s approval to drill near the city wastewater treatment plant. Tullio 
recommended drilling company Moody and Associates, who estimated drilling costs of $100,000 
per well. Tullio proposed that the city borrow the money and repay it from savings on gas bills.235 
Tullio had hired Monsanto to research the most productive places to drill on the treatment facility 
site, because a small shift in location could greatly affect the output.236 Unfortunately, the final 
study report from Monsanto did not identify any “high-probability sites” on the Sewer Authority 
property.237 
Other municipal organizations began producing their own energy supply.  Harbor Creek 
School District (in the lakefront township just to the north of Erie) drilled two productive wells, 
prompting a number of school boards and municipalities to consider investing in wells of their 
own. The cost was also $100,000 per well, but Erie’s geology made success likely. Harbor Creek 
expected to recoup the expense in about two years, from savings in energy costs. Iroquois, Fairview 
and Millcreek school districts; Millcreek Township, as well as the City of Erie had all begun 
drilling plans by the early 1980s. Some of the school districts and municipalities planned joint 
projects. Erie City and the Erie School District, for example, were investigating that possibility.238  
In March 1981, a well on the Erie Technical Memorial High School property confounded 
the predications about shallow gas well productivity, and local newspapers started using the word 
“bonanza.” When only half-way to the well’s intended depth, International Petroleum Service 
                                                 
 
235 “Tullio Proposes Gas Well at Treatment Plant,” Morning News, December 5, 1980.  
 
236 Wesman, “Gas Drilling Study – Wise or Waste?” 
 
237 “Study Identifies Probable Sites for Natural Gas Wells,” Times-News, August 15, 1981. 
  
238 Paul Groucutt, “Gas Wells Expensive, but Becoming Popular,” Times-News, February 23, 1980. 
 
 109 
Company (IPSCO) drillers hit a completely unexpected high-pressure gas pocket. The well was 
intended to go down over 3,300 feet into Medina sandstone. Instead, at 1,850 feet, the drill bit 
evidently found a part of the gas-rich Oriskaney Sand formation, something that had never 
happened in that area. Pressure at the well-head was 3.5 million cubic feet, about four times what 
was expected of the planned deep well. “’We got a bonanza,’ said jubilant School Director Edmond 
Giovanelli.” School Director Edward Sparaga was a little more cautious—he observed that it was 
possible the well would run out in a few weeks, but the undiminished pressure after hours of 
continuous runoff was a good sign.239 He added, “If the well proves out, we’ve got almost enough 
money left over to start another well somewhere else.” 240 The gas pressure escaping the well was 
so great that an odorous cloud had spread over the whole city by evening. IPSCO called in 
specialists from Dow Chemical’s Dowel Division to pump in a column of water to stop the gas. 
The Erie Fire Department and local supplier National Fuel Gas Company were swamped with calls 
from citizens worried about leaks and the possibility of explosion, although fire company officials 
said there was no danger.241  The directors decided to cease drilling, run a gas line to the high 
school and use the gas until it ran out. Then they could think about drilling a deeper well. The high 
school had potentially one of the most productive wells of its type in northwestern Pennsylvania.242  
In the midst of the drilling fever, one family in the city had a stroke of luck. James and 
Patricia Sonnenberg smelled leaking gas, which led to the discovery of an old orphan gas well just 
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three feet below ground level in the curbside grass strip in front of their house. In was on public 
property, but the gas was useless to the city because the well was not connected to any pipeline. 
The city decided to lease the well to the Sonnenbergs for one dollar per year. In exchange, the 
family would accept responsibility for putting the well into service for themselves. Then, when it 
was exhausted, the Sonnenbergs would cap it according to Department of Environmental 
Resources guidelines. The refurbishment would cost roughly a thousand dollars, and the family 
could reasonably expect the well to provide free gas for decades. The family saved the expense of 
a new well. The city saved the eventual cost of capping, for which it would have been responsible, 
because no one knew how old the well was, or who had drilled it. The Sonnenbergs were 
astonished to learn that similar forgotten wells were “numerous” in Erie. The newspaper reporter 
covering the story suggested that folks should get out their metal detectors.243 There is no record 
of anybody else in Erie having luck like the Sonnenbergs, but other private citizens did drill wells 
for their own use. The city of Erie issued one hundred forty-eight drilling permits in 1983, and 
ninety in 1984, the last two years of local control over that process.244  
4.5 Municipal and Commercial Interests 
The unexpectedly high production of several early wells changed the focus of drilling 
within the city from self-help to commercial production. Organizations including the Erie 
Zoological Society and the Erie Airport Authority became more interested in selling gas from their 
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wells than using it themselves. The sale of gas violated the new local ordinance which restricted 
commercial wells within city limits. Worse, the private investors who financed wells for those 
organizations were accused of betraying public trust and profiting from a public resource. The 
National Fuel Gas Company also attempted to sink a commercial well into the newly-discovered 
high pressure pocket under the city. All of these organizations saw themselves as vying for the 
same limited gas supply, and no one knew how long the bonanza was likely to last. 
The Erie Zoological Society began to sell gas from a well that was originally intended to 
supply the zoo itself, which was a violation of its drilling permit. The directors of the zoo arranged 
to have a gas well drilled on land owned by the City of Erie, for which the city would receive an 
eight percent royalty. Some of the investors that financed it were also members of the zoo board.245 
Twenty-one investors financed the well, $5000 from each. Under the details of their agreement, 
they stood to gain much less than the zoo or the city itself. The chair of the zoo board said that the 
investors were looking for a tax break, and just hoped that they would recover their money, and 
perhaps receive a small return. The circumstances suggest that the zoo solicited investments from 
charitable donors already inclined to support the zoo. However, the well far exceeded expectations, 
producing much more than the zoo could use for itself. The directors decided to sell the gas—all 
of it—to the National Fuel Gas (NFG), which violated the city’s gas ordinance. The director fully 
expected to reach an agreement with the city to solve the problem. He emphasized that the gas 
income would enable the zoo to make necessary upgrades and repairs running into the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars without needing to request money from the city, a substantial benefit to 
taxpayers. 246  
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The zoo’s decision violated several provisions of the city ordinance. Because NFG 
purchased all the gas, with none going to zoo buildings, the well did not conform to the zoo’s 
drilling permit. The well location was zoned residential; to sell the gas legally the property would 
need to be rezoned light industrial. The city could opt to amend the ordinance to allow commercial 
drilling in residential areas, or to grant a variance to the zoo, based on its “hardship situation.” 
Mayor Tullio favored that last solution.247 
Complaints, mainly from the school board, hampered the mayor’s inclination to allow the 
zoo a variance. The zoo’s well appeared to tap the same gas pocket as the school’s well in a 
formation that geologists expected to be productive for only a couple of years. Essentially, the 
school felt robbed of ‘its’ gas. However, legally, gas belongs to whomever recovers it—the school 
may have felt it had a prior claim, but it did not.248 Further, the head of the school district 
complained that NFG had declined to purchase gas from the school well because it was not up to 
NFG standards. Now it was buying gas from the same pocket. An NFG spokesman replied that the 
zoo was willing to sell its gas according to company guidelines, but the school district was not. 
The zoo had purchased a filter that removed sulfur and made the gas marketable; the school could 
have done the same if it chose. In addition, the zoo’s production went exclusively to NFG. The 
school district wanted to sell surplus gas when it had some, not by regular schedules or amounts.249 
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Although the school board was highly indignant about the idea of commercial sales draining the 
gas pool quickly, it had clearly approached NFG about selling to them. 
The mood at a public meeting between zoo officials and the city council was highly 
charged. A councilman angrily demanded to know why the zoo had applied for a permit to extract 
gas for its own use, and then without informing the city decided to sell gas for profit. Zoo Society 
Chair John Quinn explained that the zoo could have saved about $35,000 in utility costs by using 
the gas, but it stood to gain possibly hundreds of thousands of dollars by selling the gas. The zoo 
board considered it a good business decision to have that source of revenue for capital 
improvements and operating expenses, which need not come from the city or other donors. Further, 
the driller was working at cost as a favor to the zoo and deserved a quick answer about whether he 
should keep drilling deeper. Tullio tried unsuccessfully to calm the more vocal opponents of the 
zoo, but all members of the council were critical of the zoo’s actions.250   
The councilmembers were angry at the idea that private investors, especially in the case of 
zoo directors, would make a profit from resources under public land. Zoo officials protested that 
the investors had risked the chance of losing their money in a dry well. Quinn, one of the investors, 
in apparent defense of the insinuation that zoo society members worked secretly to cash in on a 
good thing, said he had offered the chance to invest to city council members. However, at least 
one member denied he had been given the opportunity. Council President Joyce Savocchio pointed 
out, correctly, that a decision about the zoo well would set a precedent for wells on other city 
property. As zoo society attorney James Blackwell remarked, “This well established this city is 
sitting on a pile of gas.”251 
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In view of the successful school and zoo wells, Mayor Tullio and city council members 
favored sinking commercial wells on other city properties, which they judged allowable because 
it would be in the city’s best interests.252  The school district continued to object to wells intended 
for sales to NFG. It pointed out that commercial extraction would hasten the depletion of the pocket 
much faster and repeated that under city zoning regulations, wells in areas zoned residential must 
be “an accessory to a structure,” in other words piped into a building for its own use. However, 
NFG would only agree to purchase gas if it had exclusive access to the well—it would not buy 
“surplus” gas.253 The school board argued that the people of Erie would be better served in the 
long run if commercial sales did not hasten the depletion of the gas pocket.254 
After the meeting, and at Tullio’s urging, zoo officials shut down the well until they could 
decide on a course of action.255 In the face of accusations that they had violated the public trust, 
they made arrangements to reconnect the well to zoo buildings, while wondering what to do about 
planned repairs that gas income would have covered.256 The city, still considering its own plans to 
drill, turned its attention to the substantial savings possible by converting its vehicles to natural 
gas.257 
The Erie International Airport also benefited from a very productive private gas well 
drawing on the same Oriskany sandstone formation that supplied the school and zoo wells. The 
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Airport Authority leased drilling rights to a private company for an eight percent royalty and a 
supply of gas for airport facilities. Again, the Airport officials said that they had not anticipated 
the volume of gas, another “record buster.” The drilling company was optimistic about the 
potential for more successful wells on airport property. Airport officials were expecting the city to 
request some of the gas revenue.258 
The airport wells drilled by Vineyard Oil and Gas Company were so successful that some 
members of the Authority argued that the airport ought to get a “better deal.” They wanted a higher 
percent of the revenue from Vineyard, or else a contract with a different drilling company. 
However, because no other company offered a higher percentage, the Airport Authority decided 
to honor and expand the contract with Vineyard.259 Airport Authority President Louis J. Porreco 
urged other board members to act quickly to drill additional wells before prime locations went to 
those “pirating up at our borders.”260 
As in the case of the zoo controversy, municipal leaders were criticized for personal 
involvement in the airports’ gas production. Porreco owned companies that had invested in 12,000 
shares of Vineyard stock, which was only about three tenths of a percent of the company’s shares. 
Nevertheless, because of Porreco’s potential conflict of interest, he abstained from the vote in 
which the authority decided to reaffirm the original terms of the deal, and contract for four new 
wells.261 Mayor Tullio was also suspected of hiding a personal interest. Political opponents 
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claimed that Tullio failed to disclose that his wife was also an investor in the gas company that 
developed the airport wells.262  
Once the possibility arose for variances that allowed commercial drilling in places not 
zoned industrial, National Fuel Gas applied for a permit to drill a commercial well in a location 
zoned C-2, or commercial. The company argued that a natural gas well was appropriate in a 
commercial district because it was analogous to a gasoline filling station.263 NFG’s attorney 
stressed the traditional rights of property owners. He opined, “In our society we are supposed to 
be free and the laws should protect us only when necessary.”264 The zoning board delayed acting 
on the permit for so long that NFG referred the matter to county court, which ruled in NFG’s favor. 
City officials and school board officials planned to appeal the court decision, fearing again that 
commercial drilling would drain the gas pocket that supplied the school. Time was running out for 
NFG, as the rules for drilling continued to evolve.  Pending local legislation would require a three-
acre space to drill a commercial well in the city. In addition, under new state legislation effective 
on April 18, 1985, the state of Pennsylvania, not local authorities, would issue drilling permits.265 
NFG began drilling in early April without a city permit. Reports indicated that NFG had 
drilled only about ten feet, possibly to establish the project as an existing well not subject to new 
state regulations.266 The well at the corner of 38th and Liberty Streets was the first drilled within 
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city limits specifically for commercial production.267 City leaders expressed outrage that NFG 
went ahead with their project without a permit and without giving the required advance notice of 
the drilling start date. The city expected to cite NFG for the violations. NFG defended its actions 
by saying that it had state permits and assumed that the court ruling in its favor made a local permit 
unnecessary. NFG confirmed that it wanted to start the well before the new state regulation took 
effect, forcing it to redo the application process.268  
An NFG spokesman remarked that the well issue had been politicized in Erie, referring to 
the discussions at a council meeting.269 That was evidently true. Mayor Tullio reversed his position 
on drilling commercial wells within the city. He declared that any potential benefit to the city was 
not worth the risk of depleting the school district well. If that well failed, the blow to district 
finances would probably require a tax increase. Tullio still believed that the commercial drilling 
would not deplete the school well, but he did not want to be held responsible for the possibility.270 
The timing of action or inaction by the city zoning board and mayor, regarding their failure to act 
on NFG’s permit request, prompted one editorial to accuse the mayor of actually wanting NFG to 
drill its well, but not wanting to take responsibility for allowing it.271 That conclusion is consistent 
with Tullio’s long-standing ambivalence about drilling. The mayor’s stance is in itself consistent: 
He judged whether or not to support gas extraction based on the relative benefits and risks to the 
                                                 
267 Miller, “Gas Company Starts Drilling Without Permit.” 
 
268 Gary Wesman, “Erie Goes to Court to Halt Gas Well Drilling,” Morning News, April 11, 1985. 
 
269 George Miller, “NFG Stops Drilling,” Erie Daily Times, April 11, 1985. 
 
270 George Miller, “Tullio Withdraws Proposal Permitting Commercial Gas Wells Within City,” Erie Daily Times, 
February 3, 1985. 
 
271 Tony Zona, “City Zoning Law Gets the Old One-Two Punch,” Erie Daily Times, April 4, 1985. 
 
 118 
city. But it was also possible that he hoped to benefit personally, not just acquire political capital, 
from looser drilling restrictions. His wife’s investment in the Airport Authority’s venture was an 
ongoing scandal.272 
4.6 Local Impact 
The reality of living near gas wells became more evident after a number of organizations 
began to sink wells, which showed how little most citizens understood the implications of in-town 
drilling. City Councilman Bagnoni proposed an amendment to the city ordinance that would 
prohibit night-time drilling, presumably following complaints from people who lived near 
Mercyhurst College, where drilling was in progress around the clock. Bagnoni said, “All that noise 
and pounding travels quite a distance. I think they should only drill to eight or nine at night and 
then stop, so the neighbors can get some sleep without all that pounding going on.” The college 
protested that they had communicated the drilling schedule to nearby residents, who hadn’t 
seriously objected. Others pointed out that it is not really possible, practical, or safe to halt drilling, 
cap the well, then uncap and recommence. A nighttime restriction could halt any drilling in 
town.273 This outcome would be at odds with Bagnoni’s previous position on citizen’s 
opportunities to benefit from their own wells, unless perhaps he thought of the college as a ‘big 
guy.’ Bagnoni withdrew his proposal, after city engineer Wasinder Mokha explained that trying to 
halt a well in progress would lead to increased danger of leaking gas, explosion and fire. It would 
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also increase the cost and duration of drilling significantly. Bagnoni admitted that neighbors only 
objected to drilling that goes on for weeks. “They (the neighbors) didn’t mind if it was a ten-day 
thing.”274 
As time went on, the dangers and nuisances of in-town drilling became more obvious. A 
news report characterized a well owned by the high school as “problem-plagued.” An explosion 
injured a workman and prompted the evacuation of two school buildings. The workman was 
welding a section of pipeline when a different short portion of pipe blew out and broke his arm. 
The smell of gas filled the neighborhood, but not in dangerous concentrations. School officials 
planned to call in a consultant to evaluate the unexplained pipe failure, and advise on the 
construction of a bypass pipeline that would put the gas well back in production within a few days. 
275  
Erie newspaper columnist Len Kholos stated his objection to drilling within the city. 
Kholos admitted that as an Erie taxpayer, he was grateful for the tax savings made possible by the 
school well. Nevertheless, he wished that NFG would suck all the gas out of the ground under 
south Erie as soon as possible, because he did not like living downwind of the school well. The 
bad gas smell was pervasive. He welcomed new state law, which would put restrictions on drilling 
in urban areas, but knew that the new law would not actually protect him from the nuisance of the 
NFG well. It was too far away for him to legally protest, but “well within gagging distance.”276 
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4.7 The 1984 Oil and Gas Act 
The larger context for the conflict between the Erie city council and National Fuel Gas was 
imminent state legislation. Many people in Erie (besides those gagging on emissions from the high 
school’s well) were concerned about the way drilling was handled locally and statewide. Regional 
concerns prompted discussion about the need for regulation at the state level. At a June 1981 public 
hearing, State Senator Anthony Andrezeski spoke to representatives of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Resources (DER), the Pennsylvania Fish Commission, the Erie 
County Health Department, and over 200 citizens, about the dangers of area drilling. Andrezeski 
explained that, out of the forty-one states with regulations for oil and gas drilling, Pennsylvania’s 
laws were the weakest. Andrezeski said he was not anti-business, nor anti-drilling, but was 
concerned about long-term health problems and ecological damage. Citizens Advisory Council 
member Richard Kubiak reported that Pennsylvania did not require bonds to ensure that abandoned 
wells would be plugged, as thirty-eight other states did. Pennsylvania had no permit fee, no rule 
for well spacing, no requirement for well casing, and no mandate for reports on the chemicals 
injected into wells. Kubiak also accused DER of lax attention to reports of problems. Richard Zinn, 
regional director of Northwest Pennsylvania DER, said the agency had insufficient staff, and he 
planned to triple the number of agency investigators.277 
Despite the level of acceptance people in Erie displayed for drilling in the built landscape, 
some long-term environmental activists began working to control the practice. Sister Pat Lupo 
OSB was one. Lupo was (and is) a member of the Benedictine Convent that decided by consensus 
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to acquire a self-help gas well in 1980. However, shortly afterward she became a founding member 
of the Erie County Environmental Coalition, formed around 1983 to protest the lack of 
Pennsylvania gas drilling regulations. Sister Lupo said, “Anybody could drill, which caused issues; 
there was water contamination in many places” and “people’s water caught fire.” Lupo was also a 
member of the Citizens Environmental Council, part of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources, which eventually became the state Department of Environmental 
Protection. Initially she found that the attitude in Harrisburg was that “Erie wasn’t even part of the 
state.” That started to change in the late 1980s under Gov. Casey, who appointed Sister Lupo to 
several environmental advisory boards.278 
In 1984, the state enacted Pennsylvania Act 223, the Oil and Gas Act of 1984 to regulate 
gas drilling. The law took effect on April 19, 1985. The state law was more restrictive than Erie’s 
local ordinance and preempted it. For example, the state mandated a two-hundred-foot setback 
from buildings and water wells, which overturned the (contested) twenty-foot city requirement. 
Under the new law the Pennsylvania Department of Natural Resources would issue drilling permits 
and handle complaints, not local authorities. The city only retained the authority to impose zoning 
regulations, for example allowing drilling only in places zoned industrial.279 Act 223 was a game-
changer for the natural gas industry. As another Erie County Environmental Coalition member, 
retired Mercyhurst Professor Dick Kubiak expressed, “Prior to Act 223, of twenty-something gas-
producing states, Pennsylvania was at the bottom [in terms of regulation]. Act 223 put us 
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somewhere in the middle, and it drove the gas boys crazy. They didn’t know how good they had 
it. They were drilling wherever. They were drilling in wetlands.”280  
Nevertheless, neither the original local ordinance nor the new state legislation halted the 
controversy over drilling in the City of Erie. By the end of summer 1985, Mayor Tullio proposed 
to city council an amended ordinance to allow commercial drilling on city-owned property and 
non-residential parcels of at least three acres. Tullio wanted revenue for the city, and said the 
council would be responsible for a budget shortfall if they opposed the revised drilling regulations. 
The revised ordinance would allow the zoo to sell gas to NFG.281 The zoo officials continued to 
advocate for the right to sell gas to fund significant repairs. Some members of the council remained 
opposed to commercial sale of gas. They advocated using wells to supply the city’s own needs. 
They argued that it made no sense to sell gas to NFG, which would quickly deplete the 
underground pool, while paying NFG a higher price to supply the city or zoo with gas.282   
Experts continued to contradict each other as competing interests defended their positions. 
Drilling consultant Mack Porter, who was also gas consultant for the school district, informed the 
council that commercial extraction of gas could deplete the Oriskany pocket before the city even 
had a chance to drill its own wells. He argued that the private investors would reap all the benefits 
and force higher taxes to fund the school system and the zoo when their wells went dry.283 City 
Engineer Wasinder Mokha countered that the city ordinance restrictions, which stipulated the 
property to be drilled must be three acres and contain only one single-purpose building, would 
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keep private investors from competing with the city. Only a few parcels existed that would qualify 
and the city owned them all.284  
4.8 The “Frac” Experiment 
Erie’s quest for an increased gas supply and fear of exhausting the existing wells 
contributed to the development of hydraulic fracturing, the gas-extraction method that would make 
the twenty-first century Marcellus Shale boom possible. Due to Erie’s distinctive geology and 
struggling economy, the region probably had the most self-use wells in the state, perhaps the 
nation. Erie had an abundance of underground gas that was low pressure or difficult to extract. The 
existence of so many low-flow wells in northwestern Pennsylvania prompted an “experiment” in 
a new technology. The drilling companies called it “fracing.” Possibly for the first time, Erie 
residents learned that “fracing” was short for “hydraulic fracturing,” a process that pumped a 
mixture of water, chemicals, and sand under high pressure into a well, to open up fractures in the 
surrounding shale, and release the natural gas.285  
The Department of Energy (DOE) partnered with the independent Gas Research Institute 
and the Monsanto Corporation to do a “fracture study” of low-producing wells, and make the 
results available to local industry and government, who would cost-share the study, and arrange 
for leasing and drilling.286 Gary Moody, head of a local gas and oil exploration firm, was initially 
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highly critical of the study. He told a school board meeting that those wells would produce perhaps 
2,000 to 8,000 cubic feet per day, which was only enough for a private home, not a big public 
institution. He warned the board not to “let glamour overcome reality.” He accused Monsanto and 
the Institute of experimenting with the idea of shallow shale gas wells, because no one yet knew 
how to extract gas from shale.287 However, within a year, Moody discussed the difficulty of getting 
gas out of the Devonian shale with a local reporter, and said that coming technology would make 
Devonian shale gas an important commercial source. Certainly DOE was optimistic enough about 
the possibilities to fund studies of shale gas and experimentation with new technologies.288 
The Erie School District contracted for new three wells in 1984 to supply a district 
elementary school, a middle school, and an administrative building. Initially none of the wells 
produced much gas. That changed after the wells were “stimulated” by “fracing.” The school 
district reported that it now expected the wells to supply between 70 and 100 percent of the energy 
needs for the three buildings. The school district had received a grant from the Pennsylvania 
Energy Development Authority to pay for the experimental and logistically-challenging drilling 
practice. The drillers involved worked at a discount in hope that success would lead to more 
business. They estimated that 2,000 such old non-productive wells existed within the city dating 
from much earlier than the 1980s boom—an interesting glimpse at the long history of self-help 
wells. The district was required to report the practice to the Department of Environmental 
Resources. A project spokesman mentioned that “We tried to get all the chemicals out of the well 
as quickly as possible.” But he didn’t say why.289 Commenting on whether or not it was worthwhile 
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to spend the federal grant money on researching new gas, City Engineer Wasinder Mokha said, 
“‘The energy industry advertises that it is spending so many billions of dollars to explore new 
sources of energy. Taking risks, in other words. They say it with pride; can’t we?’”290 
4.9 Conclusion 
The gas-drilling boom in Erie during the late 1970s and early 1980s had a substantial 
impact on the landscape of opportunity available to the gas industry during the twenty-first century 
Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale boom. Erie’s poorly-regulated spate of municipal drilling 
contributed to legislation at the state level for at least some control. The 1984 Oil and Gas Act was 
the basic legal framework for almost thirty years, until the 2012 passage of Pennsylvania Act 13, 
the regulatory overhaul in response to Marcellus drilling. 291 The connections between energy costs 
and poverty in Erie, which drew national attention, only reinforced a perception among a portion 
of the population that gas extraction should be encouraged, not restricted. Conversely, Erie’s gas 
boom also produced a cadre of those who protested the unregulated drilling free-for-all. Both 
groups, and some of the same people, were still around in 2007 for the Marcellus boom. In 
addition, Erie’s abundance of shallow and low-flow wells stimulated experimentation with new 
technology to extract gas from tight shale, ultimately contributing to the development of the 
fracking procedure that is so central to the success of the Marcellus boom.  
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The extraction and regulation of natural gas is complicated by its fungible nature: As a 
resource it acts more like a school of fish than a vein of coal or an over-grazed meadow. Gas flows. 
The gas under Erie certainly was a commons until, by rule of capture, someone drilled a well to 
extract and claim it. Beset by economic pressures and federal actions, Erie’s leaders and citizens 
did not unite to protect their common gas reserve, as they had united to protect their common 
interest in protecting Lake Erie. Instead, the community, fragmented by their conflicting interests, 
rushed to maximize individual benefits before the bonanza ran out. 
This aspect of the ‘tragedy of commons’ is of course not limited to Erie, but Erie is an 
illustrative case study of the dynamic in a small-scale community. During the energy crisis of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, people in Erie acted on an internalized principle of individual action 
to solve what was predominantly a collective problem, largely shaped by factors outside their 
control. The more power and agency that individuals possessed, the better they were able to 
negotiate rapidly shifting circumstances, which served to reinforce the neoliberal ideal of 
individual responsibility.  
Although the gas boom of the 1970s-80s did not create the same kind of state-wide public 
controversy that the Marcellus boom has, a number of activists did press the case for environmental 
protection. Sister Lupo’s work illustrates the long narrative arc of activism on energy issues in 
Pennsylvania. In reference to the decision to drill their well, Lupo said that the convent’s main 
concern was of course energy prices, but the wars over energy resources did play a part. The 
Benedictines in Erie very actively support peace and justice movements, then and now. Sister 
Lupo: 
I want to say something else. I don’t want you to think we are for gas. Right now 
 we are fighting to keep fossil fuels in the ground. We are working for a moratorium on
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drilling, pipelines and so on. Our organization is called Our Water, Our Air, Our Rights. 
Right now we are looking for funding for solar panels.292  
Erie also provides a case study of the problems of federalism and divisions of jurisdiction. 
Municipal regulation may take note of resources and concerns unique to the region. The benefits 
and burdens of extractive industry look different at a small scale than they do at the national or 
even state level. However, the state overrides the local, and the federal regulation overrides the 
state. The federal government has power to set prices that determine whether or not an energy 
source is worth extracting. It can protect consumers from local self-interested powers. 
Nevertheless, policy for the national good may unfairly burden locals, as did federal gas price 
deregulation. The state of Pennsylvania, with less direct incentive to allow expanded drilling on 
land than it had in the lake bed, was able to enact some controls for the gas industry, despite a 
social climate that favored incentivizing extraction. This legislation was not adequate for the 
circumstances in the mid-2000s, when fracking—hydraulic fracturing combined with horizontal 
drilling—transformed the gas industry throughout the central Appalachians. 
Fracking started small, its use stimulated by the desire to bring old wells back on line, as 
in Erie. By the time the potential in the Marcellus play became evident, there was a precedent for 
fracking—it was not necessarily an alarming new development. The experimental process of 
hydraulic fracturing was underwritten by government agencies and private industry, although 
changes in energy industries are fundamentally market-driven.293 However, the dire need for 
abundant energy so evident in the region suggests a reason for industry and official interest, and 
for a measure of public acquiescence toward a new drilling practice.   
292 Personal communication from Sr. Pat Lupo, January 16, 2017. 
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The ongoing struggles among interested parties in Erie’s drilling controversy illustrate the 
process of negotiation and accretion by which frankly jerry-built energy policy evolves. Opposing 
political powers and market forces, counterbalancing against each other, created a regulatory 
structure with a shifting center, rather than a coherent and systematic plan. And the terms are 
always subject to debate and revision.  
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5.0 Drilling Rural Appalachia Part I: The Farmers 
The legacy of extraction in Pennsylvania’s Appalachian hinterland facilitated the modern 
gas boom. Many of the stakeholders in rural land use—farmers, drillers, conservationists, 
government leaders, and scholar-activists of the region—during the 1970s and 1980s were aware 
of the negative consequences of gas drilling. Some worked for passage of legislation to mitigate 
the worst impacts. However, on the whole, other considerations took precedence. The values and 
knowledge of rural landowners weighed in favor of gas drilling. Scholars of Appalachian 
exploitation and persistent poverty did not prioritize gas issues. Conservationists who sometimes 
did prioritize restrictive gas regulation focused on the threats to public parkland. No one advocated 
keeping the gas in the ground, as some do today. All these stakeholders were influenced by a blend 
of current and long-standing contexts. They were affected by the immediate economic and social 
issues of the decades which featured the rise of modern environmentalism and the nearly 
simultaneous energy crisis. Their actions and priorities were also fundamentally affected by fallout 
from the previous hundred years of drilling and other energy extraction.   
Pennsylvania’s mountains are a physical and cultural part of Appalachia, the rural region 
that encompasses the highlands that stretch from Maine to Georgia.294 The mountains are a vast 
storehouse of fossil fuel energy: coal, oil and gas. Capital from outside the region financed modern 
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development, and most of the profits generated went outside too.295  These are the hallmarks of a 
colonial economy. Conflicting land claims and patterns of settlement dating back to Revolutionary 
times forced many resident landowners to concede mineral rights to outside corporate interests as 
the nation industrialized in the nineteenth century.296 If Appalachia is in some ways a sacrifice 
zone, an internal colony to supply energy to metropoles both inside and outside the region, that 
pattern originated in the Pennsylvania mountains. The booms and busts of extractive industries are 
a familiar pattern there. The gas boom that commenced with the federal deregulation of gas prices 
in the late 1970s expanded interest in drilling to new areas of the state, where some landowners 
still retained their subsurface mineral rights. These areas included the ridge and valley region that 
lies along the southern edge of the Allegheny plateau.297 This chapter, the first part of a discussion 
of drilling for natural gas in Appalachian Pennsylvania, considers the role of rural landowners who 
did not see themselves as part of a colonial economy. Their decisions, which were a factor in 
keeping the state of Pennsylvania friendly to the gas industry, were influenced by a long-held 
system of land ethics and personal values, and also by the available knowledge of what gas drilling 
entailed. 
Rural Pennsylvanian landowners in the 1970s and 1980s, whose actions and opinions set a 
precedent for the modern Marcellus gas boom, operated within the context of their era. They were 
impacted by the energy crisis, and concerned with preserving their land from environmental 
degradation and suburban sprawl. In addition, they had long memories and traditions that affected 
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their decisions about gas extraction, in situations where they actually had a choice in the matter. 
The influence of tradition and the times, as well as their own interests, tended to encourage farmers 
to sell or lease drilling rights in the last quarter of the twentieth century.  
Landowners’ priorities and values alone do not adequately explain their land-use decisions. 
The availability of knowledge about the consequences of drilling was also an important factor. 
Rural residents during the 1970s and 1980s possessed much different common knowledge, 
compared to information readily available after about 2007. The amount of public attention paid 
to gas drilling, and the public presentation of gas’s benefits and drawbacks, significantly affects 
what the individual citizen who has not made a personal study can know about it. Knowledge of 
environmental degradation caused by drilling, which could have dissuaded landowners (and 
particularly farmers) from signing leases with drilling companies, was publically available, but not 
widely discussed. Despite experiencing many of the same problems that drilling causes now, rural 
Pennsylvanians were more concerned with other threats.  
Despite the environmental problems of drilling, farmers continued to allow gas drilling, 
which might suggest that they did not regard these problem as sufficiently important deterrents, or 
any concern of theirs. That conclusion is too simple. Rural people traditionally have valued land 
in practical terms of material production, and defended the right to use their land as they saw fit. 
But they were not indifferent to environmental degradation.  
5.1 Land Ethics and Rural Values: The Culture of Conservative Liberalism 
Farmers and rural landowners in Pennsylvania and adjacent parts of Appalachia who sold 
or leased natural gas drilling rights forty years ago were influenced in part by a set of agrarian 
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values, a long-held ethic of land use. These values—a combination of utilitarianism, 
libertarianism, and stewardship—encompass basic ambiguities between pragmatism and sense of 
place. Underlying all the theories about what motivates many farmers is their stubborn 
determination to hang on to their land and identity.  
James T. Lemon, who studied the cultural roots that favor a utilitarian ethic of extraction, 
saw “the early signs of liberal North America in Pennsylvania as much as anywhere.” In his 1972 
classic, The Best Poor Man’s Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania, 
Lemon argued that conditions of the initial settlement of Pennsylvania favored a “liberal, middle-
class orientation” in its citizens. By that he meant that a combination of factors—cultural 
traditions, environmental, economic and social conditions, as well as the goals and expectations of 
those who chose to immigrate—favored an outlook in which “people planned more for themselves 
than for their communities.” They placed “individual freedom and material gain over that of public 
interest.” Lemon did not claim that early Pennsylvanians were “single-minded materialists,” but 
that they did have a great sense of opportunity in an unlimited environment. Although Lemon 
wrote about the early settlement of the state, he was consciously writing about his own time as 
well. He wanted to provide insight and perhaps self-awareness to contemporary readers, who must 
learn to live with the knowledge that the world and its resources are finite.298 In his analysis, 
Pennsylvania farmers developed a cultural tradition of utilitarian and libertarian rural values, 
which Lemon saw persisting into the latter half of the twentieth century, and which are still evident 
now.  
                                                 
298 James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man’s Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), xv-xvi. 
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For farmers, land-use issues are not simple. Utilitarian and libertarian rural values have a 
complicated relationship with environmental values, both in the abstract and on the ground. The 
defense of private property rights—itself an extension of liberal economics—can lead to 
environmental consciousness as well as environmental degradation. Often what looks like an anti-
environmental attitude is actually distrust of high-handed regulation imposed from above. This 
distrust is long established, and possibly militates against activism for a high degree of government 
control over the right of a landowner to lease his gas drilling rights.  
Conventional farmers who own the land they work can have assumptions in common with 
gas drilling companies about the proper use of land. At the same time, the differing natures of these 
two industries can create a conflict of interest.  Farmers, like others involved in extractive 
industries, tend to be anti-regulatory and anti-environmentalist. They base their system of land use 
values—their land ethic—on utilitarian and libertarian philosophies.299 This shared set of values 
may partly explain a long-standing lack of conflict with extractive industries over land use. 
Nevertheless, farmers and drillers have differing agendas. Farming must be sustainable to a greater 
degree than fossil-fuel extraction. Farmers often are invested in their identity as independent 
landowners and possess a strong sense of place. Even as they are willing to subsidize their 
businesses with income from mineral leases—part of a persistent and stubborn effort to remain on 
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Zalta, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/libertarianism-history/.  
 
 134 
the land— they are aware of the possibilities for negative impact on the land. Although farmers 
who engage in conventional modern agriculture are often stereotyped as anti-environmentalist, 
they have sometimes made common cause with more conventional environmental activists against 
other extractive industries.  One cannot conclude that farmers who allow drilling are completely 
indifferent to the possible negative effects of energy extraction.  
Some writers on the ethics of land use have argued that the attachment rural people have 
to their own land and their intimate knowledge of it give them a strong sense of place.  These 
factors instill a conservationist ethic and produce good stewards of the environment. Stuart Udall 
took this point of view when he discussed ethics and land use policy in the early days of the 
environmental movement. He believed that an agrarian connection produced a conservation land 
ethic. He argued that the nation needed a new land ethic because the majority of Americans no 
longer had a direct connection to the land.300 Wendell Berry argued more specifically that the less 
industrially-inclined farmers preserved a respect for ethical limits in the use of land, especially in 
connection with energy. He used the example of the Amish community, whose members have 
deliberately exercised restraint in the use of technology. Berry characterized the methods of the 
Amish, which depend on human and animal energy more than on fossil fuels, as neither wasteful 
nor destructive.301 
On the other hand, influential conservationist Aldo Leopold concluded that a human’s 
working relationship with a particular place offers no automatic protection for the land. Leopold 
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was the first to use the expression ‘land ethic’ to describe the basis of values on which people 
decide the proper use of land. In Sand County Almanac he wrote for the need to establish a new 
working philosophy of land use to replace the competitive drive for economic gain. He called for 
an ethic that includes resources and the environment as part of the community to which humans 
feel respect and responsibility. Leopold saw the conservation movement as the beginnings of such 
an ethic, but he concluded that Americans’ supposed “love for and obligation to the land of the 
free and home of the brave” did not prevent the loss of top soil, pollution of water, or extermination 
of species.302  
Either despite or because of their working relationship with the land, a majority of farmers, 
and those rural residents who think like farmers, differ from conventional environmentalists in 
their view of the purpose and use of open land.303 In the early history of America, farmers settled 
the wilderness and transformed what they perceived as wasteland into fruitful and civilized farms 
and communities. By the early decades of the twentieth century, a basic rift in land use philosophy 
had developed between farmers and those who had begun to value the wild for itself and to work 
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for its preservation. Wilderness enthusiasts tended to be urbanites who used undeveloped areas for 
recreational purposes.304 Farmers clashed with outdoor enthusiasts and environmental preservation 
advocates over such issues as wildlife management including predator control and hunting rights, 
over proposals for wetland and scenic river preservation, and over disrespect for private property 
rights by off-roaders, campers and hikers.305  
In the decades after World War II, conflict increased between farmers and environmental 
advocates over mainstream farming practices that caused soil erosion and water pollution, and 
especially over the use of herbicides and pesticides.  Agricultural organizations reacted 
aggressively to criticisms of modern farm management, and they opposed federal environmental 
policy by leveraging their considerable power at the state and local level.306 The voting record on 
environmental bills reflected rural resistance to such regulation; in nearly every case, the more 
rural an area, the stronger the opposition to environmental programs.307 This anti-regulatory voting 
record of representatives from rural areas on farm-related environmental issues helps demonstrate 
the shared values of farmers and other rural residents. Given the dramatically decreasing number 
of commercial farmers, they would have been less able to consistently influence their 
representatives without the support their non-farming neighbors.   
In the early 1970s, the Pennsylvania Land Use Policy Project investigated the land use 
values of Pennsylvania’s rural residents. The authors of the report conducted a survey in order to 
assess public views on land use concerns and priorities. The results support the conclusion that 
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rural residents’ values are utilitarian and libertarian, although the respondents still expressed a 
desire to protect the land from harmful use.  Respondents from the Appalachian region expressed 
a strong belief in the sanctity of private property and individual choice. They were anxious for new 
industry and jobs, but resented land degradation from past abuses. Farmers wanted government 
help to protect them from development pressure and rising operating costs, but they also reported 
that they “resent government intervention.” They particularly protested against land acquisition by 
the government.308 
Sometimes the purportedly anti-environmentalist attitudes among rural people are a 
function of bureaucratic arrogance. For example, the “anti-environmentalism” manifested by the 
population of the southern Appalachians, many of whom were evicted from their homesteads 
during the establishment of Great Smokey National Park, was a reaction to elitist federal planning 
that occurred without reference to the strong sense of place felt by those people forced to move.309  
Another example comes from a study of commercial farming operations in the Mississippi delta, 
which also concluded that resistance to conservation legislation was more anti-federal regulation 
than anti-environmentalist. Delta farmers took a utilitarian and economic approach to land-use 
planning, yet were still sensitive to the environmental consequences of farming. They commonly 
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implemented soil and water conservation management practices. However, they were highly 
reluctant to relinquish control of land-use decisions to outsiders.310 In both these situations local 
residents who possessed unique understanding and attachment to a place reacted to their exclusion 
from the regulatory planning process. That reaction placed them in opposition to the goals of 
environmental advocates and earned them the name of anti-environmentalist.   
Modern drilling companies themselves acknowledged the influence of rural values and 
resistance to federal intrusion in landowners’ decisions to sign a drilling contract. Energy 
companies employ agents called landmen to negotiate with those from whom they want to lease 
mineral rights. Successful landmen use the known values of conservative rural residents to gain 
access to owners’ homes and to deflect their concerns. These company representatives leverage 
patriotism, expressed as worries about America’s energy needs and fears about foreign 
competition. They know about the resentments among conservative people toward big government 
interference.  After checking on the political drift of owners’ bumper stickers, landmen can defuse 
questions about environmental regulation by contrasting the role of local and state permitting with 
the intrusiveness of federal oversight.311 Local control, the landmen imply, will be more sensitive 
to regional concerns—including financial benefits to rural areas—and not base regulation entirely 
on a national environmental agenda formed from an elitist urban perspective.312  
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Nevertheless, farmers and neighboring landowners have at times effectively cooperated 
with more conventional environmentalists to oppose large-scale development projects that 
threatened the health and usefulness of the land. The most effective such partnership united in 
opposition to surface mining for coal.313  During the 1960s and 1970s these rural Appalachian 
landowners acted as unconventional grass-roots environmental activists. The culturally 
conservative rural people who advocated for environmental protection laws against the powerful 
coal interests did so in defense of their own private property rights. Not only did they see that 
surface mining was a severe and irremediable encroachment on landowners’ rights, they had 
learned by experience the link between environmental degradation and rural poverty.  Under these 
circumstances, they made common cause with more mainstream labor and conservation 
organizations such as the United Mine Workers of America and the Allegheny County 
Sportsmen’s League to push for tougher controls on surface mining.314  
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Other examples exist of environmental stewardship among rural Appalachian residents 
motivated by attachment to land and of local struggle against resource appropriation by outside 
interests. These include West Virginian ginseng hunters who worked during the late twentieth 
century to preserve the mountain hillside commons against coal and timber interests, and residents 
in several rural Virginia counties who participated in the 1993 environmental impact assessment 
of a proposed high voltage power line.315 These examples show that despite farmers’ utilitarian 
relationship with their land, and their acceptance of modern farming practices that have a negative 
environmental impact, farmers and other rural landowners do sometimes engage in environmental 
activism against other extractive industries. The relative lack of conflict and controversy between 
gas drilling companies and rural residents during the 1970s and 1980s cannot be fully explained 
by the assumption that rural land owners, engrossed by practical necessities, are indifferent to 
environmental concerns. Values alone do not dictate decisions—knowledge is another factor.  
5.2 The Influence of Knowledge 
Although the environmental impact associated with gas drilling did not receive the kind of 
public attention in the 1970s and 1980s that we see now, farmers in the first decades of the modern 
environmental movement had several readily available sources of information about gas drilling. 
They had knowledge about the positive and negative experiences of their neighbors during a 
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century of oil and gas drilling. Farmers had access to reporting in the agricultural press. They, like 
other Americans, were influenced by the public discourse on environmental problems, especially 
the energy crisis of the 1970s. On the whole, agricultural knowledge facilitated acceptance of gas 
drilling. 
One important basis of farmers’ knowledge about resource extraction has been the very 
longstanding and common practice of selling and leasing mineral rights. Since the beginning of 
the gas industry in the nineteenth century, farmers have sold mineral rights on land they continued 
to farm because small scale farming frequently does not support itself. Agricultural operations in 
Pennsylvania quite often depended for economic sustainability on some sort of direct or indirect 
subsidy—unpaid or underpaid labor, government support, off-farm job income, externalized costs, 
and of course natural resource extraction such as gas drilling. The accumulation of successful 
experiences by the farmers who benefitted from natural gas income became an important part of 
the common knowledge base that other landowners drew upon to make their own decisions to 
lease drilling rights.   
No one buys into Thomas Jefferson’s views of the primary virtues and usefulness of the 
independent agrarian life more than the farmers themselves, especially beleaguered smaller scale 
agriculturalists in recent decades. In Pennsylvania, the immigrant’s ‘best poor man’s country,’ the 
farms have in many cases managed to conform to the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal—farm production 
began and has often remained both diversified in types of commodities grown and managed by 
small owner/operators.316  Farmers may well resort to income from mineral rights with a sense of 
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how precarious their profession and their land tenure has become. American farmers as a group 
are dwindling drastically, and those who are left—the strong, lucky, and stubborn—sometimes 
struggle to hang on to their farms in defiance of economic logic. The twentieth century agricultural 
revolution resulted in substantial reductions in numbers of farmers, farms, and acreage farmed.317  
Today only about 1 percent of the United States population identify themselves as farmers, 
although closer to 2 percent live on farms. Of that small number (by contrast more than 20 percent 
of Americans farmed in 1930), only a minority report farming as their major source of income.318 
Pennsylvania has followed national trends in the decline of farm populations that resulted from the 
industrialization, specialization, and commercialization of agriculture.319 For example, in 1970, 
Pennsylvania had thirty thousand dairy farms. In 2004, only about nine thousand remained.320 By 
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2013, that number had dropped to nearly seven thousand.321 The preservation of the American 
family farm is a real problem.322 
Although some farmers and other rural landowners have been deprived of their homes and 
businesses due to the environmental consequences of energy extraction by drilling and especially 
coal mining, others used the income from leased mineral rights to subsidize their farming 
operations. Examples of Pennsylvanians who supplemented their agricultural income with the sale 
or lease of mineral rights have existed from the early part of the twentieth century until the present. 
The following examples illustrate some of the wide variety of rural landowners who have used gas 
income to subsidize their farms.   
Dr. Ira Garard’s account of rural life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Greene County, described in the first chapter, specifically refers to the gas as a subsidy on 
subsistence farms. He wrote: 
Here and there over the county there was a well with commercial quantities of gas that was 
piped to the nearest village. The farmer collected a royalty on the gas and free gas to heat 
and light his house including an outside light, which was of the torch type and which could 
                                                 
321 “Most Dairy Farms Exit Business Since 2007,” Hoard’s Dairyman, March 10, 2014, 151. 
 
322 As I write this, in the spring of 2018, Pennsylvania’s dairy industry is in the midst of an historic economic crisis. 
The wholesale price of milk is below anyone’s cost of production and dairy farmers are burning through their equity 
as they borrow to meet running expenses. Dairy cooperative processers are cancelling numerous farmers’ contracts, 
which means those affected have no market for their milk. The number of dairy farms in Pennsylvania is down to 
about 6,650, according to the February 21, 2018 Milk Production report, by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS), Agricultural Statistics Board, United States Department of Agriculture, 
https://release.nass.usda.gov/reports/mkpr0218.pdf. The dairy industry, the backbone of Pennsylvanian agriculture, 
has lost 30 percent of its producers in the last decade. The dust has by no means settled yet. Our family will likely be 
among those who are forced to exit the business this year. The situation prompts the following question: If farmers 
benefit from gas leases, what explains the apparently inverse correlation between the gas energy boom and the 
bankrupt dairy farmers of Pennsylvania?  
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be seen for miles . . . Of course, only a few farmers received money from oil or gas, but 
what they did receive was generally more than they made from farming.323  
 Garard was evidently familiar with the details of drilling according to the technology of 
the time, yet he did not record any conflict between drilling companies and landowners. His 
account further suggests the shared utilitarian interest in natural resources between drillers and 
farmers. In fact, at times they seemed to have been the same people. The farmers assumed less 
financial risk than the drillers, who took the chance of sinking a dry well. Garard did not mention 
any other type of negative impact on businesses or properties that farmers risked by allowing 
mining or drilling. The work exhibits a detailed knowledge of the mineral extraction occurring in 
his county and the rest of southwestern Pennsylvania, as well as many other aspects of farming 
life there. As Garard did not gloss over the hardships of subsistence farming in the area, it is hard 
to imagine that he would have failed to mention problems related to drilling if he had known about 
any substantial examples. With this outcome, the landowner had no need to seek regulatory 
protection from drillers, and his neighbors did not need to worry about damage to their property. 
This sort of experience establishes a precedent. Note that Garrard published his account in 1980, 
at the time of the post-deregulation gas boom in Pennsylvania.  
Accounts of the beginning of the Marcellus boom show how rural landowners perceptions 
of drilling drew on their knowledge of the previous generations’ experience. In the early 2000s, 
journalist Tom Wilber interviewed the Carters, residents of Susquehanna County in 
Pennsylvania’s Northern Tier. Wilber asked about their initial contact with a man representing 
Cabot Oil and Gas, a company interested in leasing their land for natural gas exploration. At that 
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time, leasing for drilling in the Marcellus shale was just beginning and had not attracted significant 
public notice. Carter’s father had been approached years before about leasing mineral rights on 
terms that his neighbors found acceptable: “Some property owners from previous generations had 
signed over mineral rights to land speculators for between one and five dollars per acre, with little 
ever coming of it but a modest check and a little paperwork.”324 The Carters saw little to suggest 
a problem in that experience. 
Another example concerns Amish farmers who subsidized their operations with gas lease 
money. This example suggests that Wendell Berry is not entirely correct in his assessment that 
landowners who use preindustrial methods in their farming operations are not involved with fossil 
fuels. Erich Schwartzel of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported on conservative Amish farm 
families in eastern Ohio that leased drilling rights. Although Schwartzel wrote, “Allowing gas 
drilling technology on their land is the latest example of religious tradition colliding head-on with 
the modern world,” this connection between some of America’s most traditional farmers and the 
natural gas industry is not new.325   Schwartzel continued: “Many of the Amish farms of New 
Wilmington, Lawrence County, have shallow wells that have been on the property for decades. 
Recent drilling targets deeper gas formations like the Marcellus and Utica shales.” The article 
included a photograph (Andrew Rush, Post-Gazette) of the superstructure of an older conventional 
well in front of the farmhouse. The decision to drill, therefore, had a precedent on this property. 
The experience with conventional drilling did not deter the family from allowing a new well. 
Another Amish group that used gas royalties to support their farming operation was the Mullet 
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community of Bergholz, Ohio. It gained national notoriety because some radical members received 
prison sentences for a federal hate crime of beard-cutting other Amish men, whom they considered 
to have acted improperly. The Mullet gas money was used for legal fees and to sustain the families 
of the convicted men. In both cases, farmers had previous experience with drillers to guide their 
decision. 
A different landowner, who had special reasons to avoid environmental damage to her 
property agreed to lease rights to gas companies, despite increased public knowledge of the 
potential problems associated with modern gas drilling. Denise Dennis, of Susquehanna County, 
Pennsylvania, had unusual incentives to preserve the historic appearance of her property. In 2012, 
she agreed to allow gas drilling below a farm that had been in her family for eight generations. 
Dennis intended to use the royalty money to repair and preserve features of the farm that had 
particular historical and archaeological significance. The original owner, Dennis’s ancestor, was a 
free black Revolutionary War veteran. The farmhouse later became a stop on the underground 
railroad. Dennis decided that drilling would not harm the property, and the money would enable 
her to establish a visitors’ center.326 Dennis is an example of a landowner who is willing to accept 
the risk involved because of personal priorities and values: a deep desire to preserve family 
ownership and protect an important legacy.  
In each of these cases, farmers and rural landowners successfully integrated gas drilling 
into their livelihoods. These decisions to allow drilling, stretched over a significant period of time, 
appear to have had neutral or beneficial effects on the life of the farm. Even if the financial benefits 
varied widely, none of these experiences as reported would discourage other landowners from 
                                                 
326 John Hurdle, “Fracking Under Historic Farm,” New York Times, 1 March 2012. 
 
 147 
agreeing to drill. In addition to word of mouth among the farm community, the way experiences 
are publically reported adds to the widely held assumptions that are a factor in individual decisions.  
The agricultural press is another significant source of information that farmers use to guide 
their decisions about many aspects of their businesses. Articles that mid-Atlantic farmers read in 
Lancaster Farming about natural gas during the 1970s and 1980s represented the mutual interests 
of the natural gas industry and agriculture.327 They reinforced a sense of patriotic duty in the efforts 
of Americans to produce domestic energy and reduce reliance on imported oil. Spokesmen 
mentioned conservation in connection with natural gas, but only in the context of reducing the 
waste of gas, not in the sense of environmental protection from the effects of drilling. The news 
coverage fed the distrust with which farmers viewed government oversight, in articles that 
described the mismanaged federal policy that contributed to natural gas shortages.  
In the context of the 1970s energy crisis, natural gas was a scarce commodity, likely to get 
even more scarce. In 1973, when the first oil and gasoline shortages were contributing to a national 
panic, natural gas was also in short supply in some parts of the United States. A crucial fuel, natural 
gas furnished about one-third of the energy used in the United States. Continued shortages of gas 
during the cold winters of 1977 and 1978, especially in the Northeast and upper Midwest, resulted 
in significant hardships for residential and industrial customers. People could not heat their homes. 
Factory closings and layoffs due to the shortages affected an estimated two million people.328  
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On February 19, 1977, the front page of Lancaster Farming featured a story about a 
“dismal” meeting in which spokesmen for a gas transmission company, the Pennsylvania Public 
Utilities Commission (PUC), and the governor’s Energy Council discussed natural gas as “a real 
crisis situation” worse than during the 1973 oil embargo.329 Although federal legislation had given 
agricultural users priority access to gas supplies, the PUC representative warned milk processors 
to plan for alternate fuel use or face the possibility of dumping milk. Furthermore, the 
representative did not guarantee “adequate” gas supplies for needs such as fertilizer.330 In the face 
of declining production and growing consumption of gas, a Columbia Gas representative blamed 
the crisis on an apathetic national government and called for extreme mandatory conservation 
measures for gas, especially by switching from gas to coal for the generation of electricity. The 
representative warned that “the biggest difficulty [with the plan to switch to coal] will be the 
constant battle with ‘would-be environmentalists,’” and that “environmental considerations cost a 
lot of time and money.”331  
Here, in the depth of February during a particularly rough winter, was a story that 
juxtaposed a crisis situation with the perceived sources of the crisis. The article first informed 
farmers about the possibility that the milk someone had gotten up in the freezing dark to produce 
would be poured down the drain for lack of energy to process it, and that when spring finally came 
there might not be enough already expensive and scarce fertilizer to make a decent next year’s 
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crop. Then the article blamed mismanagement by government and obstruction from 
environmentalists for the situation.  It is not hard to conclude whose side farmers would be on. 
Other spokesmen for the agricultural community in the 1970s encouraged farmers to allow 
gas drilling, again stressing both public and private benefits. In the light of the reporting on the gas 
crisis and its potential effects on their businesses, farmers could hardly fail to see that a gas lease 
would not only provide direct income from gas sales, but would help to increase the supply of a 
vital resource. For example, an article published in autumn 1975 in Lancaster Farming presented 
the use of natural gas in an entirely positive light through two main points: an adequate supply of 
natural gas is necessary for the well-being of farmers, and the reason for the current shortage is a 
failed federal regulatory policy. In anticipation of a serious natural gas shortage in the mid-Atlantic 
for the winter of 1975, Bill Brier, the Director of Energy Resources for the National Council of 
Farmer Cooperatives (NCFC), explored the implications for the region’s agriculturalists. Brier 
pointed out that the United States had sufficient domestic natural gas, a reference to new fears 
about the nation’s dependence on foreign oil.  He informed his readers that natural gas accounted 
for 15 percent of farm use as a direct energy source. But more importantly, he stressed its use in 
the production of anhydrous ammonia, a key source of nitrogen fertilizer, as well as in the 
production of other indispensable farm inputs such as herbicides, pesticides, and plastics. Brier, 
speaking for the NCFC, strongly recommended the elimination of federal price controls to allow 
the gas industry sufficient incentives to expand gas reserves and production.  Brier’s position was 
that the gas industry and the agricultural community had a mutual interest in gas exploration and 
development. Certainly the cooperatives that he represented, many of which sold LP gas, fertilizer, 
and sprays, had an economic interest in an adequate supply of gas. But the tone of the article 
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suggested to farmers that they would serve their individual best interests by supporting “maximum 
exploration and development of domestic natural gas supplies.”332  
Subsequent articles reinforced the message about the desirability of an increased gas 
supply. They reported additional warnings about the potential scarcity and high price of fertilizer 
and added that twenty-one farmer’s organizations supported deregulation to stimulate supply. The 
articles generally portrayed expansion of the gas industry in a positive light, as they emphasized 
the vital need to provide the gas industry with financial incentives for exploration and 
development.333 Congressman Tom Harkin (Democrat-Iowa), serving on the U.S. House 
Agricultural Committee and also the Science and Technology Committee, reportedly predicted 
higher prices and shorter supplies of gas. He urged farmers to look for alternatives sources of 
power.334 More alarming was Harkin’s failure to offer any advice on a possible substitute for 
fertilizer. In another article, a fertilizer company representative restated the connection between 
the cost of natural gas and fertilizer price and availability, and predicted long-term that natural gas 
would be in short supply by the year 2000. He stressed the critical need for fertilizer, especially in 
consideration of recent losses of farmland acreage, and argued that natural gas was too valuable as 
a chemical feedstock to burn for fuel.335 In the context of the energy crisis, farmers competed with 
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other energy users for natural gas. These repeated messages undoubtedly contributed to a receptive 
mood among farmers when presented with the choice to allow drilling on their land. 
Federal regulators further emphasized the close link between the needs of agriculture and 
the supply of natural gas. In response to gas shortages, the federal government adopted a multi-
tiered priority system to allocate supplies.336 The system privileged residential consumers over 
most industrial customers, but gave special priority to agricultural users. Lancaster Farming 
covered the proposed measures and the subsequent procedures that farmers should follow to 
receive their priority allotments, which would be priced at a lower rate than other industries paid.337 
The paper informed its readers of public hearings and Senate plans to prevent a negative impact 
on “essential agricultural use” as had happened during previous shortages. It published the 
deadlines to file necessary paperwork under the new allocation system. Lancaster Farming passed 
along a reminder to farmers from a county agricultural agent to register with suppliers and provide 
sworn statements about their past usage and future requirements, in order to receive the legislated 
protection against natural gas curtailments.338  
Lancaster Farming warned its readers that despite these preferential measures, continuing 
bureaucratic problems between government bodies still threatened farmers’ protection under the 
new regulations. Farmers read that the Senate Agricultural Committee had sent a sharp protest to 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission over a proposed plan of gas allocation curtailment 
measures that contravened the terms of the Natural Gas Policy Act, which provided for the priority 
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of agricultural use.339 The information on natural gas that Lancaster Farming presented to a broad 
readership in the mid-Atlantic farming community during the energy crisis of 1970s reinforced the 
mutual interests of farmers and gas drillers to increase the natural gas supply and to keep a sharp 
eye on government regulation. 
Then, as a new decade began, a shift occurred in the gas industry that affected the concerns 
of landowners. By the early 1980s, the energy crisis was a less pressing national concern. The 
deregulation of gas prices, combined with the increased demand for gas in the previous decade, 
sharply increased drilling in Pennsylvania.340 That increase generated some evidence that 
landowners were experiencing conflicts with drilling companies and increased environmental 
problems. Lancaster Farming changed the tone of its message somewhat, as the paper began to 
cover stories on farmers’ concerns about proper compensation for their mineral rights. Both rural 
landowners and representatives of drilling companies felt the need to form cooperative groups to 
share information and better protect their separate interests. Despite the shared assumption about 
legitimate land usage based on private property rights, there was some conflict between drilling 
companies and landowners, as well as a desire on both sides to protect legitimate interests and 
minimize avoidable risks. But still no fundamental disagreement arose over the desirability of 
drilling for gas, and no large public controversy existed over the possible environmental or social 
consequences of sinking gas wells on private land. 
In response to the increased activity of the gas industry in seeking drilling leases in the 
early 1980s, agricultural groups such as county chapters of the Pennsylvania Farmers Association 
and the Agricultural Extension Service held public meetings to provide information on how 
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farmers could best negotiate leases with drilling companies. The principal issue was to arrange fair 
compensation for their mineral rights, not how to regulate or prevent drilling. In September 1981, 
for example, the Wayne County Agricultural Extension Service and the county Farmers 
Association jointly sponsored an educational meeting for landowners. Joe Macialek, Community 
Development Agent for the Extension Service, stressed the importance of understanding the terms 
of the gas lease. In an interview with Lancaster Farming, which publicized the event, he said that 
drilling “may have a great impact on the land, the landowner and the community.”341 He explained 
important features of oil and gas leases, including details about the length of leases and the 
payments. He informed his listeners that although the gas exploration company offers the 
landowner a standard lease, the owner may negotiate for different terms.  
In another example, in 1982 several Berks County farmers formed a union of landowners 
affiliated with the Pennsylvania Farmers Association to negotiate more effectively with oil and 
gas companies. They also wished to educate farmers about the implications of the terms in the 
leases offered to them. Each member agreed not to sign a lease until the company negotiated with 
the group as a whole.  Chairman George Moyer emphasized that “the group is not against leasing 
land to the oil and gas companies; but for better terms.” He outlined terms that farmers should 
negotiate for:  
. . . better monetary terms; reduction of lease terms from 10 years to 3 years or less; the 
right to inspect company monthly reports, well records and well meters; proper restoration 
of the land surface and payment for all damaged land; the right to determine the location 
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of wells, pipelines, access roads and other structures; and the protection against the 
drainage of oil and gas by wells on neighboring properties.342   
The inspection rights concerned the landowner’s ability to verify the volume of gas 
extracted, on which royalty payments were based. The emphasis on surface restoration may have 
indicated past problems for farmers that resulted from drilling, but the problems were apparently 
not serious or extensive enough for individual cases to have made the farming news.  
While farmers formed landowners’ organizations in the 1980s, representatives of gas 
companies also met to seek legal and practical guidance in writing leases that protected their 
interests. In 1981, the Eastern Mineral Law Foundation’s Special Institute, “The Oil and Gas 
Lease,” met in Pittsburgh, for the first of a series of annual educational meetings. Its stated purpose 
was to form better communication between area landmen (company representatives that presented 
offers to land owners) and energy companies’ legal advisors. The meeting was organized as a 
workshop to study specific clauses that should be included in a lease. These included gas storage, 
rights of way, delayed rental, royalties, pooling, warrantees, free gas, and implied covenants. 343 
All these terms would likely be unfamiliar, at least initially, to the farmers confronting them.344  
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The workshop participants studied sample leases, forms required for filing leases, selected 
updates in mineral laws, and examples of legal cases. John Keller presented an essay on drafting 
the lease. He stated that the standard lease commonly offered was essentially the same one in use 
in the early twentieth century, even though conditions for the industry had changed 
substantially.345 His concern underscored the importance of up-to-date knowledge to all 
stakeholders in the production of natural gas. 
Often, conflicts between landowners and well drillers have their roots in the disconnection 
between the knowledge available at the time the lease is signed and the knowledge of the 
consequences in the aftermath of drilling. Gas drilling is not unique in this regard.  For example, 
farmers in the early twentieth century signed broad form deeds that conveyed permission for 
surface access as part of the right to mine coal, but they did not anticipate that fifty years later their 
heirs would be fighting surface mining companies that actually stripped away the entire surface of 
the land. The technology had changed in ways landowners could not have been able to foresee. In 
a 1953 ruling by Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court that defended landowners’ rights, the judge 
acknowledged that no farmer in his right mind would have signed a mining lease if he knew that 
it gave the mining company permission to destroy his land.346  
Conflicts over leases that are decades old persist, which reflect the changing expectations 
and knowledge of landowners. Recently, a Pennsylvania court ruled in favor of an energy company 
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that possessed drilling rights to 160 acres in Jefferson County, Pennsylvania.347 The original gas 
lease had been signed in the early twentieth century. At issue was a clause stipulating that the 
energy company relinquish rights to any acreage it deemed not worth exploring for gas. Although 
no drilling had occurred on the property since 1927, the current landowners lost their attempt to 
regain control of the 130 acres that had never been drilled because the gas company had not 
explicitly stated that the land did not warrant further exploration and development as required in 
the lease. The original lessors of the drilling rights probably did not anticipate allowing the gas 
company to retain the option to drill indefinitely. The problem over this lease would not even have 
arisen in 2014, after all parties had allowed more than eighty years to pass without further drilling, 
if the new fracking technology had not made gas drilling rights in Pennsylvania suddenly so 
valuable. The original landowners were apparently comfortable with an open-ended agreement 
based on the level of interest in natural gas and the practical possibilities available to extract it at 
the time they signed. The new owners of the land initiated the lawsuit based on knowledge of the 
current potential for extraction and income. 
The timing and subjects for informational meetings imply previous legal issues that gas 
industry advisors hoped to help their clients avoid in future. But actual legal cases concerning 
conflict with landowners do not seem to have been a source of information readily available in the 
farming community.  For one thing, then as now, legal disputes over gas drilling were most often 
settled out of court; the settlements contained non-disclosure clauses, and so did not enter the legal 
record or make the papers.348 No general public knowledge of extensive legal conflict between 
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drillers and landowners apparently existed to act as a deterrent when farmers were presented with 
a lease designed by a drilling company.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Fundamental connections exist between values, knowledge and actions. Wendell Berry’s 
The Way of Ignorance includes a conversation between a conservationist and a woman rancher.  
She had convinced her ranching family to alter its management practices so effectively that their 
commercially grazed range was in better ecological condition than an adjacent protected national 
wildlife refuge.  When asked how one goes about changing a rancher’s land ethic, she replied, 
“We didn’t change our ethics.  We’re the same people we were fifteen years ago.  What changed 
was our knowledge.”349 Farmers make their choices on how to use land based on what they value, 
but also on what they know. 
This investigation of gas drilling in the 1970s and 1980s from the point of view of farmers 
is a case study of people who grounded their personal environmental policies in what they valued, 
but were nevertheless strongly influenced by what they were able to learn. It helps to explain the 
decisions they made more than thirty years ago about gas drilling, which affected the decisions 
made in the early 2000s. In the 1970s, during the national emergency caused by the energy crisis, 
farmers and gas drillers had a shared agenda. Generally speaking, they both had a stake in the 
expanded production of natural gas, and similar utilitarian views on the extractive use of resources. 
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In the 1980s, more conflict between drillers and landowners surfaced, but these revolved around 
lease negotiations for compensation and accountability given the prevailing context of markets 
and industry practices. Farmers’ chief environmental concerns were restoration of the surface 
condition of fields and roads, rather than a concern for nature per se. The issues between drillers 
and farmers in the 1980s, if any arose, underscored their shared view of land and resources as 
private property from which the owner was entitled to profit. The general acceptance of gas drilling 
in the past fostered acceptance of drilling during the Marcellus boom.  
This chapter only touches on what many assume is the biggest motivator for decisions: the 
money involved. Undeniably, the money matters. But, a full discussion of the economic 
implications of gas drilling must examine why, if money matters most, did resistance to drilling 
after 2005 become much higher at the same time that the potential payoff from gas drilling grew 
much higher too. And there may be indirect economic disincentives to lease drilling rights. Banks 
and insurance companies may be less willing to accommodate landowners whose properties are 
under lease. Drilling activity can reduce property value and marketability, and increase damage 
risks. Farmers rely on the availability of credit, and loans backed by property usually come with 
insurance requirements. Changes in the policies of lenders and insurers, and how those changes 
affected working farmers, are worth investigating for clues about the effects of gas drilling in the 
countryside. 
That being said, farmers in Pennsylvania have placed more than an economic value on 
what they do and the land they hold, while still utilizing new technologies and constantly devising 
practical strategies in order to maintain their own economic sustainability. Indications are that the 
values that have affected their business decisions, especially the desire to preserve their 
independence and work-based identity, have remained largely consistent over the past several 
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generations. In the 1970s and 1980s, farmers’ personal stake in their private property rights, their 
aversion to heavy-handed federal restrictions, and their concerns about energy shortages 
influenced their inclination to lease gas rights. Knowledge, especially the most easily available 
information, the stuff that is in the air at a particular time, is also among the biggest influences on 
individual decisions. When a farmer opens his door to a man in a cowboy hat who speaks with a 
drawl and wants to talk about a drilling lease, that farmer’s response, as he thinks on his feet, will 
draw partly upon what he glanced at in the paper before chores, what the boys drinking coffee 
talked about while he paid for gas at the local convenience store, and what news played on the 
tractor radio while he did fieldwork.  
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6.0 Drilling Rural Appalachia Part II: The Scholars and Activists 
Appalachia, as a distinct region of the United States, is characterized by its geography and 
culture, but also by its poverty. The region’s economy attracted considerable attention in the 1960s 
through the 1970s. It was a centerpiece of the federal “war on poverty” that began during Lyndon 
Johnson’s administration in the mid-1960s. Scholars and activists were among the stakeholders in 
Appalachia that had concerns about the well-being of Appalachia’s citizens and environment. 
Sociologists, many with roots in the mountains, contributed to the emerging field of Appalachian 
studies. Some of these academics connected resource extraction with regional poverty, and 
actively worked to curb the industries that stripped the mountains of coal and timber.350 They 
grappled with the colonial characteristics of the regional economy. However, the scholar-activists 
of Appalachian exploitation did not prioritize natural gas issues, because coal was so much more 
evident a problem. Mainstream conservation groups, more preoccupied with the environmental 
rather than the social consequences of extractive industry, also did not prioritize restrictive gas 
regulation. One important exception was the effort to protect the Allegheny National Forest (ANF) 
from effects of gas extraction, which reflected the prevailing environmental preservationist 
philosophy of the times. Environmentalists defended ANF public land in a similar way that 
concerned citizens defended their common interests in Lake Erie. Nevertheless, in most of 
Appalachian Pennsylvania, the urgency of other environmental issues judged more pressing 
eclipsed concerns about the impact of gas extraction. The preoccupations and limited focus of 
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those working for environmental justice contributed to keeping Pennsylvania friendly to the 
natural gas industry, even after the passage of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984.  
6.1 Colonialism and Energy in Appalachian Studies 
An extensive scholarly literature of the mid-twentieth century exposed the environmentally 
and socially exploitive nature of Appalachian energy extraction. This literature argued that 
persistent poverty in Appalachia came from long-term systemic injustices, rather than 
characteristics of the mountains and their inhabitants. Poverty was not the result of mountain 
people’s physical or character defects—the persistent and classist hillbilly stereotype. Nor did it 
stem entirely from the isolation and lack of infrastructure in the mountains. Rather, a direct 
connection existed between regional poverty and the high proportion of absentee ownership of 
Appalachian resources by the energy industry. In many regions, the residents did not actually own 
the surface, still less the subsurface mineral rights.  
This scholarship, which coincided with national attention to Appalachian poverty, sought 
to disprove two explanations for Appalachian poverty—the “culture of deficiency” and 
“underdevelopment” models. The first attributed blame to personal traits of the stereotypically-
imagined highlander, which were the alleged source of regional problems. In this view, the very 
nature of the shiftless, improvident, ignorant, fatalistic, slovenly, and probably inbred hillbilly 
accounted for the lack of regional prosperity. The second argued that isolation, and lack of 
investment, modernization, and infrastructure caused Appalachian poverty.351 Academics and 
351Helen Matthews Lewis, Linda Johnson and Donald Askins, Colonialism in Modern America: The Appalachian 
Case (Boone, North Carolina: The Appalachian Consortium Press, 1978), 14.  
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activists, such as those who formed the Appalachian Studies Association in the late 1970s, 
debunked both theories. They published work showing a more systemic source of persistent 
poverty: the power of absentee capitalists to control local economies, and the colonial nature of 
industry in the highlands.352 However, concerning extractive industries, they focused mainly on 
timber and coal. Compared to the ravages of coal mining and clear-cutting, natural gas drilling 
evidently was not on the radar.  
Helen Matthews Lewis was both activist and scholar, one of the founders of the field of 
Appalachian studies. Her research on the Appalachian coalfields led to the co-edited collection 
Colonialism in Modern America: The Appalachian Case.353 She and her colleagues acknowledged 
limits to the colonial model, but they pointed out the similarity of Appalachia to external colonies, 
where wealth and resources flow out of an exploited country. The second section of the volume 
specifically concerned the extraction of resources. It dealt with coal most often, but the work also 
implicated the timber, cotton, and tourism industries in the region’s impoverishment and loss of 
local political control. Ironically, considering its Appalachian geography and cultural roots, the 
study targeted Pittsburgh as one location of absentee big-city financial interests.354 One essay, Rev. 
Jack Weller’s “Appalachia: America’s Mineral Colony,” briefly mentioned natural gas and 
petroleum extraction as part of the problem, but nevertheless asserted that “coal is king.”355 
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Another contemporary study that attempted to diagnose the roots of Appalachian poverty 
also showed a preoccupation with coal among researchers examining the social and environmental 
effects of energy extraction. Charles C. Geisler and the Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 
[ALOTF] produced Who Owns Appalachia?: Land Ownership and Its Impact, drawing on a 
database assembled by academics in cooperation with people who would now be described as 
citizen-scientists.356  The research revealed the impact of extensive absentee and corporate 
landownership by large energy concerns. Such ownership eroded local tax bases; contributed to 
housing shortages, poor schools and bad roads; and discouraged diverse economic development. 
This landmark study also focused primarily on the coal industry, a narrow agenda acknowledged 
and afterward regretted by a key organizer of the project. Charles Winfrey, of the group Save Our 
Cumberland Mountains, explained, “We were an existing organization with an agenda . . . We 
were working on strip mining, coal issues, and tax issues . . . We were restricted because of our 
agenda at looking at coal.”357  
Nevertheless, the ALOTF project analysis included limited comments on oil and gas 
extraction. It reported the significant uptick in oil and gas leasing during the late 1970s, especially 
in agricultural areas not previously affected by energy extraction. The report treats natural gas as 
an adjunct to the business of drilling for oil, although the report mentioned “More [gas wells] 
would be drilled if more gas pipelines were constructed to transport the gas that is often found in 
concert with oil.” In a telling comment, the analyst concluded that “Oil and gas extraction is not 
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normally regarded in Appalachia as being environmentally damaging, for few people have 
experienced it at first hand.” Here, the conclusion is based on research done in what is usually 
viewed as the ‘core’ counties of Appalachia, which does not include Pennsylvania, even though 
the state had a long history of experience with the effects of oil and gas drilling. Instead, the report 
cites problems from such drilling in West Virginia, including poisoned livestock, ruined wells, 
degraded roads, and destruction of farm land and improvements.358    
6.2 Pennsylvania Environmentalism and the Allegheny National Forest 
In Pennsylvania, a number of other overriding land use concerns eclipsed the 
environmental problems of natural gas. As in the rest of the country, the growth of environmental 
consciousness influenced the state’s citizens in the post-WWII era. In May 1971, with 
overwhelming approval from their constituencies, Pennsylvania’s legislators passed Article 1, 
Section 27 of the state constitution, also referred to as the Pennsylvania Declaration of 
Environmental Rights Amendment, which read: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, 
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. 
As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the 
benefit of all the people.359 
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Policy makers in Pennsylvania were not focused on natural gas problems. They gave 
priority to other environmental and social concerns, as illustrated by a land-use planning document. 
During the early 1970s the Pennsylvania Land Policy Project prepared a report for the 
Pennsylvania Office of State Planning and Development to address the need for an integrated 
statewide plan to manage the Commonwealth’s land and resources. The report was generated 
under the auspices of the Western Pennsylvania Conservancy (WPC), a Pittsburgh-based private 
conservation organization founded in the 1930s. In 1973, then Governor Milton Shapp initiated a 
project to generate a cohesive land-use plan for the state. WPC member Thomas M. Schmidt was 
the project coordinator.  The finished report described current conditions, surveyed public opinion, 
and issued recommendations. Coal mining was the sole energy extraction issue included in the 
survey.360  The report made few references to oil and gas drilling. It mentioned the establishment 
of Colonel Drake’s first oil well in Titusville as a historic preservation site.361 However, the report 
included an important comment about resource extraction in the Appalachians in its overview of 
the state’s special land-use challenges: 
Mountains and the high northcentral plateau offer superb forests and parks, unspoiled 
landscapes, and abundant hunting and fishing opportunities. Yet these regions also must 
[emphasis added] supply coal, oil and gas, and raw materials for the second ranking 
industrial state in the Nation. The national energy crisis will increase these pressures.362  
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Such a need reflected heightened public concern for the environment, awareness of a need 
to manage resources, alarm over the energy crisis, and anticipation of national land-use 
legislation.363 Areas that Pennsylvania already regulated by the early 1970s reflected the top 
environmental issues. These included scenic rivers, surface mining, air pollution, coal mine 
subsidence, farm and forest land tax assessment, clean streams, coal refuse disposal, site 
development, open space acquisition, atomic energy and radiation control, soil conservation, and 
industrial development. The report highlighted the importance of Pennsylvania’s natural gas 
reserves during the ongoing energy crisis, but it examined drilling primarily as it affected forested 
areas of public, not private lands:  
. . . the Commonwealth stores more natural gas than any other state, new recovery 
techniques and increased exploration doubled production activities in 1973, over a quarter 
million acres of State parks and forests are under lease for oil and gas exploration, 
production or storage. Lands of the Game Commission are similarly involved, and much 
of the Allegheny National Forest is checker-boarded with oil and gas developments.364  
Although the report recommended portions of the Allegheny National Forest for wilderness 
designation, the threat to those lands that most concerned land planners was the construction of 
vacation homes, an extension of their concerns about development and suburban sprawl. A 
supplementary study of the economic consequences of state land planning on individuals, as 
weighed against the non-monetary benefits to the citizens at large, did not mention natural gas. 
Under the heading “Extractive Industries,” there was a short discussion of coal mines and gravel 
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quarries, but “Most other extractive industries will be little affected.” 365  In short, the Pennsylvania 
Land Policy Project did not advocate regulation of natural gas extraction on private lands in the 
1970s.  
In keeping with the priorities that in many ways shaped the modern environmental 
movement, state environmental organizations prioritized wilderness preservation, the making of a 
separate space without human interaction.366 The Western Pennsylvania Conservancy, the 
Pennsylvania chapter of the Sierra Club, and the state Citizens Advisory Council (CAC) 
approached the problem of gas extraction mainly (although not entirely) as a threat to wilderness 
preservation. They focused attention on the Allegheny National Forest (ANF). Conversely, the 
Forest Service, which was charged with stewardship of the ANF, was constrained by legal 
precedent that prioritized the rights of sub-surface mineral owners over the preservation of the 
surface environment. The passage of the 1984 Oil and Gas Act, fought for by the Sierra Club, 
CAC, and their allies in the legislature, introduced measures that would reduce the impact of 
drilling generally. However, it left the presumption of subordinate surface rights intact.  
Although the Sierra Club in Pennsylvania was involved in the effort to regulate gas drilling, 
especially in the Allegheny National Forest, that issue was also not its first priority. When the state 
organization received its charter from the national Sierra Club in 1972, its initial focus was on 
environmental degradation from coal mining and pesticides. It was also active in issues concerning 
nuclear power, waste disposal and water quality. 
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Management of the Allegheny National Forest exemplifies the fundamental binary of 
American environmental thought: the conflict between conservation and preservation. The conflict 
helps explain why the Sierra Club was more apt to focus its attention on gas drilling in the ANF 
than elsewhere on privately-owned land. The idea of wilderness preservation was a reaction to the 
earlier Progressive era wise-use conservation model, as represented by Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot’s 
guiding philosophy was utilitarian: the careful husbandry of natural resources, to provide the 
greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest time. In contrast, wilderness advocate John 
Muir argued for the value of wilderness for its own sake, and for its importance to the human spirit. 
After 1945, Muir’s ecologically-based preservationist view began to gain traction in policy 
debates.367 The Sierra Club, founded by Muir and led by David Brower for many years, was 
arguably the strongest advocate organization for wilderness protection at that time. But the concept 
of wilderness precludes a working landscape, such as a privately-owned farm.  
The Forest Service, the federal agency which managed ANF, had an institutional history 
that predisposed its administrators to prioritize extractive industry over other uses of the forest, 
such as recreation, wildlife, and watershed protection. Gifford Pinchot, the main architect and first 
chief of the National Forest Service at the turn of the twentieth century, rejected other uses (which 
did have their advocates) in favor of timber production and grazing. Pinchot’s first priority was to 
ensure adequate timber supplies for the United States at time when rapid deforestation threated a 
future shortage.368 He clearly expressed his views on the purpose of federal land set aside for 
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timber reserves, writing, “‘National forests are not parks or game preserves.’” Historian and 
activist Samuel Hays argued that this “silviculture legacy” persisted and influenced the 
administrators of national forests to prioritize extractive industry, even after increased public 
pressure and legislative mandates for mixed use.369   
At the end of the 1970s, federal gas price deregulation and the on-going energy crisis 
increased drilling impacts in Pennsylvania, revealing plenty of evidence of environmental 
degradation in the region that included the Allegheny National Forest. In 1984, the mayor and 
residents of Clarendon, Warren County, (in Pennsylvania’s northern tier and now part of the ANF), 
reported that their water had recently gotten off-color with a petroleum smell. Similar problems 
had occurred at a local state park. A drilling company was operating nearby. 370  At that time the 
natural gas industry was treated as a subset of the petroleum industry. The Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Resources (DER), working with the owner of Clarendon’s water 
company, traced the oil contamination to an old well very close to the township water source. The 
well’s owner, a local man, immediately offered to plug it.371 
Just to the north, in Chandlers Valley, citizens pressured the township supervisors to draft 
an ordinance similar to gas drilling regulations of other nearby communities, which demonstrated 
that communities felt the need to look out for themselves.  Officials notified Chandlers Valley 
residents to stop drinking their water immediately because oil was found in it. The driller of the 
suspected pollution source, Black Stallion Oil Co., had obeyed existing laws, even casing its wells 
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although there was no legal requirement to do so then. The problem was that no one could supply 
a map of the water flow that supplied the village. The company declined to post a bond that would 
pay for contamination clean-up, because it was expensive and not legally required. It would, 
however, drill a new water well for the township if it had caused any contamination.372  
In another small community of approximately seventy families just east of Warren 
Borough, the Department of Environmental Resources determined that methane pollution affected 
the wells of half the homes and the amount of pollution was increasing. Gas had collected in 
plumbing, basements, and walls. The water was odorous and off-color. The source of the 
contamination was twenty nearby gas wells owned by a lumber company, which had also illegally 
discharged gas into surface water in quantities sufficient to cause a public hazard. A Warren 
County judge and DER officials ordered the company, which had a history of non-compliance, to 
repair the defective wells, eliminate gas pressure at the well head, and drill no more wells for two 
months. The DER superintendent commented that the case demonstrated the need for oil and gas 
regulation such as the bill then before the House Conservation Committee. 
The Pennsylvania Citizen’s Advisory Council (CAC), an organization formed to help 
legislators make policy in line with the new constitutional commitment to environmental quality, 
responded to the reports of increasing impact from oil and gas drilling.373 The CAC Committee on 
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Resource Management corroborated the reports of serious water quality problems associated with 
oil and gas extraction in northwestern Pennsylvania. The CAC surveyed the industry throughout 
the state, but its most specific concern was the ANF, which contained over 100,000 oil and gas 
wells. In May 1980, members toured sections of ANF. What the Committee observed at active and 
abandoned drill sites prompted it to investigate threats from drilling and the effectiveness of 
existing legislation. CAC produced a thorough report of its findings, and made strong 
recommendations for improved regulation and better environmental protection.374  
Vinnedge Lawrence, chairperson of the Citizen’s Advisory Council, was also involved in 
the Sierra Club and served as the coordinator of the Pennsylvania Citizen Coalition for Responsible 
Oil and Gas Legislation. The Coalition included “environmental, conservation, and public interest 
groups, and individuals.” Its members worked for regulatory control before the passage of the 1984 
Oil and Gas Act. In April 1983, Sierra Club member Jeff Schmidt, on behalf of the Coalition, 
presented testimony before the Pennsylvania House Conservation Committee. He faulted both 
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sides: the gas industry for fighting against reasonable controls, and environmentalists for lack of 
effort to establish such legislation.375 
The Coalition critiqued the proposed regulation, which it viewed as insufficient. CAC 
pushed for “rebuttable presumption” in which the burden of proof is on the driller to establish 
responsibility in the case of a contaminated water supply. CAC advocated for empowering 
Pennsylvania DER with the authority to shut down non-compliant wells by eliminating language 
that restricted DER to refusing future permits for problem drillers and limited DER’s cease and 
desist power to five days. CAC recommended bonding fees of $10,000 for one well, or $100,000 
for multiple coverage to pay for capping wells if necessary, and a $100 permit fee to cover 
administrative costs. CAC wanted to shorten the time required for restoration of a well site to six 
months.  The CAC leadership urged fellow organization members to contact state 
representatives.376 
At the federal level, Republican Pennsylvania legislators U.S. Senator John Heinz and U.S. 
Representative William Clinger backed a different bill to offer added protection to the Allegheny 
National Forest. The bill would reserve 9780 acres of ANF as a designated wilderness, and another 
9200 acres as a national recreation area. These reserves amounted to less than 4 percent of the 
500,000 acres in ANF. The bill was designed to protect parts of the forest from logging and drilling 
for oil and gas. Five hundred wells had been drilled in 1982, twice as many as any time in the 
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previous ten years.  “Sometimes I feel as though I’m not managing a forest anymore,” district 
ranger Paul Brohn remarked, “I’m managing wood lots in between well sites.”377  
The bill sponsored by Heinz and Clinger was the latest move in a long debate over resource 
extraction in Allegheny National Forest. In the early 1970s, the Sierra Club had fought for 
wilderness areas there. Pennsylvania Sierra Club chair Wyona Coleman called the proposed 
legislation a step in the right direction. The Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Association, although 
opposed to wilderness designation of any land, conceded that the measure would at least have 
ended the controversy. The bill would have allowed current owners of subsurface rights to develop 
energy resources with a special permit from the Forest Service. Owners would have been required 
to follow existing state regulations to control soil erosion. Alternatively, they could have 
exchanged their holdings for comparable subsoil mineral rights under public land without 
wilderness designation. In the recreational area, the bill required minimal disruption of forest 
habitat by energy development. Logging would have been banned.378  
As moderate as their action was, Heinz and Clinger were fighting against the tide. One 
problem was that the subsurface rights to nearly all of Allegheny National Forest were in private 
hands, thus still subject to development.  ANF’s designation as a federal “further study area” 
concerning its status as a wilderness area offered no protection. For example, a court confirmed 
that no additional environmental impact statement was required for ANF’s supervisor to issue a 
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drilling permit for twenty-eight new gas wells in 1983.379 A later plea to block the drilling, 
mounted by the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, the National Audubon Society, Trout 
Unlimited, and the Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, was also rejected in federal 
court.380  
Action to make appropriate law dragged on for years after the need was identified. In the 
meantime, Ronald Reagan won the 1980 presidential election. Reagan supported an anti-
environmental policy under the leadership of Environmental Protection Agency head James Watt. 
Watt’s appointment was a blow to conservation and preservation efforts. For example, in the early 
1980s, Watt opened up an estimated four million acres of previously protected wildlife refuges to 
oil and gas exploration. This action reversed a twenty-five-year-old policy of habitat protection, 
although in some cases, wilderness designation protected the refuges.381 
Even members of the public who sympathized with the goals of Heinz and Clinger may 
have judged their efforts as futile. A Pittsburgh Press editorial, although in favor of protecting the 
pristine Allegheny Front section of ANF, opined that properly done gas drilling “left minimal 
lasting scars.” The author was not optimistic, though, and noted the careless drilling practices in 
other parts of the forest. He further claimed that designating the area as wilderness would hurt, not 
help, its preservation. He thought the action would attract a horde of visitors, who would surely 
destroy what they had come to see.382 
                                                 
379 Wyndle Watson, “No Wilderness: All’s (About Oil) Wells Along the Allegheny Front,” The Pittsburgh Press, 
November 22, 1983. Watson’s title evokes the WWI era phrase “all quiet on the western front,” also the title of a 
book by Rilke, indicating a stalemate in a war zone.  
 
380 “Bar on Oil Wells Rejected,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 24, 1984. 
 
381 “Environmentalists Suing Watt Over Opening of Refuges to Oilmen,” The Pittsburgh Press, August 28, 1983. 
 
382 Watson, “No Wilderness.” 
 
 175 
Nevertheless, state lawmakers continued to advocate for the passage of State Bill 402 that 
did eventually become the 1984 Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act. Evidence of water pollution from 
drilling was the principal argument in favor of legislative control. In the midst of a 1983 debate on 
the Pennsylvania House floor about regulation of the natural gas industry, Camille ‘Bud’ George, 
the ranking Democrat on the House Environmental Resources and Energy Committee, commented 
on proposed amendments to State Bill 402. He argued that a bill protecting the waters of the 
Commonwealth from the effects of oil and gas drilling was badly needed to correct a serious 
ongoing pollution problem. Other representatives emphasized the danger to private water wells. 
Representative Thomas Michlovic testified that of all the environmental problems the 
Conservation Committee had investigated in meetings throughout the state, he judged that the 
worst issues concerned the under-regulated oil and gas industry. Michlovic said that the committee 
had “heard testimony from witnesses who said that their appliances blew up, their appliances blew 
up, and they were injured because of the amount of gas that was in their water. It is a serious 
problem. We have had witnesses who have brought jars of water before the committee that were 
ignitable.”383 Michlovic’s repeated phrase about household explosions emphasized his assessment 
of the seriousness of the environmental problems associated with the gas industry. 
The amendment to H.B. 402 under discussion concerned whether or not the owner of a 
water well should enjoy a “rebuttal presumption.” In short, if the water in a well located within a 
specified proximity to oil or gas drilling was diminished, lost or polluted, the owner of the water 
well would be legally entitled to assume that the industrial drilling caused his loss. The burden of 
proof to the contrary would be on the gas/oil drillers. The representatives who supported this clause 
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felt that it was indispensable in protecting the water rights of landowners, many of whom would 
be unable to afford the expense of pursuing a suit for damages, including hiring geologists and 
other expert witnesses to prove the source of damage.  These legislators had received accounts 
from landowners who had been able to prove that oil/gas drilling had caused the degradation of 
their water wells. They had also heard from people who were financially unable to try and get such 
proof. Obtaining it would cost much more than a new water well, if a new well were an option. 
The representatives who opposed assigning presumption of guilt to oil and gas drillers in this 
matter were, ironically, also concerned with water quality. One of the other provisions of the bill 
mandated the registration of new and old gas wells, so that the Department of Environmental 
Resources could better monitor them and enforce the capping of exhausted wells, in order to 
prevent the discharge of subsurface brine into surrounding bodies of water. The opposing 
representatives felt that owners of gas wells would fail to report well locations for fear of damage 
claims from water well owners.384  The debate on the House floor grew heated. In the end the bill 
passed with the protection of the rebuttal presumption allowed to water well owners. Gas well 
drilling caused enough environmental damage in the countryside, especially to water, to demand 
legislative protection for surface owners and ecosystems.  
6.3 Allegheny National Forest after the 1984 Oil and Gas Act 
Although it fell short of what environmentalists had hoped to accomplish, the passage of 
the 1984 Oil and Gas Act did provide some standards and controls for the gas industry. However, 
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in the Allegheny National Forest the new regulations did not prevent the problems that had drawn 
reformers’ attention. The Forest Service itself, which managed ANF, largely accepted drilling as 
unavoidable and beyond its power to police effectively. The management of the Service did not 
officially seek increased authority over sub-surface owners, although individual personnel 
expressed that need.   
The Forest Service managers of ANF drafted a new management plan for ANF in the mid-
1980s. The plan identified six management issues for ANF; one was “Private Oil and Gas 
Development.” The Forest Service view, stated succinctly, was:  
The private sector owns 96 percent of the oil and gas rights under the Allegheny National 
Forest. The rate of development of oil and gas deposits is expected to continue for the next 
20 years. The Forest Service is legally obliged to allow development of privately-held 
rights. The Forest Service seeks to lessen the environmental impacts of development by 
working cooperatively with developers. Alternative policies for managing development 
were not considered.385  
The only legal constraints on drillers in the forest would have been any restrictions included 
in the original mineral rights deed of sale that were negotiated by the surface owner at some time 
previous to the land’s acquisition for ANF.386  The “adverse effects that cannot be avoided” from 
oil and gas development included increased erosion and stream sedimentation from road-building, 
other water pollution, negative changes in scenic views, increased noise, and disruption of use by 
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visitors and wildlife, “to which some people may object.”387 Purchase of mineral rights was judged 
too expensive. Mitigation of drilling impact would be limited to “a cooperation and education 
approach.” The managers of ANF would also work with state and federal government to protect 
the environment.388 
Samuel P. Hays, environmental historian and activist, wrote an extensive critique of the 
ANF management plan on behalf of the Pennsylvania Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. He 
stated that the plan displayed an “unwarranted resignation to the ‘unavoidable’ environmental 
degradation of the forest by oil and gas extraction.”389 Hays characterized the forest as overly 
fragmented by roads, especially private ones that served drillers.390 He criticized the plan’s lack of 
engagement with the problems of drilling, and apparent expectation that other government 
agencies would deal with the consequent pollution.  In Hays’s view, ANF management needed 
improved systematic monitoring to assess damage to the forest, to provide hard data for “analysis, 
planning and action.” Consistent with the ideas of wilderness protection, Hays called for a plan 
that would maximize the environmental quality of areas not affected by drilling, to offset the 
degradation done in drilled areas.391 
All these efforts by conservationists, legislators, and government agencies during and after 
the passage of the 1984 Oil and Gas Act did not substantially change the threats to Allegheny 
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National Forest.  A 1991 federal congressional hearing in Pittsburgh covered all the old 
problems.392 The principal issue remained the conflict between public ownership of the ANF 
surface and the private ownership of subsurface mineral rights. The testimony described the 
ongoing environmental degradation and the legacy of past drilling. It showed the way regulating 
agencies come to identify with the needs of industries they regulate.393 It also showed how the 
designation of a business as ‘small’ or owned by the ‘little guy’ can be used to justify dubious 
practices. Conversely, it also showed the very real impact on people who had built a livelihood 
under one set of circumstances, and protested changes that threatened to sacrifice them to a larger 
good.    
Representative Peter H. Kostmayer, a Pennsylvanian Democrat then chairman of the 
federal House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, heard testimony from two panels. 
One was composed of environmental advocates—recreational users, the Pennsylvania Fish 
Commission, the Sierra Club, the Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, the Pennsylvania 
Wildlife Federation, and Trout Unlimited. The second panel included representatives of the 
government agencies responsible for various aspects of park management—the ANF supervisor, 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
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Resources (DER), and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).  Kostmayer opened 
by describing the terrible impact of energy extraction in ANF: polluted streams and dead trees 
from dumped debris and brine disposal, erosion from substandard roads, and the illegal privatizing 
of hunting rights. In his view, the Forest Service was not doing enough to enforce existing 
regulations.394 The testimony from the first panel corroborated Kostmayer’s assessment. Each 
witness, speaking on behalf of large constituencies, described worsening conditions in ANF caused 
by gas industry abuses.  
Witness Karen Atwood of the Pennsylvania State Snowmobile Association and the 
Allegheny Trail Committee had been involved in ANF affairs since the 1970s. Atwood reported 
that loggers and snowmobilers had usually shared forest roads successfully during the winter 
season, as mandated by ANF regulations. However, oil and gas developers plowed and cindered 
the roads all winter, which prevented snowmobile use. The Snowmobile Association volunteers 
had donated labor and money to benefit park roads. Snowmobilers also constructed and maintained 
trails that drilling companies then ruined on the assumption that subsurface rights superseded 
control of the surface. Businesses dependent on recreational visitors to ANF suffered when 
snowmobilers could not use the trails; they came at a time of year when few other tourists visited.  
Atwood testified that old wells in the lease area remained unplugged, and called for a halt in gas 
development until these problems were addressed.395 Atwood reported that Forest Service 
personnel wished they had more power to control gas activity’s widespread problems. She thought 
steps could be taken to reduce drilling impacts. For example, the Pennsylvania DER was 
                                                 
394 “Oil and gas operations in the Allegheny National Forest,” 4-6.  
 
395“Oil and gas operations in the Allegheny National Forest,” 7-9.  
 
 181 
responsible for overseeing sedimentation control, but they apparently had no dedicated personnel 
in the ANF. 396 Atwood stated that oil drilling had been done for a long time, and previously it was 
less disruptive. She proposed that the multiple-use policy could be managed as it was in the past.397  
John Arway represented the Pennsylvania Fish Commission, which was legally responsible 
for protection of state waterways and aquatic life. He reported that brine waste from drilling was 
a severe problem; several billion gallons annually were dumped into surface waters. Erosion and 
sedimentation were also clogging waterways. Arway called for more consistent regulation of 
development on public and private lands, with damage assessment and appropriate penalties.398  
Wyona Colman, representing the Pennsylvania Sierra Club’s 21,000 members, also argued 
that the Forest Service must take greater action to preserve the surface users’ rights, as provided 
for by law. She said that the Service approved each separate development without considering the 
cumulative effects of thousands of wells. She criticized the inadequate level of inspections. She 
claimed that many current projects were in violation of DER standards, and the companies had no 
incentive to improve. An example of laxity was a current Pennzoil project for potentially 700 wells. 
Pennzoil had begun construction of facilities before the review process was complete. Colman 
insisted that the public must also have free access to drilling locations to monitor gas activity. She 
called for an effort to acquire the sub-surface rights.399  
Two representatives of sportsmen’s organization addressed the problem of brine and other 
water pollution. Bonita Hoke, director of the Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs and 
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the Pennsylvania Wildlife Federation, demanded specific written records of where “every gallon” 
of brine went. She also reported that lease operators were gating off their drilling areas, effectively 
turning them into private hunting preserves. She called for ANF officials to speak for the “non-
commodity benefits” of recreation, and to protect the interests of the many against the few who 
profited from gas and oil resources.400 John McKown of Trout Unlimited in Warren County 
showed a video of leaking brine pollution, in his view the biggest threat to stream quality. He 
testified that even when spills and pollution were not evident, sedimentation was an ongoing 
problem, especially from clearing for roads and drill pads. McKown pointed out that even the 
careful operators do road building and earth moving.401 
Testimony from the second panel followed. Representatives of government bodies with 
authority over some aspect of ANF rebutted the previous panel’s criticisms. They focused mainly 
on the legal requirements and constraints of their duties. All stressed that negative impacts of 
drilling were the legacy of a century of industry activity. David F. Wright, ANF Supervisor, opened 
by stating that his objective was multiple-use management and environmentally sound resource 
development according to the formal plan implemented in 1986. He reiterated that oil and gas 
development long predated establishment of ANF. He stressed that the United States government 
owned subsurface rights under only 34,000 acres of ANF’s total 734,000 acres. The Forest Service 
must allow “reasonable” access to private mineral owners in the vast majority of the forest.402 
Charles Kleeman, Chief, Western Response Section of EPA, clarified and defended the 
agency’s activities in ANF. Kleeman was less interested in gas than oil. He said that 
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Pennsylvania’s DER was tasked with regulating effluent discharge by controlling permits; EPA 
only had oversight. No federal guidelines existed for discharge from ‘stripper’ oil wells that 
produced less than ten gallons per day and most ANF wells fell into that category. Pennsylvania 
was then developing a permit system to cover this particular water quality problem. Permits for 
injection wells (used for underground disposal of drilling wastewater) required drillers to plug old 
abandoned wells in their injection field. Hundreds of old wells had been plugged, but many more 
were in played-out areas of no interest to new operators, and so were not included in the program. 
The EPA had conducted regular inspections, and accomplished 95 percent of mandated mechanical 
tests. However, Kleeman pointed out that northwestern Pennsylvania was the oldest oil field in the 
nation, and old equipment was still in use. He estimated that 250,000 wells had been drilled in the 
region over the previous hundred years. The regional EPA division was at that time engaged in the 
“Northwestern Pennsylvania Major Oil Spill Project” a cleanup attempt of numerous small oil 
leaks classified for efficiency’s sake as one large spill. The EPA conducted its mission as a joint 
effort with industry “responsible parties.”  The agency had recently taken legal action against two 
large producers.403 
Colonel Harold F. Alvord, District Commander of the United States Geological Survey, 
was brief in his remarks. The USGS interest in ANF was limited to the Kinzua Flood Control 
project; Alvord declined to comment on any other aspect of the drilling issue.404 He explained that 
as part of the Kinzua project, the USGS had plugged more than one hundred old wells in the 
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planned impoundment area behind Kinzua Dam. After the lake filled, methane bubbling up from 
the bottom had at times caused thin ice, a potentially dangerous situation. Despite this and other 
risks such as oil spills, Alvord claimed that it would be too difficult and expensive to plug sources 
of gas currently under water.405  
After members of the panel had spoken, Congressman Kostmayer was evidently not 
satisfied with their testimony, especially that of ANF Supervisor Wright. Kostmayer quoted 
federal law that empowered Wright to control drilling activity:  
The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection against destruction 
and depredation upon the public forest and national forest which may have been set aside 
or which may hereafter be set aside. He may make such rules and regulations and establish 
such services as will ensure the objects of such reservations; namely, to regulate their 
occupancy and use and to preserve the forest thereon from destruction.406 
Wright protested that the quoted provision only applied when the government controlled 
all aspects of the land. It did not supersede previously held private rights. Wright explained that 
because only surface ownership of ANF was acquired in the 1920s, the Forest Service could only 
“negotiate” with the owners of subsurface rights. These owners of mineral rights essentially have 
the freedom, in fact a “constitutional right” to use the surface in any “reasonable and prudent” way 
to access their resources. Wright said, “We try to ask and work with the oil and gas operators to 
just consider the sensitivity of the environment and the ecosystem out there. We will provide the 
access to your right, but we would like to have you do that in an environmentally sound manner.” 
Wright stated that the service could negotiate and review a plan, but could not “approve” one. 
                                                 
405 “Oil and gas operations in the Allegheny National Forest,” 70-72. 
 
406 Ibid., 76. 
 185 
Furthermore, Forest Service attorneys had informed Wright that the provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act did not apply to oil and gas activity. Kostmayer replied, “It sounds to 
me as if you are saying there is not really much you can do” about the environmental problems. 
Wright disagreed, and declared that conditions had improved. He did not require more authority, 
and had all the regulatory power he needed from DER and the state Clean Water Act.407 
Stephen Rhoads, president of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Association, also testified. His 
timing in managing to speak last seemed strategic. Rhoads’s statement in defense of current 
operations in ANF was a skillful leveraging of both the values of gas industry critics and the 
concerns of those who worked and lived in the region, which included the forest managers. As 
might be expected, he stressed the economic returns from energy extraction and protested the 
current regulations as burdensome to small operators who produced oil from marginal ‘stripper 
wells.’  Rhoads supported the testimony concerning the legal position of ANF Superintendent 
Wright. However, he also used a particular environmentally-based argument to defend drilling in 
ANF. He advocated extraction in the Pennsylvania forest, already a developed region, as a better 
alternative to opening up new oil fields in wilderness such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(ANWAR).  
Rhoads stressed the economic importance of the energy industry in northwestern 
Pennsylvania to small holders and ordinary citizens, rather than corporate interests. He represented 
four hundred industry companies and individuals, a large number of which operated in ANF. He 
said that ongoing oil and gas development had brought $28 million in new investment capital to 
the region. Oil and gas development generated jobs. About a thousand employees, a quarter of the 
oil and gas industry labor force in Pennsylvania, worked in and around ANF. Oil income to small 
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landholders had a multiplier effect in the local economy, which did not offer many employment 
opportunities. The oil and gas came mainly from “classic stripper wells.” According to Rhoads, 
these were the “backbone” of Pennsylvania’s oil and gas industry.408 Rhoads claimed that the 
regulations for wastewater discharge were designed for large municipal and industrial waste 
treatment operations, not small stripper operations. He listed the expenses involved in legal 
permitting and implementation, which were $1,000 per pollution point source, and anywhere up 
to $60,000 in engineering and other professional fees.409 
Rhoads argued for support of extraction in Pennsylvania and ANF in order to protect new 
environmentally sensitive areas elsewhere from development. Rhoads strongly agreed with 
Congressman Kostmayer that stripper well reserves were the “largest domestic source of oil, 
dwarfing estimates of petroleum that might come from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(ANWAR).” He said, “Clearly the environmental risks that are associated with preserving the 
nation’s existing stripper wells infrastructure are trivial in comparison to the kinds of risks that 
you are concerned in ANWAR and offshore.”410  
Rhoads provided legal details to support Supervisor Wright’s view of the legal situation 
between ANF and the gas and oil industry. The courts, beginning with the 1893 case “Chartiers 
Block Coal Company v. Mellon, et al,” have upheld the right of drillers to determine the number 
and location of wells and any other infrastructure they deem necessary, although they are directed 
to prevent any unnecessary disturbance. A 1980 case, “Minard Run Oil Company v. United States 
of America,” dealt directly with oil and gas rights under ANF. The court upheld the subsurface 
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rights previously established. It required drillers to give the surface owner advance notice of their 
plans to drill, a map of operations, and a detailed plan including a sedimentation control plan. The 
driller must conform to legal set-back requirements. The surface owner, in turn, may not make any 
construction, such as buildings or roads, that interferes with drilling operations.  As an owner of 
surface rights, the federal government has no greater standing than any other individual owner.411 
Rhoads claimed that the definition of reasonable and prudent conduct on the part of drilling 
companies has been established by custom over the last century; the courts recognized and 
legitimated these customary performance benchmarks.412 In addition, he said, “cradle to grave” 
regulation of the drilling industry is contained in an “Oil and Gas Operators Manual” compiled by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.413 
Nevertheless, Congressman Kostmayer remained unsatisfied, and continued to interrogate 
the agency officials concerning their lack of engagement and dearth of accurate knowledge about 
environmental degradation in ANF.  Wright especially seemed more invested in the rights of 
subsurface owners. Nothing in the hearing record suggests that Wright had a personal economic 
interest in energy extraction. Was he following the well-known tendency of government agencies 
to cooperate with those whom they are supposed to regulate, especially considering the Forest 
Service’s legacy of utilitarian management? Did his stance come from a long habit of needing to 
remain on good terms with industry representatives in order to negotiate what concessions he could 
obtain? The oil and gas interests, big and little, were of course listening to Wright’s testimony. At 
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this point the record contains the following exchange: “A voice from the audience: ‘That man 
[Wright] stood up for our rights and you are putting him down. We are all here to stand up for our 
rights, and you should be too.’” “Kostmayer: ‘Mr. Wright’s job is to represent the American 
people, not the oil and gas industry.’”414 The problem is that those two categories are not mutually 
exclusive.  
6.4 Conclusion 
Pennsylvania remained friendly to the natural gas industry even after the passage of the 
state’s 1984 Oil and Gas Act. A number of factors reduced pressure for more stringent state-wide 
regulations despite the evidence of serious environmental impacts from natural gas drilling.  This 
chapter shows that the diverse groups of Appalachian scholars, grass-roots activists, and organized 
environmentalists were more focused either on the social and environmental impacts of coal 
mining, or on wilderness protection issues. Federal and state agencies working in ANF, 
Pennsylvania’s only national forest, followed a long-standing pattern of cooperation with 
extractive industry in the nation’s oldest gas and oil field. The Appalachian cases examined here 
demonstrate the priority of private property rights over a public good—even a public good 
mandated under state law.  
Are Pennsylvania’s Appalachian gas fields an energy sacrifice zone, part of Appalachia’s 
economic existence as an internal colony? John Alexander Williams, preeminent Appalachian 
historian for nearly half a century, considers that the colonial characterization works better as an 
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analogy than an analysis, but is nevertheless an important concept in understanding what has 
happened in Appalachia and why.415 Writing during the 1970s, Williams concluded that those who 
made the colonialism  argument, whether they leaned toward socialist or capitalist solutions, left 
out important points, among them the culture and agency of the inhabitants themselves. 
Appalachians are not merely oppressed by American power, they are Americans. Williams’s 
evaluation is borne out by the people and events described in this chapter, and the previous one. 
 The defenders and opponents of gas drilling, resident and non-resident, shared a larger 
cultural legacy. They used each other’s arguments, not only strategically, but honestly based on a 
shared set of assumptions. Among these are the value of individualism and self-reliance as 
represented by the ‘small independent operator,’ and the sanctity of private property with the 
expectation of a return on investment (which includes the investment of time and emotion). 
Although they were divided on the issue of conservation versus preservation, they shared a 
worldview that ‘nature’ was categorically a space that excluded humans except as visitors.  
The environmental activists and forest visitors shared a landscape with the farmers, drillers, 
and government officials. That landscape contained an immensely valuable geologic inheritance, 
and a physical legacy of extractive industry. It represented a legal system that had accreted over 
time. These, the physical landscape of the mountains, the long legacy of extraction, as well as the 
long legacy of culture, were the structures that constrained the possible responses to the immediate 
concerns of the day.  
These long-term structures limited the choices available to stakeholders in the 
Appalachians. For example, many thousands of acres of sub-surface mineral rights were already 
                                                 
415 “Appalachia as Colony and as Periphery: A Review Essay,” Appalachian Journal 6, no. 2 (Winter 1979), 157-
161, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40932702.  
 
 190 
owned by energy concerns before the drilling boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Legal 
decisions dating back to the 19th century gave the owners of sub-surface rights precedence over 
interests of surface owners. This was true even on land where the surface was owned by the federal 
government. Subsurface owners were merely enjoined to avoid unnecessary waste and to use due 
consideration of the surface owner’s interests.  
Stakeholders were caught up in more pressing issues—other environmental concerns, the 
energy crisis, a changing federal regulatory climate, and economic hardship.  Under the 
circumstances, natural gas was a less-threatening part of the business of extraction than other fossil 
fuels, with the caveat that it should be done properly. Indeed, that last sentence accurately describes 
the attitude many Pennsylvanians had toward the industry at the beginning of the Marcellus gas 
boom in 2007, and still have now. The 1984 Oil and Gas Act, the result of attempts to see that gas 
drilling was done as well as possible, was certainly better than no regulation at all. However, it did 
not significantly change the prevailing conditions that facilitated the extraction of natural gas in 
Appalachian Pennsylvania. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
This is a significant, and obviously testable, hypothesis: did any of the political or cultural 
movements to temper human action in relation to their surroundings demonstrably change 
the course of human history, or are the forces of technology, energy use, capitalism, and 
long-standing philosophies of property ownership largely unaffected? Reduced very nearly 
ad absurdum, the question becomes: did environmentalism matter? The Mid-Atlantic 
might be an excellent place to test any answer to these questions . . . Environmental crisis, 
never too far away, always serves to refocus our interest in a history that explores the 
foundations and preconditions of that crisis, and while Marcellus shale is our current 
motivation, the next crisis is surely just around the corner.416  
In my work, I consider some of the reasons—Longhurst’s “foundations and 
preconditions”—that explain why Pennsylvania remained particularly open to natural gas drilling 
in the Marcellus play despite two centuries of experience with the impact from gas and from 
extractive industry of all kinds. True, the adverse effects of an earlier Pennsylvania gas boom 
following the 1978 federal price deregulation prompted activism that resulted in a new and more 
restrictive state gas law. The Pennsylvania 1984 Oil and Gas Act was an improvement from an 
environmental viewpoint. However, it did not really do much to protect people and the 
environment, as shown by the persistence of the same problems from gas drilling over the last fifty 
years. To answer Longhurst’s question in brief, it appears that environmentalism concerning gas 
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extraction was not very effective.  I conclude, to use Longhurst’s succinct summary of modern 
structures, that “the forces of technology, energy use, capitalism, and long-standing philosophies 
of property ownership [were] largely unaffected” by mid-twentieth century efforts, such as they 
were, to regulate natural gas drilling. 
 Furthermore, the mid-Atlantic does offer particular insight into the evolution of extractive 
energy industries, especially in southwestern Pennsylvania, an early source of all three major fossil 
fuels. The region’s landscape is a palimpsest. Current land uses overlay the evidence of previous 
human actions, and some records in the body of this large physical text are more visible than others. 
Interposed with the agricultural, rural, and urban built environments are the mines, wells, and other 
accumulated structures of fossil fuel extraction. Each subsequent activity added a layer to the 
complex picture—layers in time and in physical space. The landscape preserves records that may 
otherwise be overlooked or forgotten. 
The Pennsylvania landscape also displays the entangled connections between various 
aspects of fossil fuel extraction and use. A coal seam could be a marker of likely gas sources, 
therefore a positive factor in gas production. But coal mining could also produce acid that 
contributed to the failure of a gas well casing, and leave behind an underground cavern with 
potential to accumulate dangerously leaking gas. Wells can produce natural gas and salty water, 
and so, depending on the era and area, drillers who wanted the brine for salt production had a gas 
problem, while drillers who wanted gas had a brine problem. These ironies are representative of 
the larger contradictions inherent in the use of fossil fuels, which both support and threaten global 
industrial civilization. 
A distinct pattern emerged from the Pennsylvania case studies in these chapters about 
prevailing public attitudes for and against gas extraction, and public desire to regulate the gas 
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industry. The studies show that a difference existed between efforts to protect public commons 
versus private property. Generally, (with some exceptions) people tended to defend their commons 
against the gas industry, but were more likely to support gas extraction on private land, as well as 
on public property that administrators could treat like private land. The exception is in the 
Pittsburgh metropole, where private and public interests were harder to distinguish and where the 
existing infrastructure of gas created a level of practical and technical determinism. The pattern 
was also affected by the differing policies and power of federal, state, and local leadership.  These 
differences helped shape public perceptions of what constituted a common good, versus a 
legitimate opportunity for private gain.  
The effect of gas drilling on water quality was—then as now—the most important incentive 
for tighter regulation of the gas industry. Private citizens defended their common interest in 
protecting the drinking water supply, especially because water cannot be contained by the 
boundaries of private property. Water that smelled and tasted bad or actually caught fire attracted 
the notice of legislators and mainstream environmental organizations that otherwise paid minimal 
attention to gas’s environmental impact.  
Citizens and their local officials objected to gas drilling that would impact their common 
interest in preserving the recreational value of public land. Residents near Lake Erie and the 
Allegheny National Forest valued these public areas and in many cases worked to improve the 
quality of the recreational facilities. Municipal leaders and business owners who were struggling 
to diversify the economy in the deindustrializing northeast were anxious to attract tourism dollars. 
Mainstream environment organizations, seeing beyond the economic benefits of recreational use, 
also valued the ecosystems involved.  Of course, none of these particular stakeholders had a 
financial incentive to facilitate drilling, quite the contrary.   
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 On the other hand, public initiatives to restrict gas drilling on private property were more 
limited. Property owners in both rural Appalachia and urban Erie expected to have the right to 
profit from natural gas discoveries. They wanted to be fairly compensated and not subject to 
unnecessary hazards, but they were on the whole more concerned with the possibility of losing out 
to their neighbors. The fungible nature and uncertain quantities of the gas supply fed this fear. 
Certainly the Pennsylvania Citizens Advisory Council and the Pennsylvania Citizen Coalition for 
Responsible Oil and Gas Legislation advocated better standards for drilling practices. However, 
unlike the effort to ban drilling in Lake Erie, they did not work to prevent gas drilling. Of course, 
the lake had none of ANF’s long-established private property rights and customary practices that 
privileged drilling. 
Pennsylvania’s citizens had several reasons to view gas drilling in a positive light compared 
to other energy sources. Perhaps the most important reason was the role of natural gas in the fight 
to clean up Pittsburgh’s smoky air. Concerning fossil fuel pollution more generally, in all five case 
studies examined here natural gas was viewed as less harmful to the environment than oil or coal. 
In addition, other more pressing concerns eclipsed gas. Issues of social justice did not influence 
public opinion toward stricter control of drilling. In the case of Erie’s poor, ruinous energy prices 
and an identity based on self-reliance contributed to a positive view of gas extraction. In 
Appalachia, poverty correlated with energy extraction and an economy with colonial analogs. 
Nevertheless, those investigating systemic poverty in Appalachia’s energy landscape targeted 
other causes—mining, logging, and mismanaged federal regulations—not natural gas extraction. 
State-wide, concerns about land use and the environment focused on the damage caused by coal 
mining, and problems of the built environment—roads, suburbs, factories, power plants, and waste 
disposal facilities.   
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Despite the differing positions and agendas of the stakeholders in natural gas issues, they 
shared some broad assumptions about two basic concepts—property rights and the natural 
environment. In the argument over protection of natural resources, rights can go two ways: the 
right to sell resources in the name of personal and community economic development, or the right 
to limit resource extraction in the name of personal and community quality of life. Advocates on 
both sides argued for their rights as individuals and sharers in a commons. Stakeholders also shared 
a basic idea about ‘nature,’ especially wilderness, as a space that primarily excludes human beings 
except as visitors. Environmental activists unsurprisingly focused on the desirability of wilderness 
protection, which had gained greater importance than wise-use conservationism during the mid-
century environmental movement. However, advocates for the gas industry also leveraged 
prevailing ideas about wilderness to defend industry activity in ANF. They argued that drilling 
ANF, a space with a long history of extraction and therefore not truly wild, was better than opening 
up pristine Alaskan wilderness to drilling.  
This project is an initial effort to examine the actions and motivations of numerous 
stakeholders involved in natural gas extraction, and to investigate how they influenced the 
conditions that eventually governed the Marcellus boom. Considering the nearly complete lack of 
scholarly attention to gas drilling in the last third of the twentieth century (except for the federal 
price control controversy), a significant part of the story is not yet told.  A more complete picture 
might be gained by a closer examination of groups this work so far only touched upon. One such 
group, for example, is the operators of “stripper wells.” They were the local oil and gas producers 
that persisted in operating marginal wells after Pennsylvania was no longer the major gas and oil 
producing state. Their presence shows that the drilling industry was not a monolithic category. The 
major gas producers hid behind them, in a sense. The spokesman for the national petroleum and 
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gas organization, which represented major industry players, objected to more stringent regulations 
that posed unacceptable economic hardships for what were essentially ‘mom and pop’ operations. 
These wells generated small returns, but they also produced serious pollution. However, in 
Pennsylvania their owners were numerous and commanded some public sympathy as beleaguered 
‘little guys’. The plight of independent small-scale producers was one more factor that worked 
against state efforts to reduce the environmental impact of gas extraction, and so kept Pennsylvania 
driller-friendly. In addition, stripper activity added to the gas pipeline infrastructure that helped 
facilitate the recent boom.  
Another group worth further investigation is rural women, who complicate the idea of 
farmers as a homogenous block.  Their story may be somewhat difficult to separate from other 
rural actors. Nevertheless, given the role of women environmentalists—concerning coal mining 
and air pollution issues, for example—this is a narrative I intend to pursue. Certainly the advice to 
landmen about avoiding the ladies indicates that the industry believed women did not always view 
drilling in the same light that men did. Women complained about pollution. An important related 
investigation beyond the scope of this work is a digital mapping project of citizen complaints. It 
will correlate reports of suspected drilling pollution with existing data bases of oil and gas well 
locations, and also with county-level patterns of health problems. The complaints, housed at the 
Pennsylvania State Archives, are in the form of letters and memos received by regional state 
agencies, such as the northeastern division of the Bureau of Oil and Gas Management, which 
became part of the Pennsylvania Department of Natural Resources. The memos usually include 
the name and address of the person—often a woman—who contacted the agency, the date and 
location of the problem, and any action taken by the state. The data from the documents may show 
correlations between gender, official response, and health issues in areas with high well numbers. 
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The letters and memos may represent the voices of individuals who were affected by drilling, but 
not in ways that were obvious or dramatic enough to make the news.  
The history of natural gas in Pennsylvania has larger implications than local impacts, as 
the need to reduce fossil fuel use grows more urgent. That history can provide a clearer 
understanding of the factors that drive or impede energy transitions, the significant shifts between 
primary energy sources. The inescapable continuities and contingencies of Pennsylvania’s energy 
legacy demonstrate that these factors are necessary for a complete story of the transitions. Over 
the last 150 years, the factors that influenced the choice of a particular fuel started with economics, 
but also included contingencies like national politics, local activism, unexpected discoveries, 
technical developments, available infrastructure, corporate power and public awareness.417  
People need sources of fuel to power their lives, yet each type of energy extraction and use 
has a long-lasting physical effect on the environment. Each comes with disadvantages and 
unintended consequences. In western Pennsylvania, one increasingly important energy source has 
on occasion quite literally exploded underfoot. The threat of climate change makes clear the urgent 
need to accomplish an energy transition away from fossil fuels. In that transition, natural gas is 
likely to play a key role. The history of natural gas in Pennsylvania is therefore a valuable source 
of insight concerning that global problem.  Among the persistent legacies of Pennsylvania’s energy 
history is a particular habit of mind. Although people may be aware of problems, they seem by 
long habit to get used to them, just learn to live with them, if they even feel like they have a choice. 
The layering of coal and rural and urban settlement with gas extraction has rendered people 
accustomed or oblivious to serious dangers from the use of fossil fuels. The activities and 
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infrastructure of the gas industry in Westmoreland County or South Park did not seem out of the 
ordinary to real estate developers or the people living there.  Energy infrastructure that once made 
sense may become more dangerous over time, without nearby people really noticing it. That habit 
of mind is a local example of a very widespread attitude, in which it is possible to ignore the 
hazards of fossil fuels because using them feels so normal and inevitable.  That feeling may not be 
the least of the factors impeding the next energy transition. The public and political will in 
America, at the moment, does not appear sufficient to seize the opportunities for new ways to 
power global civilization.  
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